Problems of Communism

Book Reviews

William Treharne Jones

Stephen R. Bowers

Jane P. Shapiro

Ramon H. Myers

MARCH–APRIL 1978



THE GDR IN THE 1970's

Hartmut Zimmermann

Eurocommunism and Eastern Europe

Jiri Valenta

The East European Economies

Alfred Zauberman

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Problems of Communism

2

MARCH-APRIL 1978 VOL XXVII

Problems of Communism is a bimonthly publication providing analyses and significant information about the contemporary affairs of the Soviet Union, China, and comparable states and political movements. Views of contributors, as well as geographic boundaries and names, do not necessarily reflect the policies of the United States Government.

On all editorial matters, communications should be addressed to: The Editors, *Problems of Communism,* International Communication Agency, United States of America, 1776 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Washington, DC, 20547, USA. Telephone: (202) 724-9801.

On subscriptions, communications should be addressed to: The Superintendent of Documents, US Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 20402, USA, preferably using the subscription form provided on the inside back cover of this issue. Outside the United States, please address inquiries to the Public Affairs Section, Embassy of the United States of America.

Copyright: Reproduction or republication of texts from *Problems of Communism* is permissible, and no claim of copyright is asserted. However, the Editors request that they be advised of reprint usage and that source credit be given both to the authors of individual articles and to *Problems of Communism.* Should textual items in the journal ever be subject to a claim of copyright, such claim will be clearly stated. Graphics and pictures which carry a credit line are not necessarily owned by *Problems of Communism,* and users bear responsibility for obtaining appropriate permissions.

An annual index for Problems of Communism appears in the November-December issue (No. 6) of each year except in the case of the first three volumes, which are covered in a combined index in the November-December issue (No. 6) of Vol. III. Material from the journal is also indexed in *ABC POL SCI, Bibliographie Internationale des Sciences Sociales* (all sections), *Current Contents, Economic Abstracts, Historical Abstracts, Index to US Government Periodicals, International Political Science Abstracts, Public Affairs Information Service, Social Sciences Index, Social Sciences Citation Index, Strategic Studies Reference Guide,* and *United States Political Science Documents.*

1 The GDR in the 1970's
by Hartmut Zimmermann

41 Eurocommunism and Eastern Europe
by Jiri Valenta

55 The East European Economies
by Alfred Zauberman

BOOKS

70 East German Literature
by William Treharne Jones

78 Youth Policies in the GDR
by Stephen R. Bowers

83 Biographies of Communist Leaders
by Jane P. Shapiro

86 Scarcity and Ideology in Chinese Economic Development
by Ramon H. Myers

Cover: Successive chiefs of the GDR's Socialist Unity Party, Walter Ulbricht (left) and Erich Honecker. Photo by Pictorial Parade.

EDITOR
Paul A. Smith, Jr.
SENIOR EDITOR (TEXT) David E. Albright
SENIOR EDITOR (MANAGEMENT) Wayne Hall
ASSOCIATE EDITORS
Paul A. Shapiro
Peter Hauslohner
PRODUCTION ASSISTANT Edith Born
DESIGNER Gary Soderstrom

PRODUCED 2003 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The GDR in the 1970's

By Hartmut Zimmermann

The negotiation of the Basic Treaty between the two German states and the conclusion of the Four-Power Agreement on Berlin in 1972, the introduction of domestic policies intended to bring about sociopolitical improvements and to promote the formulation of "realistic" economic objectives, and, finally, a situation of relative openness in the cultural field created the impression during the early 1970's that the domestic situation in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) had stabilized. Over the last two years, however, this impression has become subject to doubt. After the signing of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, convened in Helsinki in 1975, and the conclusion of the meeting of European communist parties held in East Berlin in 1976, applications by citizens of the GDR for permission to emigrate to the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) increased, and journalists and other observers reported that the "man in the street" was showing growing dissatisfaction and greater willingness to criticize the regime.[1] The forcible deprivation of citizenship of communist songwriter Wolf Biermann in 1976 and the subsequent subjection of more than 100 artists and performers who spoke out in his favor to disciplinary measures—ranging from party penalties and arrest to expulsion to the FRG—was the first concrete demonstration of the GDR leadership's resolve to counter the symptoms of a process of inner erosion.[2] Even so, in 1977 some East German writers continued to publish critical comments on the GDR in West German newspapers and periodicals. In addition, statements of an explicitly political-programmatic nature began to appear.

The most prominent of these statements by authors living in the GDR was the book by Rudolf Bahro which appeared in the FRG under the programmatic title *The Alternative: A Critique of Actually Existing Socialism*. Bahro is a member and functionary of the East German Socialist Unity Party (*Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands*—SED) who sees himself

Mr. Zimmermann is head of the office for GDR Research and Archives of the Central Institute for Social Scientific Research, Free University (West Berlin). His articles on the political and social development of the GDR, the functions of mass organizations (especially trade unions), and the political-ideological concept of the scientific-technological revolution have appeared in such publications as Deutschland Archiv, Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, and DDR-Handbuch, 1975. *At present, he is engaged in major studies of changes in the social structure and of the post-1955 political-social history of the GDR.*

[1] An impression of the nature of reporting from the GDR and of how discussions are conducted there can be gained from Lothar Loewe, *Abends kommt der Klassenfeind* (The Class Enemy Comes by Night), Frankfurt/Main—Berlin (West)—Vienna, Verla Ullstein, 1977. Until his expulsion on Dec. 12, 1976, Loewe worked in East Berlin as correspondent of the West German ARD Television Network. On May 25, 1977, he reported his impressions and experiences in the GDR to the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe of the US Congress. The minutes of his testimony are contained in his book and in US Congress, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, *Basket III: Implementation of the Helsinki Accords*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1977, Vol. 3, pp. 164-76.

In the beginning, state authorities of the GDR were uncertain how to react to applications to leave the country. Later, those who applied as a rule lost their jobs and received other employment only in exceptional cases. On this, see Manfred Rexin, "Human Rights and Détente," in Jiri Pelikan and Manfred Wilke, *Menschenrechte: Ein Jahrbuch zu Osteuropa* (Human Rights: A Yearbook on Eastern Europe), Reinbeck b. Hamburg, Rowohlt Taschenbuchverlag, 1977, pp. 35 ff., esp. pp. 40 f. On his personal experience in this regard, see Reinhard Behr, "We Have Always Laid Our Cards on the Table," *Berliner Hefte* (Berlin [West]), No. 5, 1977, pp. 3 ff.

[2] East and West German mass media publications on these events are collected in a special 1977 issue of the journal *Europäische Ideen* (Berlin [West]) entitled "On Wolf Biermann" and edited by Andreas W. Mytze. On events preceding his exclusion and for an extensive bibliography of publications by and on Biermann, see Thomas Rothschild, Ed., *Wolf Biermann: Liedermacher und Sozialist* (Wolf Biermann: Songwriter and Socialist), Reinbeck b. Hamburg, Rowohlt Taschenbuchverlag, 1976.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Rudolf Bahro, East German Communist and factory official, author of the controversial Die Alternative: Zur Kritik des real existierenden Sozialismus *(The Alternative: A Critique of Actually Existing Socialism).*

—Der Spiegel

as within the tradition of a critical, enlightening Marxism. He doubts that existing Soviet-type socialist systems and parties are capable of inner reform and therefore demands the creation of a new "League of Communists" as the only possible means to fulfill the emancipatory aims of Marxian socialism in its struggle against bureaucratically rigid power structures.[3] Although Bahro openly admitted writing *The Alternative,* he was charged with having acted for the Federal Intelligence Service (*Bundesnachrichtendienst)* of the FRG and has since been under arrest.

At the beginning of 1978, the West German news magazine *Der Spiegel* published another programmatic paper, entitled "Manifesto of the First Organized Opposition in the GDR."[4] The first part of the manifesto, which encompasses an extraordinary variety of diverse and contradictory positions, is pervaded by a pronounced anti-Soviet attitude and also by demands for the restoration of a unified German state. While the individuals and interests responsible for the paper have not been clearly identified even as of the present writing, the political leadership of the GDR reacted vigorously both domestically and vis-à-vis the FRG. The office of *Der Spiegel* in East Berlin was closed, and the leader of the Christian Democrat/Christian Social (CDU/CSU) opposition in the West German *Bundestag* and other members of the *Bundestag* were denied entry from West into East Berlin. In addition, the conflict over the manifesto has exacerbated the many differences of interpretation and application that arose soon after the conclusion of the various treaties between the two German states and the Four-Power Agreement on Berlin,[5] and it is threatening to obstruct progress for some time to come in the long-delayed bilateral negotiations which began in late 1977 aimed at the formulation of new treaty regulations on matters which have remained unresolved between the GDR and the FRG. The conflict may even raise fundamental questions about the potentialities and limitations of détente. Inside the GDR, where, as had been the case with Bahro's theses, the contents of the manifesto became known through dissemination by the West German mass media and through the circulation of individual copies of the text which found their way into the GDR, as well as duplications of those copies, the manifesto has ap-

[3] Rudolf Bahro, *Die Alternative: Zur Kritik des real existierenden Sozialismus* (The Alternative: A Critique of Actually Existing Socialism), Köln—Frankfurt/Main, Europäische Verlagsanstalt, 1977; and idem, *Eine Dokumentation* (A Documentation), Köln—Frankfurt/Main, Europäische Verlagsanstalt, 1977. A theoretically-oriented publication written mainly in the GDR and with similar tendencies had appeared earlier. Its author finished it in the FRG, after fleeing the GDR. See Peter Lübbe, *Der staatlich etablierte Sozialismus: Zur Kritik des staatsmonopolistischen Sozialismus* (Established State Socialism: A Critique of State Monopoly Socialism), Hamburg, Verlag Hoffmann und Campe, 1975.

[4] "We Are Against One-Party Dictatorship: The Manifesto of the First Organized Opposition in the GDR," *Der Spiegel* (Hamburg), Jan. 2, 1978, pp. 21 ff.; and "Corruption Wherever You Look: The Manifesto of the First Organized Opposition in the GDR, Part 2," ibid., Jan. 9, 1978, pp. 26 ff. The second part of the so-called manifesto mainly contains reports on the personal affairs of the political leadership of the GDR. As a rule, the leadership is particularly sensitive to this sort of publication and reacts accordingly. In December 1975, for instance, when correspondent Jörg R. Mettke published an article in *Der Spiegel* on Wandlitz, a suburb of Berlin where the top politicians of the GDR live secluded, he was expelled from the country.

[5] See, for the point of view of the government of the FRG, Bundesministerium für innerdeutsche Beziehungen, *Die Entwicklung der Beziehungen zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, 1969-1976: Bericht und Dokumentation* (The Development of Relations between the FRG and the GDR, 1969-1976: A Report and Documentation), Bonn, 1977; also, "Answer of the Federal Government to the Inquiry of the CDU/CSU Faction" and "Policy on Germany," respectively Papers 8/118 and 8/255 of the 8th Term of the German *Bundestag,* April 4, 1977. These papers are published by Verlag Dr. Hans Heger, Bonn—Bad Godesberg.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

parently been the subject of lively discussion. Its contents have been forcefully rejected by the party in meetings of its members.

Recent developments such as these and the tendencies they reflect, as well as their possible consequences, require an examination of those aspects of the domestic situation in the GDR which may explain or at least clarify the reactions of the SED leadership. While the present essay cannot be as complete and detailed as might be desirable, even a generalized and fragmented survey may contribute to a better understanding of the political and social context within which the present East German party and state leadership is operating. However, before attempting to pass judgment on the present leadership's achievements and difficulties, it is necessary to cast a retrospective glance at the conditions which prevailed in the GDR at the end of the Ulbricht era in 1971. For the replacement of Walter Ulbricht as First Secretary of the SED by Erich Honecker at the 16th Plenum of the Central Committee of the party on May 3, 1971, took place in a context of domestic social difficulties—mainly related to problems of economic policy—and of differences with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) over foreign policy and ideological issues. These conditions shaped the situation within which the new leadership of the SED—new by virtue of a reshuffling more than a replacement of leading cadres—under First Secretary Erich Honecker (General Secretary since the Ninth SED Congress in 1976) has had to operate since it assumed the reins of power.

THE ULBRICHT ERA

Technology and Economic Reform

In 1963 the GDR became the first member state of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) to begin a comprehensive economic reform, when it introduced the "New Economic System for Planning and Managing the Economy" (*Neuen Okonomischen System der Planung und Leitung der Volkswirtschaft*—NOSPL).[6] This pioneering role fell to the GDR not least because it was the most highly developed and differentiated state industrially in the Soviet orbit. As a result, its economic development was being hampered more severely than that of other CMEA countries by the unsatisfactory planning system of the Stalin era, at the same time

The late Walter Ulbricht, seen at his January 1970 East Berlin news conference, where he responded to West German Chancellor Willy Brandt's proposal to open the Berlin Wall to permit family reunions.

—Pictorial Parade

that its performance was being challenged directly and in a special way by the "economic miracle" of the FRG. The existing planning system, its functional weaknesses aside, was intended mainly to produce *extensive* economic growth. Thus, it could not help but be particularly dysfunctional in the GDR, where by the mid-1950's the most significant damages resulting from World War II had been overcome and further economic development had become increasingly dependent on the more *intensive* use of production factors. To a lesser degree, other CMEA members faced similar problems, so that by the mid-1950's they, too, were wondering whether or not to

[6] On the economic reforms of the GDR and their comparison with similar developments elsewhere in Eastern Europe, see Karl C. Thalheim and Hans-Hermann Höhmann, Eds., *Wirtschaftsreformen in Osteuropa* (Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe), Köln, Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1968; and the very informative article by Peter Mitzscherling of the GDR in Hans-Hermann Höhmann, Ed., *Die Wirtschaft Osteuropas zu Beginn der siebziger Jahre* (The Economy of Eastern Europe at the Beginning of the 1970's), Stuttgart, Verlag W. Kohlhammer, 1972, pp. 52 ff., esp. pp. 56 ff.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

follow the example of the Western capitalist states in establishing as goals the pursuit of technological progress, economic growth, and the related rise of a consumer society.

The question clearly evoked an affirmative answer from the CPSU under Nikita Khrushchev and, subsequently, from the SED. Atomic energy, automation, electronic data-processing, the development of new chemical sources of synthetic raw materials, and the like appeared initially to the party leaderships of Eastern Europe to offer qualitatively new possibilities for achieving in a short time a level of development where strenuous physical labor would no longer be necessary, the differences between physical and mental labor would be reduced, and the satisfaction of all socially relevant needs would be guaranteed—i.e., "communist society" seemed to have come within reach. These hopes, summarized in the politico-ideological concept "scientific-technological revolution," were thereafter to determine the policies of communist parties in CMEA member states, and especially those of the SED.[7]

The first visible conclusions drawn from acceptance of the concept of scientific-technological revolution affected the sciences. Previously banned empirical, or "positivist," disciplines of the organizational and social sciences—sociology, organization theory, cybernetics, etc.—were now permitted, and ideological interference in technological and natural scientific research was reduced. The resulting diversity of disciplines in turn had repercussions on the core structure and elaboration of Marxist-Leninist ideology in the countries involved. Within the poorly developed theoretical framework of the "political economy of socialism," for example, a great number of applied disciplines like economic management, political economy, and planning sciences evolved which were often connected only loosely, if at all, with the Marxist-Leninist ideological nucleus. This lack of integration of the "new" scientific disciplines into the ideological context of Marxism-Leninism facilitated the adoption of relevant methods and results of the so-called bourgeois sciences. But it also permitted cybernetics, systems theory, and other such disciplines to be used to develop autonomous explanations and interpretations of social and political relations, which, though claiming to be in conformity with ideological dogmas, in fact replaced them as paradigmatic interpretations and/or reinterpreted them.[8]

The economic reforms implemented in the GDR in the 1960's represented an attempt to create a flexible system of planning and management capable of responding to technological innovations or even of producing such innovations. Greater autonomy was accorded individual enterprises, the number of quantitative norms and other requirements to be fulfilled by the separate industrial units was reduced, the financial instruments for guiding and controlling the economic process were improved, and the development of a functional price system capable of assessing individual economic performance was attempted. At the same time, new research capacities were created, and the search was begun for an optimal organizational framework which would guarantee that research results were made available to production on an ongoing and rapid basis. The goal clearly envisaged in these attempts at reform was to introduce an economic system which was both efficient and capable of innovation, while at the same time maintaining the modes of exercising and maintaining power to which the SED leadership had become accustomed. Pursuit of this goal has remained the principal political and economic task in the GDR, for as yet no satisfactory solution to the problems involved has been found.

Economic Reform and Social Conflict

While material incentives to stimulate individual and factory performance have always played a prominent role in Soviet-type systems, they became the *primary* source of motivation, the decisive "economic lever," of the economic reform efforts of the GDR. Of course, the individual worker measures his material interest in improved work performance mainly in terms of how far it translates into greater personal puchasing power and a higher living standard.[9] In the GDR, he has tended to develop a con-

[7] The following discussion of the substance and sociopolitical consequences of the concept of scientific-technological revolution is based on the more detailed exposition in Hartmut Zimmermann, "Political Aspects of the Development, Change, and Application of the Concept of Scientific-Technological Revolution in the GDR," *Deutschland Archiv* (Köln—hereafter *DA*), Special Volume 1976, pp. 17 ff.

[8] Ibid., pp. 23 f. Concerning the societal concepts based on cybernetics and systems theory, see, in particular, Peter Christian Ludz, *Parteielite im Wandel* (Party Elite in Transition), 3rd ed., Köln—Opladen, Westdeutscher Verlag, 1970, pp. 294 ff.; idem, "Political Aspects of Cybernetic Systems Theory in the GDR," *DA*, No. 1, 1968, pp. 1 ff.; and idem, "Marxism and Systems Theory in a Bureaucratic Society," *Social Research* (New York, NY), No. 4, 1975, pp. 661 ff.

[9] Information on the effects of the principle of material incentives can be found in Frank Grätz and Dieter Voigt, "The Influence of Material Stimuli on Social Structural Change in the Course of the Scientific-Technological Revolution in the GDR," *DA*, Special Volume 1976, pp. 119 ff.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sumer attitude comparable to that of his peers in the West—a development fostered by the lack of alternative practicable guidelines concerning what a "correct," "socialist" life-style should be. The "Ten Commandments of Socialist Morality" proclaimed by Ulbricht in 1958 and incorporated into the program of the SED from the Sixth (1963) to the Ninth (1976) Party Congresses, by virtue of their idealistic aloofness from the realities of life, could not constitute such guidelines; they simply made the lack of them more obvious. Neither the discussion of ethics and morality which followed these authoritative statements, nor the more or less simultaneous research into supply and consumption patterns was particularly successful in giving "socialist" substance to the planning or utilization of consumer goods production. An orientation toward the consumption habits, fashions, and living standards of "inimical" Western bourgeois society remained determinant.

The resulting attachment of self-proclaimed East German development aims to standards set by the "enemy" had negative consequences in at least three areas. First, a demoralizing effect was unavoidable in the long run if, in spite of the efforts made, living standards set in such a manner could not be attained. Second, the emergence of a consumer attitude comparable to that in the West necessarily led to the rise of many phenomena similar to characteristics of Western social systems which continued to be the object of constant attack—e.g., a lack of interest in political and social affairs, retreat into the private sphere, and specific forms of criminality. Finally, the use of Western standards made it more and more difficult to sustain a credible propaganda position alleging "fundamental differences" between East and West and the existence of the "friend-foe relationship" on which the legitimacy of the political system of the GDR was based.

In addition, wages based on performance could only be accepted by the workers as "just" and therefore legitimate if it was clear to them which parameters were used to measure performance and how the individual could influence the way in which he was evaluated by what he did or left undone. But the highly complicated wage system introduced in the GDR in the 1960's, with its numerous supplements, premiums, etc., soon proved beyond the comprehension of those concerned. To the individual, wage levels were bound to appear to have been imposed arbitrarily from above if they were not the result of an openly organized bargaining process in which opposing social interests were taken into consideration. The very complexity of the compensation system, however, during a period of labor scarcity provided both managers and highly qualified workers with opportunities to conclude especially advantageous work contracts. As a result, the wage scale became so widely differentiated that it hardly fulfilled the economic functions for which it had been designed. Moreover, the performance of the individual worker remained largely dependent on the efficiency of the managing bodies placed above him. Deficits of raw materials, poor equipment procurement, lack of spare parts, etc.—all disruptive factors beyond his control—limited the worker's capacity to make full use of his skills.

The worker's sense of being left out was further heightened by the logic of the "scientific-technological revolution," which ascribed a special sociopolitical value to the "intelligentsia," that found expression in the establishment of better material conditions for this element of society. Those who had received scientific training and had thereby become representatives of the "productive force of science" were expected to give decisive impulses to societal development. But the special privileges granted this group—such as preferential apportionment to them of new apartments—put others in the society at a disadvantage and made them feel neglected and discriminated against.

Even automation and the full mechanization of production, on which especially high hopes had been placed by worker and manager alike, failed for the most part to yield the expected results, i.e., the improvement of working conditions, the reduction of heavy physical labor, the replacement of activities requiring only low qualification levels by "creative" tasks, etc.[10] The introduction of new technological processes was found to require much greater expense and much more time than had been anticipated at the outset. Changed work patterns involving the reduced use of worker qualifications, increased job monotony, and psychic stress also resulted. Finally, more and more of the new plants in which large sums of money had been invested had to be run in several shifts in order to make the investment profitable. Shift work in an economy like that of the GDR, with its supply bottlenecks and insufficient transport and service infrastructures, generated pressing social problems which were most difficult

[10] On the development of work conditions in the GDR, see, inter alia, Axel Bust-Bartels, "The Development of Selected Work Conditions in the GDR," *Prokla* (Berlin[West]), No. 27, 1977, pp. 41 ff.; and Jürgen Strassburger, "Some Aspects of the Effects of Scientific-Technological Progress on Material Work Conditions in Industrial Production in the GDR," *DA*, Special Volume 1976, pp. 95 ff.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to solve. Not the least important among these related to the role of women in society.

As a means of attaining the sociopolitical goal of equal rights for men and women, but also in order to mobilize additional labor reserves in view of existing labor scarcity, the GDR has always especially encouraged work by women. The policy of consciously promoting the role women have to play has led not only to a nearly complete integration of all women capable of work into the production process, but also to substantially higher levels of education and better chances for advancement for them.[11] These successes, however, also gave rise to increasingly serious social problems. The traditional conception of the woman's role in the family changed very slowly, while the desire of women for advancement met opposition in the male-dominated societal hierarachies, which could only be overcome—if at all—by performing visibly better than male competitors. The resulting multiple demands made on women at work *and* in the family often led to psychic and physical stress. At the same time, rising incomes enabled more and more women to switch to part-time jobs, an undesirable development in terms of social and economic policy. A rising divorce rate in the GDR, the difficulties of child-rearing which resulted (despite the existence of a well-developed network of nurseries and kindergartens), and a falling birth rate were indicative of the sorts of social

[11] On problems and effects of female labor in the GDR, see Gisela Helwig, *Zwischen Familie und Beruf: Die Stellung der Frau in Beiden deutschen Staaten* (Between Family and Career: The Position of Women in the Two German States), Köln, Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1974; idem, *Frau '75: Bundesrepublik Deutschland—DDR* (Women '75: Federal Republic of Germany—GDR), Köln, Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1975; and Jutta Menschik and Evelyn Leopold, *Gretchens rote Schwestern: Frauen in der DDR* (Gretchen's Red Sisters: Women in the GDR), Frankfurt/Main, Fischer Taschenbuchverlag, 1974. On the difficulties encountered by women in rising to leading positions in political institutions, see Gabriele Gast, *Die politische Rolle der Frau in der DDR* (The Political Role of Women in the GDR), Düsseldorf, Bertelsmann Universitätsverlag, 1973.



Shift work on the production line of the Wartburg Auto Works of Eisenach, German Democratic Republic, in 1968.

—Photo Researchers.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

problems created by efforts at economic reform. Given the poor functioning of the commercial and service sectors of the economy and the GDR's overall housing shortage, such problems have had, and continue to have, societal consequences which are not only very extensive, but also extremely difficult to eliminate.

Course Corrections

Some of the conflicts, unresolved questions, and dangers surveyed above began to be recognized by the SED leadership as early as the second half of the 1960's. Although it had not yet been determined what role social policy would play in the future in redressing the social consequences of a dedication to accelerated technical progress, in 1965 an increasingly intensive debate got under way concerning the possibility and usefulness of undertaking a coordinated program of sociopolitical action in the GDR, especially at the factory level.[12] The "New Economic System for Planning and Managing the Economy" (NÖSPL) was expanded into the "Economic System of Socialism" (*Ökonomischen System des Sozialismus*—ÖSS). Economic planning was to be supplemented by, and even embedded in, social planning based on independent prognoses of societal development. Responsibility for economic decision-making was in part removed once again from the lower management level. The overall modernization of the economy, which had been attempted at the beginning of NÖSPL, had evidently proved more than the GDR could achieve. Investment and research (in giant research centrals) would henceforth be concentrated on "those branches of the national economy which are structurally determinant," that is, on selected large projects. With this emphasis in its economic policy, the party leadership hoped to greatly accelerate the tempo of economic development as a means of enabling the GDR to play a part in determining the "world standard" with some of its products. "Catch up without overtaking," therefore, was the dominant slogan of the last two years of the Ulbricht party leadership.

It soon became clear that the one-sided promotion of specific branches of the economy jeopardized the proportionality of overall economic interrelations. Supply and processing industries not enjoying top priority in the plans adopted proved unable to meet goals set for them. As a result, privileged branches of the economy dependent on these industries were not in a position to fulfill their plan goals either. In addition, frequent delays in the finalization of new investments resulted in new plants coming into production later than initially expected.

SED Central Committee plenums in 1969 and 1970 were rife with discussion of the worsening economic situation of the country. Finally, the 14th Plenum of the Central Committee, which met December 9-12, 1970, terminated the economic reform effort and introduced a phase of renewed centralized planning.[13] There can be little doubt that the strikes which broke out in Poland at about the same time and toppled Wladyslaw Gomulka from power contributed to convincing the leadership of the SED that it had better refrain from further "experiments" and give priority instead to securing the domestic stability of its own system of rule, even if this meant accepting slower rates of economic growth.

The abandonment of the economic reforms also entailed renunciation of many of the expectations which had been raised by them. NÖSPL and ÖSS had done more than simply instill the economic cadres of the GDR with new self-assurance. Within CMEA, the GDR had appeared to be marching in the forefront of development and had emerged as something of a model for other member states. The hopes raised by the "scientific-technological revolution" had brought to the fore once again the utopian trait of Marxism-Leninism. Even if the revolution had been confined to "economics" and interpreted in a technocratic fashion, nature and society had still seemed capable of being harmonized, and the "society of the future" had still appeared capable of realization—even if not in the original, all-embracing emancipative sense of a classless society. Precisely these significant possibilities had had a stimulating effect on part of the young intelligentsia of the GDR. Therefore, when, after Honecker had taken over the

[12] The "rediscovery" of social policy reveals a changing understanding of society by the SED. Well into the 1960's, "social policy" was considered mainly an instrument which was used in capitalist societies to control class conflicts by means of social actions. Development of a Marxist-Leninist social policy implies that Marxist-Leninist society and its "planned" economic policy directed by the party also create tensions which require a social policy instrument for their diminution. On these problems, see Wolf-Rainer Leenen, *Zur Frage der Wachstumsorientierung der marxistisch-leninistischen Sozialpolitik in der DDR* (On the Question of the Growth Orientation of Marxist-Leninist Social Policy in the GDR), Berlin (West), Verlag Duncker und Humblot, 1977, pp. 20 ff.

[13] On the situation of the economy of the GDR in 1970 and on the initial stages of the new economic policy pursued after the Eighth SED Congress in 1971, see Peter Mitzscherling, loc. cit., pp. 80 ff.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

party leadership, the scientific-technological revolution was officially reinterpreted as a long-term, complex, and even self-contradictory *process,* a vacuum was created which the decidedly pragmatic policy followed since by the leadership of the SED has not been able to fill.

These assertions should not be taken to mean that GDR society as a whole came under the influence of expectations arising from the scientific-technological revolution and the economic reforms. But the growth of the GDR's awareness of its own identity—at least as distinct from the country's eastern neighbors, and in part also from the FRG—had its roots in this first reform period and had effects which can be felt even today. The GDR's experience at that time with a successfully performing society of its own did not exclude critical commentary, though little of it was aired publicly. Writers in particular criticized the exclusive orientation adopted favoring economic effectiveness, improved consumption prospects, and material compensation of the individual for work done—from the socialist point of view—for society.

The new self-assurance which such criticism reflected resulted from the successes of the first years of the reforms especially and became increasingly characteristic of Ulbricht's speeches, thus of official governmental statements and of the self-evaluation of the SED. It may be considered the initial source of the separate ideological development of the SED outside the framework of Marxism-Leninism as defined by the CPSU.

The SED Reinterprets "Socialism"

According to the interpretation of Marxism-Leninism held valid for the SED as for others up to the Seventh Party Congress of 1967, "socialism" was the first, lower phase in a continuous process of "formation of communist society" (*Kommunistische Gesellschaftsformation).* The transition from the socialist to the communist phase was considered to be fluid and evolutionary, and socialist society was seen as differing from communist society mainly in that it still bore the "birthmarks" of capitalism. SED First Secretary Ulbricht departed from this view in September 1967, on the occasion of the 100th anniversary of the publication of Marx's *Das Kapital,* when he offered the formulation that socialism was not a "short transitional phase," but a "relatively autonomous socioeconomic formation in the historical era of transition from socialism to communism." [14]

This new evaluation of the GDR's historical status —which was in keeping with the goal set by the Seventh Party Congress, namely, "construction of the developed societal system of socialism"—had a number of ideologically as well as politically serious consequences. The economic reforms undertaken in the GDR depended to a substantial extent on making greater use of the law of value, commodity-money relationships, efficiency wages, profit, etc.—thus, of instruments and methods which in classical Marxist interpretation had always been considered capitalist—if not on their establishment as the guiding mechanisms of the economy. This politico-economic policy, however, with the pressures it created for the theoretical exposition of a "Political Economy of Socialism," came into conflict to a degree with the notion of continuous progress toward socialism and socialist society officially espoused by the party. Still, the proclamation of socialism as a "relatively autonomous" social formation served to permit measures taken to implement the economic reforms to be called socialistic, since the claim that there existed a specific socialist legality allowed a sharp dividing line to be drawn between socialism and capitalism, at least at the ideological level. At the same time, distinguishing socialism from communism served to make socialism a "system" of autonomous "totality." The establishment of systemic autonomy was a precondition for development of theoretical propositions regarding the specific appearance, the internal structure, and the workings of such a "system."

Ulbricht's ideological construct was obviously aimed more at the conservation and improvement of what already existed in the GDR than at further development of the GDR through continued transformation. The existence of this conservative trait was confirmed in his changed estimate of the longevity of socialism: no longer was socialism to be a short-term transitional phase; rather it was to last for a long historical period. According to Marxism-Leninism, however, the systemic stability of socialist society thereby implied could only exist if the internal social situation (especially class relations) could be considered at peace. These considerations led Ulbricht to speak increasingly of the development of an ever more clearly defined "socialist human com-

[14] The substance and development of the conflict with the USSR on this subject has been analyzed in Walter Völkel, "The Problems of Ideological Integration: Notes on the Discussion of Socialism in the GDR and the Soviet Union," *DA,* Special Volume 1973, pp. 61 ff. The paper also contains a bibliography.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

munity [*Menschengemeinschaft*] in the GDR." The term *Gemeinschaft,* i.e., community, with its traditionally conservative overtones in Germany, suggested a context for socialization in which existing—or even increasing—social differentiations and the divergent social interests that resulted from them, theoretically, would not disrupt the basic harmony of society. With such a community as its social base, the political superstructure could maintain its authoritarian character. Its individual institutions could continue to function as before, and authority could be wielded in the same way as previously for as long as the socialist system lasted.

Since within Marxism-Leninism the *party* is viewed as a dynamic change-promoting force, it was no accident that during the last years of the Ulbricht era, a *government* institution headed by Ulbricht, the *Staatsrat* (State Council), increasingly developed into the true political leadership instrument of the GDR.[15] Political practice and general statements indicated agreement regarding the growing weight of the state apparatus; and functionaries of the governmental and economic organizational units which dealt directly with the details of economic reform and with the necessity of testing its separate measures in practical experiments acquired through their work a decision-making competence which could no longer be construed as part of the mere execution of detailed orders given by the party.

The extended time frame which was implied in the GDR's concept of socialism had deferred the problem of how the transition from socialism, as a closed and relatively autonomous "system," to communism was to take place. Still, the question arose whether according to this concept further social development would be by means of evolutionary transformation (i.e., without serious sociopolitical conflicts), or whether "a qualitative leap" (i.e., a revolutionary transition) from one social formation to the other was to be inferred. Since the political explosiveness of this question was obvious, it was never discussed in the GDR to the point where a binding conclusion was reached. Nevertheless, some views were formulated which, in a dialectic context, seem odd. The philosophers Georg Mende and Erhard Lange, for example, felt they could speak of a "gradual leap" as the prospective form in which qualitative social change would occur.[16]

With its new interpretation of the GDR's situation, the SED leadership not only challenged the Soviet claim to exclusive competence in issuing binding interpretations of Marxist-Leninist principles. Insistence on the view that socialism was a relatively autonomous social formation governed by concepts of legality specific unto itself would also inevitably raise doubts—at least in the long run—about the state of development of the Soviet Union, which, up to that time, after all, had not undergone economic reforms comparable to those of the GDR. The reforms established the real sociopolitical background for the growth of an interpretation of socialism specific to the GDR. Given these circumstances, it was hardly surprising that the views of the GDR were publicly subjected to severe criticism by Soviet social scientists at the international conference on "Socialism's Place in History" held in Prague in October 1970 under the auspices of the periodical *Problems of Peace and Socialism.*[17]

Educational and Cultural Policy

The effects of the two in part complementary and in part contradictory aspects of SED policy during the latter Ulbricht years—a proclivity for reform and experiment in the economic realm, coupled with conservative inflexibility in the political field—were evident in the East German government's cultural policies. Inherent in acceptance of the concept of scientific-technological revolution were a commitment to the growing significance of science and an expectation that ever higher worker qualifications would be necessary. Accordingly, the educational system of the GDR was reformed and expanded at all levels. The number of graduates for technical schools and universities and of skilled workers and foremen, etc., grew dramatically. In addition, an

[15] Peter Joachim Lapp, *Der Staatsrat im politischen System der DDR, 1960-1971* (The State Council in the Political System of the GDR), Opladen, Westdeutscher Verlag, 1972. On the question of the basic relationship between the party and state apparatuses, see Gero Neugebauer, *Partei- und Staatsapparat in der DDR: Zu einigen Aspekten der Instrumentalisierung der Staatsapparats durch die SED* (Party and State Apparatuses in the GDR: Some Aspects of the Use of the State Apparatus by the SED), Opladen, Westdeutscher Verlag, 1978.

[16] Erhard Lange and Georg Mende, "The Dialectical Method of Marx's *Kapital* and the Developed Societal System of Socialism in the GDR," in *Die aktuelle philosophische Bedeutung des "Kapital" von Karl Marx* (The Current Philosophical Significance of Karl Marx's *Kapital*), Berlin (East), VEB Deutscher Verlag der Wissenschaften, 1968, p. 26. In assessing in greater detail the meaning of the "gradual leap," the authors of this work speak of a "system-preserving qualitative change." This part of their discussion illustrates the consequences for dialectical materialism of a system-theory approach: among other things, "system" and "totality" are equated. Ibid., pp. 24 ff.

[17] See, in that publication's North American edition, "Socialism's Place in History, Stages and Criteria of its Development," *World Marxist Review* (Toronto), December 1970, pp. 46-75.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

extensive network of institutions of continuing education for the improvement of professional skills assured continuous adaptation of qualifications already acquired to changed requirements by those already working in their professions.[18] Professional and social advancement in nearly all fields depended on the presentation of proof that certain qualifying training had been formally concluded. And although for leading personnel a separate educational system (mainly party schools, colleges, and central institutes) continued to exist and was even expanded, membership in this decisive sociopolitical grouping also as a rule became contingent on possession of a university degree.

Substantial financial resources and a large number of personnel were committed to the socialist educational system as it developed in the 1960's. Yet parts of this system ceased to be functional as soon as it became clear that scientific-technological development advanced neither at the speed nor always in the direction which had been expected when the educational expansion had been undertaken. Economically, this implied the waste of limited resources; for the individual, it meant disappointment, when the actual job he received did not correspond with his acquired skills and/or qualifications. In addition, the enhancement of the general level of education of the society created a critical potential which increasingly enabled individual members of the society to pass knowledgeable judgment on political, social, and economic decisions. While the forms of "socialist democracy" which had existed earlier and which had been refined in the course of the economic reforms had been intended to forge stronger links between various institutions and the respective sectors of society with which they dealt, and also to make use of the expertise of various social groups in the decision-making process, institutionalized forms of broader societal participation in decision-making continued to be almost totally restricted to purely advisory functions. Rarely, therefore, could they fulfill the task assigned to them of integrating society in the country's political institutions, except for short periods of time and in a limited way.



Students from the upper grades of a 10-year polytechnical school in Suhl perform experiments in a laboratory provided by the "Ernst Thälmann" Vehicle and Hunting Weapon Works.

—Eastfoto.

The successful development of the educational system (10 years of mandatory schooling through polytechnical high school, the completion of a professional training program as a normal standard, etc.) created a potential for critical thinking which, because it could not find a field of regular activity, remained outside of the political system in the narrower sense. As a result, many individuals gave up and retreated from social engagement into their own private worlds. Nevertheless, one ought not overlook the fact that the training in understanding political and societal relationships which had been received was increasingly a point of departure for the growth of critical thought and action which sought to clarify the degree to which existing conditions corresponded with the emancipatory principles of official ideology.

One area in which such clarification seemed particularly necessary was that of cultural policy. For if educational policy during the 1960's can be said to have been expansive and reform-oriented, a conservative tendency was clearly evident in the arts. When the policy of economic reform was initiated, East German writers were the first to think that they too would be allowed room for experimentation. The Kafka conference held in Czechoslovakia in 1963

[18] On the achievements and the unresolved problems of the educational system of the GDR, see Adolf Kruppa, *Wirtschafts- und Bildungs-planung in der DDR* (Economic and Educational Planning in the GDR), Hamburg, Verlag Hoffmann und Campe, 1976. The effects of changed requirements on the system and level of education of functionaries are investigated in part in Gert-Joachim Glaessner, *Herrschaft durch Kader: Leitung der Gesellschaft und Kaderpolitik in der DDR* (Rule through Cadres: Direction of Societal and Cadre Policy in the GDR), Opladen, Westdeutscher Verlag, 1977, esp. pp. 218 ff. and pp. 301 ff.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

provided additional encouragement in this direction. However, the 11th Plenum of the Central Committee of the SED held in December 1965 put an end to the writers' hopes, at least insofar as these were based on the expectation of changed attitudes on the part of the party. It is noteworthy in retrospect that it was Erich Honecker who gave the Politburo report which rejected emergent critical socialist art forms and attempted to reimpose a narrow party-mindedness on creative artists.[19] Even in 1965 Wolf Biermann and Christa Wolf figured prominently in this context. Criticism was directed mostly at Biermann —although his name stood for others as well— while Christa Wolf was taken to task for pleading for art which would raise questions "which are new, which the artist thinks he sees, even if he does not see how they can be solved." She stressed the importance of the subjective for the creative process, but this view was officially rejected.

While the cultural line laid down by the 11th Plenum of the Central Committee was maintained until the Eighth SED Congress of 1971, actual cultural development was hardly influenced at all by the views of the party. As things worked out, the search for new topics and forms, the discovery of the individual and his subjective essence, the inception of critical attempts to transcend what already existed, and the development of the artist's self-consciousness were combined in these years with a readiness to take a stand based on one's own views.

Foreign Policy Conflict with the USSR

While the ideological innovations of the SED responsible for many of the GDR's difficulties in the sociopolitical, economic, and cultural fields were— as we have seen—the source of tension between the GDR and the USSR during the 1960's, by 1970 it was becoming clear that the leadership of these two states had differing views on foreign policy matters as well. The differences need not be described in detail in the present context.[20] It is sufficient for our purposes here to outline the underlying divergence of interests and perspectives between the two states and to trace the internal social consequences for the GDR of foreign policy decisions as they were finally made.

The interests and the behavior of the GDR in its foreign relations have been determined by the fact that the state must look upon itself as a strictly *political* entity, since it lacks the additional legitimation of a *national* identity, which would enable it to safeguard the continuity of its existence as a state without tying that existence to the maintenance of present political-institutional forms. These forms— i.e. the present order—moreover, are burdened by the history of their origin. (This burden has been lightened somewhat by more recent history but has not been removed entirely.) The political order of the GDR was established with the active support and after the model of the occupying power of the post-World War II eastern zone of Germany. Its creation was accompanied by a profound socioeconomic revolution which was supported only in part by the social and political forces of the society itself. To the greater part of the society it appeared to have been imposed "from the outside" and "from above."[21] The deficiency of systemic legitimacy which resulted has never been redressed by the free expression of political will. Nor have the GDR's political institutions been opened to the society, with a view to bringing social conflicts and interests within their compass and thereby uniting the political system from the grassroots up with societal structures, in a process of formation of a democratic will. Mass organizations and other forms of participation under "socialist democracy" indeed do constitute points of departure for the participation of social groups in decision-making processes. But because of the centralized decision-making structure of the bureaucratic apparatus, use of the mass organizations has

[19] See the very informative, even if often polemical and one-sided, presentation by Hans-Dietrich Sander, *Geschichte der schönen Literatur in der DDR. Ein Grundriss* (History of Literature in the GDR. An Outline), Freiburg, Verlag Rombach, 1972, pp. 225 ff. The most important documents on the cultural policy of the GDR in these years can be found in Elimar Schubbe, Ed., *Dokumente zur Kunst-, Literatur- und Kulturpolitik der SED* (Documents on the Artistic, Literary, and Cultural Policy of the SED), Stuttgart, Seewald Verlag, 1972.

[20] Developments over time, the divergent views of the GDR and the Soviet Union as expressed in the statements of the political leaders of both countries, and the change of substantive positions during the negotiations are described by Gerhard Wettig in *Die Sowjetunion, die DDR und die Deutschlandfrage 1965 bis 1976. Einvernehmen und Konflikt im sozialistischen Lager* (The Soviet Union, the GDR, and the German Question, 1965 1976: Agreement and Conflict in the Socialist Camp), Stuttgart, Verlag Bonn Aktuell, 1976. The book contains an ample bibliography.

[21] Dietrich Staritz has recently researched the extent to which an articulate autonomous movement for social transformation existed in the Soviet Zone of Occupation between 1945 and 1949, what goals it pursued, and to what extent the SED leadership integrated into prevailing political institutions this sort of early initiative for developing a process of democratic expression. See Dietrich Staritz, *Sozialismus in einem halben Land: Zur Programmatik und Politik der KPD/SED in der Phase der antifaschistisch-demokratischen Umwälzung in der DDR* (Socialism in Half a Country: The Program and Policy of the KPD/SED During the Phase of Antifascist Democratic Revolution in the GDR), Berlin (West), Verlag Klaus Wagenbach, 1976.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

remained restricted to advisory functions, as mentioned in the last section. They have not therefore fulfilled the legitimating and integrating functions for which they were created.

These generalizations must be modified to the extent that those living and working in the GDR have adjusted to the existing order, from which they increasingly derive their interests and in which they try to satisfy their needs. This "legitimizing adaptation," which can be interpreted as a continuous process of integration and disintegration, has in the course of time contributed substantially to rendering "familiar" what at first had been felt to be "alien." The familiarity, however, has remained fragile.

The justification of the existence of a separate East German state by the claim that a social order has been created which is superior to that in the other Germany remains unconvincing, despite its ideological underpinnings, if the individual cannot experience this "superiority" in everyday life, without recourse to Marxist-Leninist reasoning. Similarly, allusions to "historic progress" achieved by the GDR cannot be persuasive when, as was the case in the 1959-65 seven-year plan[22] and in the economic reforms, and as is so even now, the scientific-technological level, the living standard, certain consumer habits, and other characteristics of the inimical rival Federal Republic are proclaimed as development goals for the GDR. Still, these considerations ought not to be taken to mean that there are no system-specific aspects of life in the GDR which are considered advantageous by its citizens and which lead to (partial) identification with the system. Among these are "warmer," more binding social relations in the GDR than exist in the FRG, where interpersonal competition is sharper; high job security; the disappearance of class differences, evidenced by greater chances for advancement offered working-class children; an educational system which is excellent, despite certain weaknesses; strong adherence to local and regional traditions; etc.

While the incipient process of amalgamation of society and political system which attachment to such things represents must be taken seriously, it has in no way altered the fact that the GDR, for its self-preservation, must continue to maintain its political power structures intact. The experience of being *historically* and *culturally* different functions naturally as the basis of a state-constituting and state-preserving collective "we"-consciousness in the GDR only in relation to the other member states of CMEA. Distinctness from the other German state, in contrast, remains bound to *political* division and particularity.[23] This basic fact of life of the GDR in large part explains certain constant elements in the state's foreign policies. For its existence, the GDR remains dependent on its creator (in a very special sense) the Soviet Union. Within this context, the expansion of its international relations beyond the system of socialist states and its worldwide acceptance as a recognized subject of international law serve mainly to support a degree of national autonomy.

The presence of two German states on the territory of a divided German nation will continue to constitute a challenge to the existence of the GDR for as long as the Democratic Republic cannot be certain of the stability of its social foundations. In this situation, two possible strategic positions toward the German question and the FRG were—and are—open to a party and state leadership motivated by a desire for self-preservation. Both proceed from the historical fact of national division, but they draw contrasting conclusions from it. The first position, which will be called the "offensive" attitude here, is aimed at overcoming this division. Continued political existence of the leadership is tied, according to this position, not to the preservation of GDR statehood, but to the proposition that the GDR is more advanced than the FRG in historical

[22] The seven-year plan drafted in 1958 was supposed to cover the 1959-1965 period. Plan goals were set too high, however, and had to be changed very quickly. The plan was given up entirely in 1961. Political goals expressed in the plan included catching up with and surpassing the FRG in per-capita consumption of industrial consumer goods and foodstuffs by 1961, and surpassing the FRG in labor productivity as well by 1965. See *Der Siebenjahrplan des Friedens, des Wohlstands und des Glücks des Volkes. Rede Walter Ulbrichts vor der Volkskammer der DDR am 30.9.1959 Gesetz uber den Siebenjahrplan 1959-1965.* (The Seven-Year Plan of Peace, Prosperity and Popular Good Fortune: The Speech of Walter Ulbricht before the People's Chamber on the September 9, 1959, Law on the 1959-1965 Seven-Year Plan), Berlin (East), Dietz Verlag, 1959.

[23] Since 1970 the SED has asserted that a socialist nation has developed and continues to develop in the GDR. That this is a *political* proposition, for which there is as yet no corresponding GDR national consciousness, can be seen from the inconsistencies which appear when the SED argues its case. Honecker himself proclaimed the formula "Citizenship—GDR; Nationality—German," in a Dec. 12, 1974, speech at the 13th Plenum of the Central Committee of the SED. See Erich Honecker, *Reden und Aufsätze* (Speeches and Articles), Vol. 3, Berlin (East), Dietz Verlag, 1976, p. 262. The program issued by the Ninth Party Congress of the SED also speaks of the "Socialist Nation in the German Democratic Republic," whose citizens (aside from the Sorbians), it says, are of German nationality. *Protokoll der Verhandlungen des IX. Parteitages der Sozialistischen Einheitspartei Deutschlands* (Protocol of the Debates of the Ninth Congress of the SED), Vol. 2, Berlin (East), Dietz Verlag, 1976, pp. 251 f.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

social development. This ideologically substantiated superiority, so the argument goes, must be maintained under all circumstances. Therefore, all proposals for reunification, confederation, or intra-German cooperation, insofar as they have derived from this offensive strategic attitude, have contained the condition that the "historic achievements" of the GDR be preserved.

The advantages of such a strategy lay primarily in the fact that it permitted an active policy toward the FRG, the adversary perceived as representing a real threat, and in the opportunity which it offered the GDR to adopt a positive line with respect to the issue of national division by according to the GDR the benefits of an end to the division. This strategy's disadvantages, which became clearer as time passed, lay in its decreasing credibility as chances for its realization declined, and in the fact that it made the international isolation the GDR faced outside the sphere of direct Soviet influence as a result of the Federal Republic's policy based on the so-called Hallstein Doctrine even harder to overcome. The uncertain position of the GDR in the international community not only rendered it more difficult for the state to develop secure foreign-trade relations, but also diminished the desired gain in legitimacy which the political leadership, not least for domestic reasons, had hoped to reap from international recognition of the statehood of the GDR.

The alternative, "defensive" strategy open to the East German leadership viewed—and views—the post-World War II division of Germany as a definitive end to the history of a unified "German nation." For this strategy to be credible, it is necessary to make real (i.e., hypostatize) the "otherness" of the social and political order of the GDR in sufficient measure so that the differences between the GDR and the "bourgeois capitalist" FRG prove unbridgeable not only in political terms, but above all insofar as societal structures are concerned. Since both German societies undeniably still share such fundamental features as language, history, social and political traditions, kinship relations, etc., the defensive strategy necessitates a permanent friend-foe polarization between the two, with a constant tendency toward a corresponding politicization of the internal East German social situation. Apropos of foreign relations, this kind of "defensive" strategy with respect to the German question encourages the GDR to seek especially close ties with "humanity's historic alternative," the socialist world system, and its leading power, the Soviet Union. Not only does "socialist integration" imply political and military protection in this context; it is also the expression of a postulated total estrangement (*Entfremdung*) from the other Germany state. Legal recognition by the international community in general, and in particular by the FRG, serves the same purpose: to sanction politically and legally the permanence of the system which has come into being in the GDR. By similar logic, any playing down of the legal significance of international recognition brings into question the central axiom of the GDR's self-identity.

The defensive strategy gives the GDR the advantage of being able to base its conduct on the existence of a consistent friend-foe relationship. This is suitable for a world and German political situation where there exist fewer and fewer credible points of departure for speedily overcoming the national division of Germany and at the same time protecting the GDR's political identity. Domestically it requires, and also permits, a renewed, more thorough politicization of the whole society, which has to become committed to its alleged "otherness," to its "new quality." This domestic implication of the defensive strategy, however, is fraught with substantial danger for the political system, since the continued existence of similarities between the two Germanies indicated above undeniably contradicts the postulates the GDR is asking its citizens to accept. Conflicts with the Federal Republic arising in the context of the defensive strategy cannot be put to positive use as the point of departure for an all-German policy effective against the FRG, as is possible under the offensive alternative; rather, they appear exclusively as diversion, as interference in internal affairs, and as permanent challenge to the GDR's very existence.

Up to the end of the 1960's, the GDR leadership advocated the "offensive" strategy outlined above. Indeed, as recently as in the Constitution of 1968, the leadership proclaimed the goal of German reunification—though without specification as to concrete timing, and conditional on the preservation of the GDR's social and political order. But circumstances at the beginning of the 1970's, especially a partial divergence in the interests of the USSR and GDR, ultimately compelled the leadership to alter its perspective.

Prior to the 1970's, the foreign policy calculations of the Soviet Union did not differ fundamentally from those of the GDR. A principal aspect of Soviet foreign policy was the preservation and consolidation of the USSR's immediate sphere of influence as it had developed as a result of World War II and in

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the postwar years. In this respect, the GDR, with its border location and its economic significance, occupied a central position in Soviet thinking. The GDR's internal and external consolidation and security were, therefore, of major importance to the Soviet Union in determining its own foreign policy generally and in shaping relations among the CMEA member countries. But the USSR, as a world power and the dominant force in its own system of states, had a far broader range of goals to consider and set priorities on than did the GDR. The relative decline of prestige of the United States during the Vietnam war and certain indications of a separate European development in the international field encouraged the Soviet Union to try to establish itself more strongly as a European power. In so doing, it apparently pursued at least two goals: international recognition of existing European borders, and thus of its own sphere of influence, and the creation of conditions which would give it better means of influencing those trends in European developments that had so far eluded its control. The evolution and suppression of the Prague Spring of 1968 made the achievement of an all-European agreement of the sort the Soviet Union desired more difficult, but at the same time more desirable. For the USSR could gain from the mere act of assembly of a European conference at least tacit absolution for its behavior in Czechoslovakia.

Willy Brandt, left, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, and Willi Stoph, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the German Democratic Republic, meet for official talks on March 19, 1970, in Erfurt, GDR.

—Eastfoto.

Up to the late 1960's, the unresolved intra-German situation had been a major barrier to the achievement of Soviet objectives in Europe. Thenceforth, the making of an arrangement with the Federal Republic and its allies on the Berlin question—even if it turned out to be a modus vivendi rather than a definitive solution—increasingly came to be recognized by Moscow as a precondition for more comprehensive agreements on Germany. These, in turn, might serve as intruments which the Soviet Union could use as a vehicle for attaining the higher priority goal of convocation of a European conference.

The broader and more differentiated policy calculations of the USSR necessarily included a concern with safeguarding the GDR. But for the Soviet Union this was a partial goal, and certain concessions could be made regarding the GDR without jeopardizing the conceptual integrity of the great power's commitment. The power position of the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact countries made possible risks—defined in military terms, in the final analysis—appear predictable and therefore minor. Dependent on the Soviet Union as its protective power, the GDR could offer only temporary opposition, for the sake of its maximum goals, to Soviet resolve; it could not force the endorsement of these goals. In addition, because it for the most part lacked diplomatic channels of its own, [24] the GDR found itself dependent in another sense as well, i.e., on the foreign affairs information and foreign policy initiatives of the Soviet Union.

The development and resolution of the differences between the Soviet Union and the GDR in 1970-71 must be seen against this background. The GDR only hesitantly and reluctantly consented to enter into negotiations with the other Germany. It was constrained to do so by the fact that negotiations between the FRG and the Soviet Union had begun on January 30, 1970. The hesitation of the political leadership of the GDR is understandable: it was being compelled by circumstances and by the goals of Soviet policy to subject its foreign policy strategy to a fundamental review. While up to that time it had advocated the "offensive" concept, the leadership was now forced to switch to the "defensive" strategy. On January 19, 1970—i.e., even before the meetings of GDR and FRG government heads at

[24] Gerhard Wettig, op. cit., pp. 156 and 181.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Erich Honecker addresses the Eighth Congress of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany on June 15, 1971, a month after replacing Walter Ulbricht as party First Secretary.

—Eastfoto.

Erfurt and Kassel had been arranged [25]—Walter Ulbricht responded to a statement made by West German Chancellor Willy Brandt on January 14, 1970, by saying that Brandt's thesis concerning the continued existence of one German nation in two states was "unrealistic" and served only "to circumvent the establishment of normal relations with the GDR, based on equality of rights and international law." [26] The existence of a separate socialist nation in the GDR and its indissoluble links to the socialist states of Eastern Europe, and especially to the Soviet Union, have since become central elements in the GDR's official self-identification and the bases of the state's domestic and foreign policies.

This axiomatic stance rendered it possible for the East German party and state leadership to formulate its maximum goals for future negotiations: unqualified recognition by the Federal Republic in terms of international law; no special relations between the two German states; FRG agreement not to impede the GDR's pursuit of diplomatic relations worldwide; establishment of a permanent Four-Power status for West Berlin, accompanied by a loosening, or possibly the relinquishment, of the city's ties to the Federal Republic. In fact, as clearly demonstrated by the treaty of August 12, 1970, between the Federal Republic and the Soviet Union on the renunciation of force and the normalization of relations, and by the Four-Power agreement of September 3, 1971, the GDR was not going to be able to enforce these demands. In 1970 and early 1971, the differences of opinion between the GDR and the Soviet Union became pronounced enough to be visible even to the outside world. It was therefore in the interest of the Soviet Union to reestablish apparent harmony.

THE ERA OF "ACTUALLY EXISTING SOCIALISM"

Transition from Ulbricht to Honecker

The replacement of Walter Ulbricht as First Secretary of the SED by Erich Honecker on May 5, 1971, at the 16th Plenum of the Central Committee of the party—before the Eighth Party Congress scheduled for June, at which Ulbricht had intended to give a fundamentally ideological, forward-looking report on "The Developed Societal System of Socialism in the 1970's"—was without doubt a turning point in the development of the GDR.[27] Still, the great pains taken to make the change at the top look like a normal event should not be overlooked.

Honecker had for many years been the designated successor of Ulbricht. As secretary of the Central Committee responsible for security questions and cadre policies, he had been able to acquire a thorough knowledge of the party organization as well as of the military and police apparatus and to substantially influence their personnel policies. The new First Secretary's strong base in the power structures of the system explains to a very great extent

[25] Federal Chancellor Brandt and Chairman of the GDR Council of Ministers Stoph met at Erfurt (GDR) on Mar. 19, 1970, and at Kassel (FRG) on May 21, 1970.

[26] Walter Ulbricht, "For Peaceful International Relations between Two Sovereign German States," a press conference in Berlin, *Neues Deutschland* (Berlin [East]), Jan. 20, 1970, p. 3.

[27] On the biography and political career of Honecker, see Heinz Lippmann, *Honecker: Porträt eines Nachfolgers* (Honecker: Portrait of a Successor), Köln, Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1971. On the way Ulbricht was replaced, see Harald Ludwig (pseudonym of H. Lippmann), "The SED Before the Eighth Party Congress," *DA*, No. 6, 1971, pp. 584 ff.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Figures whose star was on the rise in the early Honecker years, from the left: Army General Heinz Hoffmann, Minister of Defense; Col. General Erich Mielke, Minister for State Security; Horst Sindermann, from 1973 to 1976 Chairman of the Council of Ministers; and Werner Krolikowski, from 1973 to 1976 Secretary for Economics in the ruling Socialist Unity Party.

—Photos of Hoffmann, Sindermann, and Krolikowski by EUPRA; of Mielke by Eastfoto.

why drastic personnel changes in the top positions of party and state failed to materialize. Even later on, when the influence of functionaries running state and economic institutions was gradually reduced and transferred to cadres with more pronounced party careers in the Central Committee, and when Minister of Security Erich Mielke and Minister of Defense Heinz Hoffmann advanced to Politburo membership, the changes made no dramatic impression. Rather, they corresponded with the new party line of again strongly emphasizing the party's own influence and leadership role.[28]

The treatment of Ulbricht reflected the same effort. He received the post of Chairman of the SED, a position not provided for in the party statute, and remained Chairman of the State Council—but he forfeited his political influence. The State Council lost its once dominant role in the political system; Ulbricht's speeches and writings ceased to be quoted; etc.

Honecker's accumulation of offices also proceeded with little dramatic spectacle. After his confirmation as First Secretary at the Eighth Party Congress of the SED held June 15-19, 1971, he took over the chairmanship of the National Defense Council on June 29, 1971. The People's Chamber elected him Chairman of the State Council on October 29, 1976.

It is important to realize that this relatively late assumption by Honecker of the function of formal head of state occurred within the context of the only drastic modification of personnel policies of the entire Ulbricht-to-Honecker transition. After Ulbricht died on August 1, 1973, Willi Stoph, who, as longtime Chairman of the Council of Ministers, had played a decisive part in the implementation of the economic reforms on the governmental side, was moved to the not very influential position of State Council Chairman on October 3, 1973. He was succeeded as Chairman of the Council of Ministers by Horst Sindermann, previously one of his primary deputies. The significance of this reshuffle of personnel as a kind of revenge on the "crew of the economic reforms" emerged when at the same juncture Günter Mittag was replaced as Central Committee Secretary for Economics. Considered the conceptual and the political brain behind both NOSPL and OSS, he was appointed First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, while Werner Krolikowski, who had only been promoted to membership in the Politburo at the Eighth Party Congress, took over his position in the Central Committee Secretariat. On October 29, 1976, however, all these moves were reversed. Willi Stoph again became Chairman of the Council of Ministers; and Günter Mittag resumed his position of responsibility

[28] On the personnel changes made at the Eighth and Ninth Party Congresses of the SED, see Karl Wilhelm Fricke, "Honecker's Team," *DA*, No. 9, 1971, pp. 962 ff.; and Peter C. Ludz, "The Ninth Party Congress of the SED: A Review," *DA*, Special Volume 1976, pp. 3 ff.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

for conceptualizing economic policy in the Secretariat of the Central Committee. Sindermann, meanwhile, was downgraded to the relatively uninfluential position of President of the People's Chamber, and Krolikowski to Mittag's former post in the Council of Ministers. Honecker at this time added the vacant Chairmanship of the State Council to his own list of posts. This complete exchange of roles within the leadership in the space of only three years must be seen against the background of the changing economic situation of the GDR. While in 1973 difficulties in the economic realm appeared to have been eliminated, in fact rising raw-material prices and the effects of the economic crisis on world markets had increasingly had an adverse impact on the economy of the GDR. Thus, although the reasoning behind the 1976 changes is not known in detail, it does seem that the slighted "reformers" used the difficult economic situation of the country to stage a comeback.[29]

Ideological Innovation Abandoned

The broad continuity of personnel in leadership positions between the Ulbricht and Honecker eras contrasted with the significant shift in the self-assessment and sociopolitical conception which was endorsed by the political leadership at the Eighth Party Congress and which remains in effect today. Impetus for the corrective changes made in the party line came from the resolutions of the 24th Congress of the CPSU, which were accepted as binding for the SED—even before the dismissal of Ulbricht—by a Politburo resolution of April 15, 1971. This resolution put an end to the separate ideological development which had been initiated several years before with Ulbricht's statements on socialism as a "relatively autonomous societal formation" and on the growth of a "socialist human community" in the GDR. The Politburo specifically stressed "that the guidelines worked out by the 24th Party Congress of the CPSU . . . are of general theoretical and political importance for our Socialist Unity Party, for answering the basic questions of the creation of the developed socialist society in the GDR." [30] Exposition in detail of the contents of this Politburo resolution, which was endorsed by the Eighth Party Congress, spelled out even then the political line which the SED has followed ever since. But acceptance of the concepts of the CPSU did not relieve the SED leadership of the necessity of adapting authoritative Soviet statements to conditions in the GDR.

The main features of the ideological-programmatic conceptions which have been valid for the SED since 1971 are based on a revision of the concept of socialism as it had been interpreted since the Seventh Party Congress in 1967. Characterization of society as a "system" has now been expressly rejected;[31] the new sociopolitical goal is the "molding of the developed socialist society." [32] The conservative, harmonious image of a developing "socialist human community" in the GDR has given way to a concept of the society as a "class society of a special type," which still bears—though in decreasing measure—the "birthmarks of the old society." [33] This characterization has far-reaching consequences not only for evaluation of the social situation but also for the development of the political system. Within the framework of Marxism-Leninism, it affords a basis for proving the necessity of the leading role of the working class, and thus of the communist party, until the establishment of communist society.[34] While this position had never been abandoned formally even under Ulbricht, the state ap-

[29] Changes in government positions at this time are analyzed in Ilse Spittmann, "The NOS Team Returns," *DA*, No. 11, 1976, pp. 1121 ff.

[30] "Resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the SED on the Results of the 24th Congress of the CPSU," *Einheit* (Berlin [East]), No. 5, 1971, pp. 499 ff., esp. p. 501.

[31] At the Eighth Party Congress of the SED, Harry Tisch spoke very categorically against the "system" terminology which had been all but exclusively used in Ulbricht's time. See *Protokoll der Verhandlungen des VIII. Parteitages der Sozialistischen Einheitspartei Deutschlands* (Protocol of the Proceedings of the Eighth Congress of the SED), Vol. 1, Berlin (East), Dietz Verlag, 1971, p. 287. Tisch was elected a candidate member of the Politburo at this party congress. On April 28, 1975, he succeeded the deceased Herbert Warnke as chairman of the communist labor unions (FDGB); and on June 5, 1975, he became a full member of the Politburo.

[32] See the SED Party Program in *Protokoll der Verhandlungen des IX. Parteitages . . .*, pp. 218 ff.

[33] On this, see Erich Hahn, "The Building of Socialist Consciousness in the Process of Constructing Socialism in the GDR," in *Die entwickelte sozialistische Gesellschaft: Wesen und Kriterien—Kritik revisionistischer Konzeptionen* (The Developed Socialist Society: Essence and Criteria—Critique of Revisionist Conceptions), Berlin (East), Dietz Verlag, 1973, pp. 237 and 239. (The second revised edition [Berlin, 1976] no longer contains the notion of a "class society of the new type." Although continued mention is made of classes and strata, these concepts are not used to characterize a class society. See the literature cited below in note 36.) Without naming Ulbricht, Hahn wrote: "We reject . . . the idea of a class-indifferent 'human-community-consciousness.' " Hahn is currently a candidate member of the Central Committee of the SED, full professor at the Academy of Social Sciences of the Central Committee of the SED, and Chairman of the GDR's Scientific Council for Philosophic Research.

[34] See Erich Honecker, *Die Rolle der Arbeiterklasse und ihrer Partei in der sozialistischen Gesellschaft* (The Role of the Working Class and Its Party in Socialist Society), Berlin (East), Dietz Verlag, 1974, pp. 166 f.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Günter Mittag, left, relieved of duties as party Secretary for Economics in 1973-76, and Willi Stoph, removed from responsibilities as Chairman of the Council of Ministers during the same period.

—Katherine Young.

paratus in fact had increasingly assumed the role of organizer of economic and, to a high degree, social processes. This development has been stopped under Honecker, and the more purely instrumental character of the state apparatus has been stressed.[35]

A view of society according to which there "still exist in the GDR distinctions in the status and in the interests of classes and social strata" draws particular attention to processes of differentiation in the social structure and to the social conflicts resulting from them. The microstructure of society, in particular, gains in importance under this view. No end to the social division of labor is foreseen, and differences in work requirements, levels of qualification, and, accordingly, in the status of the individual in the production process are apparently to remain for a long time. However, the principle of "material interest"—according to the economists, indispensable as an incentive to better work performance—can by no means lead to social equality, but rather would lead, more often than not, to socially unjustifiable differences in standards of living. As early as 1966-67, attempts made to develop a "societal forecast" (*Gesellschaftsprognostik*) demonstrated that the political leadership was becoming increasingly aware of this and convinced of the need for a systematic social policy which could influence the development of the social structure. The research undertaken at that time, because it was too pretentious in its goals and was carried out basically without using empirical data, had no practical results. But the approach which has now been adopted opens the way to more intensive and more empirically oriented research into social structures, and to a search for practicable instruments for intervention in sociopolitical development.[36]

The "Main Task"

This shift of official attention toward real social processes and the problem situations manifest in them, and toward the needs and interests of the members of society is reflected in large measure in what is called the "main task". Expressly designated a long-term strategic goal orientation, the "main task" has been the standard point of reference cited for all actions in the realms of economic, social, and cultural policy since the Eighth Party Congress. It consists "in the further enhancement of the material and cultural living standard of the people on the basis of a rapidly accelerating tempo of socialist production, increased efficiency, increased scientific technological progress, and the growth of labor productivity." [37]

[35] See the new Party Statute adopted by the Ninth Congress of the SED, which in Article 63 gives "the party organizations in the ministries and in the other central or local state organs and institutions . . . the right to control the activities of the apparatus concerning the implementation of the resolutions of the party and government and the observance of socialist legal norms." The previous Statute, adopted by the Sixth Party Congress in 1963, had provided that the party organization in the ministries and other state organs "because of the special conditions of work in the state apparatus cannot exercise controlling functions." See *Protokoll der Verhandlungen des* IX. Parteitages . . . , p. 293; and *Protokoll der Verhandlungen des VI. Parteitages der Sozialistischen Einheitspartei Deutschlands* (Protocol of the Proceedings of the Sixth Congress of the SED), Vol. 4, Berlin (East), Dietz Verlag, 1963, p. 432.

[36] On this, see especially the series *Soziologie* published by Dietz Verlag in Berlin (East). The following books of the series deserve special attention in this context: *Zur Sozialstruktur der sozialistischen Gesellschaft* (On the Social Structure of Socialist Society), 1974; *Soziologische Probleme der Klassenentwicklung in der DDR* (Sociological Problems of the Development of Classes in the GDR), 1975; S. Grundmann, *Arbeiterklasse—Gegenwart und Zukunft: Weltanschauliche und soziologische Probleme der Voraussage und Gestaltung sozialer Prozesse* (The Working Class—Present and Future: Ideological and Sociological Problems of the Prediction and Creation of Social Processes), 1975; S. Grundmann et al., *Zur Entwicklung der Arbeiterklasse und ihrer Struktur in der DDR* (On the Development of the Working Class and Its Structure in the GDR), 1976. A comprehensive bibliography is contained in Dieter Voigt, "Social Structure Research in the GDR: A Critical Analysis," *DA*, No. 5, 1975, pp. 476 ff. The trend toward categorization in Marxist-Leninist research into social structures is investigated in Horst Röder, "Sociological Categories and Concepts for the Analysis of Social Structure in the GDR," *DA*, Special Volume 1975, pp. 1 ff.

[37] See *Protokoll der Verhandlungen des IX. Parteitages* . . ., pp. 218 f.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

This general ideological-programmatic statement sets no new goals. Endorsements of similar objectives can be found in such fundamental programmatic statements of Marxism-Leninism as the so-called "Basic Economic Law of Socialism." Nevertheless, there can be no doubt that reference to the "main task" signifies a change of course. For it reveals the judgment of the political leadership that the higher level of expectations of the present generation must be taken seriously.[38] The disturbances in Poland in December 1970 had convincingly demonstrated to them that a supply of goods insufficient to satisfy existing requirements and a policy of forced investment at the cost of consumption could jeopardize the political stability of the existing system.

An orientation toward a conscious and continuous raising of living standards appeared all the more necessary since hopes that the scientific-technological revolution would produce a quick, qualitative leap in social development had proved ill-founded. It is true that the "main task" continues to stress "a rapidly accelerating tempo of socialist production" as a precondition for the improvement of working and living conditions; but it associates further economic growth with factors of intensification (increased efficiency and labor productivity) and continuity (scientific-technological progress).

Behind the disappearance of the term scientific-technological revolution from current discussion and the attendant shift of emphasis to the need to

[38] Erich Honecker, *Die Rolle der Arbeiterklasse . . .*, p. 170: "In this main task, the position of the workers' needs in socialist society is defined as fundamental. They [i.e., workers' needs] are characterized as the decisive basis for economic management and planning." Werner Krolikowski, in *Der IX. Parteitag der SED über die Fortsetzung des politischen Kurses der Hauptaufgabe. Die Einheit von Wirtschafts- und Sozialpolitik* (The Ninth Party Congress of the SED on the Pursuit of the Political Course of the Main Task: The Unity of Economic and Social Policy), Berlin (East), Dietz Verlag, 1976, p. 9, speaks of an "irrevocable political course of turning toward the masses, toward their immediate interests and requirements." The main task, he asserts, contains a "long-range strategic orientation."

Young people examine household appliances in a downtown Leipzig store in 1973.

—Black Star.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

promote scientific-technological progress lies an awareness that stages of technological development cannot be skipped over at will. The notion that they can be is now criticized as "subjectivism." Omission of intermediate steps in the GDR had not only overstrained the investment capacity of the economy, but also prevented possible improvements of existing production facilities.[39] In addition, full automation of production processes had given rise to a number of unresolved technical problems. Concentration on the goal of full automation complicated necessary steps toward part- or full-mechanization which would have permitted better use of existing possibilities for a more efficient production conifiguration. These more strictly economic considerations were reinforced by the fact that in the GDR as elsewhere the scientific-technological revolution was resulting in damage to the environment which it would be difficult to remedy, and in the waste of scarce raw materials.

The more sober assessment of the tempo and prospects of scientific-technological revolution which resulted led to a change of view concerning the relationship between the scientific-technological revolution and the socialist order of society. As late as 1971 Ulbricht had spoken of "the development of socialism during the scientific-technological revolution."[40] According to this view, socialist and scientific-technological revolution were in inseparable unity. But from Marxist-Leninist perspective, this inseparability implied an infringement upon the primacy of the party: "base" and "superstructure" seemed to coalesce, with processes at the base perhaps even conceded definitive priority. The current official view draws the dividing line between base and superstructure more clearly and thereby safeguards the leading role of the party. It promotes "the organic linkage of the achievements of the scientific-technological revolution with the merits of socialism." This goal is bound to the "intensification of social production," thus to a better utilization and a continuous development of that which already exists.[41]

The hope that with the help of the scientific-technological revolution victory might come in the not too distant future in "the socialist offensive in economic competition with imperialism" is no longer maintained. But of course, retreat from this oft-proclaimed goal does not mean that the claim to systemic superiority has been abandoned. Rather, it is now alleged that the superiority will become manifest first "objectively in the long run . . . in the utilization of these new forces." [42]

Thus, the long-range optimistic perspective of the "main task" remains tied to further progress in the sciences. But in this field the party has found itself facing what is in many respects an unsatisfactory situation. A whole range of new mathematically and empirically oriented sciences which had developed during the period of the reforms stood next to central Marxist-Leninist disciplines such as Marxist-Leninist philosophy, the political economy of socialism, and scientific communism. Marxist-Leninist research proper had been neglected because of its apparent practical irrelevance. As a result, not only had the ideology in many cases lost its integrating and organizing powers, but the leading position of the party—a position closely tied in with that of Marxism-Leninism—itself seemed to be affected.

The reaction of the SED leadership at the Eighth Party Congress and afterwards was unambiguous: the primacy of Marxism-Leninism was to be restored.[43] General Marxist-Leninist schooling and training was intensified. Research in the basic disciplines of Marxism-Leninism was given special attention with the goal of arriving at concepts which conformed with ideology and at the same time were adequate for dealing with the real situation. The discussion which has taken place to date, however, has made it clear that many of the categories of Marxism-Leninism can no longer be unequivocally defined. Among these are such central concepts as "force of production," "production relationship," "base," "superstructure," etc. Furthermore, it has proved impossible—in view of contrasting epistomological positions, this was to be expected—to reconcile Marxist-Leninist categories with the basic concepts of the empirical sciences. The tension between the two conceptual systems did lead to fruitful discussions which showed the limitations of each,

[39] See Erich Honecker, *Die Rolle der Arbeiterklasse . . .*, p. 172.

[40] Walter Ulbricht, *Die historische Mission der Sozialistischen Einheitspartei Deutschlands: 6 Reden und Aufsätze* (The Historic Mission of the SED: 6 Speeches and Articles), Berlin (East), Dietz Verlag, 1971, p. 126.

[41] *Protokoll der Verhandlungen des IX. Parteitages . . .*, p. 219.

[42] See Erich Honecker, *Die Rolle der Arbeiterklasse . . .*, p. 172.

[43] Ibid., pp. 165 f. and pp. 171 f. Also Kurt Hager, "The Developed Socialist Society: The Problems of the Social Sciences after the Eighth Party Congress of the SED," *Einheit*, No. 11, 1971, p. 1207. On the present policy of the SED in the area of the social sciences, see Kurt Hager, *Der IX. Parteitag und die Gesellschaftswissenschaften. Rede auf der Konferenz der Gesellschaftswissenschaftler der DDR am 25. und 26. November 1976 in Berlin* (The Ninth Party Congress and the Social Sciences: Speech at the Conference of Social Scientists of the GDR of November 25-26, 1976, Berlin), Berlin (East), Dietz Verlag, 1976.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

but on the whole, the party has apparently managed to a large extent to establish in the framework of its scientific policy the priority of ideology in the various disciplines.

In addition, the party has secured its claim to leadership by means of a reorganization of research. A compact system of scientific councils attached to the Academy of Sciences of the GDR, the Academy of Social Sciences of the Central Committee of the SED, and other central party and state organizations enables it to better plan, coordinate, and control research capacities and contents.[44]

Evaluation of "Realistic" Policy

At this point in our presentation, the question can already be raised as to what was really *new* in the conceptual formulations and self-assessment of the SED after the Eighth Party Congress. The answer seems likely to clarify the changed way in which the present political leadership of the GDR is confronted with the problem of legitimacy. All programmatic statements include a striking emphasis on the leading role of the party. The importance of the "subjective factor," i.e., the party, and the primacy of politics are being stressed both with regard to "spontaneous" economic and social processes, and inside the network of political institutions as well. This would appear to indicate that views which were current during the years which preceded the economic reforms are once again gaining ground. But this first impression does not get to the heart of the present situation. The distinction between what is happening now and what was happening prior to the reforms is revealed by the different argumentation used to justify the special role of the party. If one leaves aside the standard set arguments in favor of the party's claim to the leading role (e.g., its advanced consciousness, its position as avant-garde of the working class, etc.), one sees that whereas formerly the claim was also based on "the situation of internal class struggle" (nationalization of industrry, collectivization in agriculture, etc.), on the existence of an alleged or real "threat" from abroad, or on the need to concentrate all forces in order to achieve a future, higher socioeconomic condition (scientific-technological revolution), these arguments have now generally been set aside or play only a peripheral role. The new arguments which have replaced them are based on a more sober orientation regarding the existing societal situation and on a substantially different assessment of the length of time in which qualitative changes in the state of the society can reasonably be expected to occur. In the view of the party itself, even socialist society functioning "on the basis of its own principles" (that is, even after the means of production are nationalized, overall social planning is introduced, etc.) will continue to produce and reproduce social differentiation and conflict. The present society is imperfect; and though it is progressing—at a pace which has not been determined—it will continue to struggle for a long time to come with the "birthmarks" of past eras, as well as with new problems of its own which will continue to arise. While it is true that the party continues to cling to the optimistic prospect of a "society of the future," this society remains undefined and serves at best, insofar as the pressing demands of the day permit, as a point of reference for the solution of current conflicts.

On the basis of such an assessment, the party can no longer legitimate its policy as it had during the economic reform period, by reference to a future to be created by the reforms. It can do so today only by demonstrating what it can do for society under present circumstances. Thus, the "improvement of the material and cultural standards of living" related to the performance of the economic system as formulated in the "main task" is an adequate expression of the challenge to which the party must respond in this new situation.

That the political leadership is aware of this specific challenge can be seen in its frequent use of the word "real." The party's attachment to "reality" is intended both as a commitment and as a warning. The "real view" and the "real plan" commit the party to transforming existing potentialities into practical realities. On the other hand, the leadership demurs to unrealizable hopes and experiments of the sort which in the history of the GDR have proved abortive time after time. The formula of "actually existing socialism" combines the two positions.[45] It

[44] See the entry "Scientific Councils" (*Wissenschaftliche Räte*) in *DDR-Handbuch*, Köln, Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1975, pp. 953 f.

[45] It seems that this notion was introduced by Erich Honecker at the Ninth Plenum of the Central Committee of the SED on May 28-29, 1973. See Erich Honecker, *Die Rolle der Arbeiterklasse . . .*, p. 317. Since then, it has appeared in Honecker's writings and in other publications in the GDR. For a recent example, see Erich Honecker, "The Socialist Revolution in the GDR and Its Prospects," *Neues Deutschland*, Sept. 27, 1977, p. 4. In this address, Honecker speaks of the GDR as having belonged "for a long time to the world of real socialism."

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

demonstrates the will of the present political leadership to preserve its own existence and at the same time to rebut the contentions of critical voices, especially on the left. On the "left," the party has seen illusionary wishful thinking at work which in the end might undermine established political structures.[46] The party opposes with equal forcefulness, however, those who lean more toward a right, social democratic position and urge the party to adopt an even more "pragmatic" policy. Apparently, the political leadership is aware of its own persisting lack of legitimacy and has concluded that it can maintain its position of power only by means of an intensive "politicization" of society.

The willingness of the SED to back away from goals and promises in which no one could earnestly continue to believe responded to a broadly-based attitude in the society of the GDR. In Ulbricht's time the society had too often been confronted with slogans which it knew to be unrealizable even as they were being proclaimed. As a result, the prospect of a period of secure and predictable normality which a gradual improvement of concrete living conditions promised was a sizable asset to the political leadership under Honecker, especially in its early years in power. The problem with such a "realistic" policy, given the party's will to self-preservation, derives from the implied necessity of daily "proving" itself anew. The success or failure of the political leadership is opened to almost daily judgment. In periods of crisis, such a "realistic" policy is seriously deficient in its ability to mobilize a positive emotional response. This defect is all the more troublesome for the SED since there exists no process for shaping the will of the people and thereby providing continuous integration, which alone could properly legitimate the party's position. The party, and especially its leadership, cling to the view that they must not permit their monopoly of power and force to be infringed upon, despite the fact that, except in acute crisis situations or for purposes of intimidation in particular cases, they are less and less able to make unlimited use of it. For if it is to achieve its economic goals, the party will have to depend to a considerable degree on individual initiative and desire to work, which could only be destroyed, not awakened or preserved intact, by the demonstrative use of coercive measures.

The policy shift of the party just discussed, away from distant goals toward individually experienced successes in the present, had to prove itself first of all in the economic field. The shift of emphasis in SED policy was evident, among other places, in the change made in basic agitation slogans. While into the 1960's the main slogan was "As we work today, we shall live tomorrow," today's slogan in the context of the "main task" is the "unity of economic and social policy." Of course, the thinking of the party expressed in this way does not deny the validity of the economic fact that in a growth-oriented economy today's investments mean forgone consumption. Nevertheless, under the "unity of economic and social policy," present needs are given higher priority than was the case in earlier years. Another point should be stressed in evaluating this new central slogan. The "just" distribution of goods produced is no longer expected to result immediately from a "correct" economic policy; it is seen to require an instrument of its own, i.e., social policy. Since only that which has actually been produced and is available can be distributed and consumed, however, the policy of the SED remains tied to the success of its economic policy.[47]

The Economic Situation

Economic development in the GDR after 1970-71 was burdened by the disproportions in the economy —referred to earlier in this essay—that had developed by 1969-70. By means of increased attention to supply industries which had been neglected and as a result of "realistic" plans, however, these disproportions in the economic structure of the country were soon eliminated, and greater stability in economic development was achieved. But after

[46] See, for example, the section entitled "The Falsification of the Marxist-Leninist Theory of Socialism as a Method of Fighting against Real Socialism," in *Philosophischer Revisionismus: Quellen, Argumente, Funktionen im ideologischen Klassenkampf* (Philosophical Revisionism: Sources, Arguments, Functions in Ideological Class Struggle), Berlin (East), Dietz Verlag, 1977, pp. 415 ff. In addition, this volume contains a comprehensive selected bibliography of Soviet and East German literature on the criticism of "revisionism." Ibid., pp. 426 ff.

[47] A detailed analysis of the development and present situation of the economy of the GDR would be beyond the scope of this article. For such information, see the weekly reports of the *Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung* in Berlin (West), which observes and analyzes the development of the economic situation in the GDR on a continuous basis. The institute has published the most important results of its research in summarized form in Doris Cornelsen et al., *Handbuch der DDR-Wirtschaft* (Handbook of the Economy of the GDR), Reinbeck b. Hamburg, Rowohlt Taschenbuchverlag, 1977. In addition, the *Forschungsstelle für gesamtdeutsche wirtschaftliche und soziale Fragen* in Berlin (West) investigates individual aspects of the economic development of the GDR, especially matters related to the planning and management of the economy. It publishes the series *FS-Analysen* (Research Office Analyses).

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1973, following the enormous rise worldwide of raw material prices—especially of crude oil prices—the GDR again found itself faced with a new situation.[48] Because the Soviet Union and the other member countries of CMEA raised their prices for raw materials traded within the bloc—though with a two-year time lag and not to the extent prices rose outside the bloc—the GDR, poor in raw materials as it is, experienced cost rises from which it has not been able to recover to this day.

In recent years, the GDR has become increasingly dependent on foreign trade.[49] While national income rose annually from 1960 to 1975 by an average 4.7 percent, foreign trade in the same period increased by 9.7 percent annually. By 1975, the country's export quotient (exports as a percentage of gross social product) had reached 25 percent, just as had that of the FRG. The deterioration of the GDR's trade position is clearly revealed, however, when price developments on the import and export sides of the country's foreign trade are compared. While from 1972 to 1975 prices for GDR exports increased by a total of 17 percent, prices for the goods it imported rose by 34 percent.

The serious problems resulting from this foreign trade situation were intensified by changes taking place in the regional structure of the GDR's foreign trade. Specifically, the relative importance of the socialist countries as trading partners declined, while that of the Western industrial countries increased. Both imports and exports were affected by this trend. But imports from the Western industrial countries grew much faster than exports to them, and the imbalance intensified the GDR's shortage of hard currency. Although the share of all the socialist countries in GDR imports averaged 76 percent in 1961-65, it dropped to 72.2 percent in 1966-70, and to only 65 percent in 1971-75. Imports from the Western industrial countries for these periods averaged, respectively, 20.1 percent, 23.9 percent, and 30.9 percent of total GDR imports. On the export side, the GDR sent to all the socialist countries 76.9 percent, 74.6 percent, and 72.7 percent of its total exports in the three periods, and it sent the Western industrial countries 19 percent, 20.8 percent and 23.2 percent, respectively. Foreign trade statistics for the GDR are incomplete, so that these figures must be considered as approximations. Nevertheless, they are likely to correctly reflect trends over the last decade and a half.



Willi Stoph, left, then Chairman of the GDR State Council, discusses trade between the GDR and FRG with Ernst Wolf Mommsen, head of the FRG's Krupp concerns, during the 1974 Leipzig trade fair.

—EUPRA.

As a result of these developments in its foreign trade situation, the GDR incurred significant foreign debt, especially in its dealings with the Western industrial states. Although reliable figures are not available, the net indebtedness of the GDR was estimated by the Bank of International Settlements in Basel, Switzerland, to have reached approximately US$3.5 billion by the middle of 1976.

Particular importance must be attributed to the GDR's trade with the FRG. Because the Federal Republic regards them as a special form of domestic trade ("intra-German trade"),[50] economic relations between the two states are especially advantageous to the GDR. The FRG is the second largest trading partner of the GDR, and the first by a wide margin among Western states. Since 1970, intra-German trade has increased steadily. While in that year the GDR imported goods from the FRG valued at 2.416 billion marks and exported goods valued at 1.99

[48] According to the index of world market prices of the *Hamburgisches Welt-Wirtschafts-Archiv* (Hamburg) raw material prices developed as follows between 1972 and 1976 (average of the years 1952-56 = index base 100): food and fodder prices rose from 114.6 in 1972 to 218.1 in 1976; industrial raw materials prices rose from 120.6 in 1972 to 320.1 in 1976; and combustibles and fuels rose from 129.8 in 1972 to 495.8 in 1976. *See Handbuch der DDR-Wirtschaft*, p. 251.

[49] For the basis of the following discussion, see ibid., pp. 246 ff.

[50] Ibid., pp. 264 ff., and Table 70, "The Development of Intra-German Trade," p. 365.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

billion marks, the corresponding figures for 1976 were 4.269 billion and 3.877 billion marks.[51] By 1976 the accumulated passive balance of the GDR in intra-German trade had reached DM2.6 billion. Its export-to-import ratio in this trade, meanwhile, remained constant at approximately 0.85.

Despite the growing share of East German trade which is with the West, the GDR's trade with CMEA states remains of decisive importance even as it declines slowly as a share of total trade. GDR imports from the CMEA states were 71.7 percent of total imports in 1961-65, 68.4 percent in 1966-70, and 62.1 percent in 1971-75. Exports to CMEA states were 72.9 percent, 69.3 percent, and 68.9 percent of total GDR exports for the same respective time periods.[52] As a rule, the GDR has exported industrial goods, especially machinery, and imported primarily raw materials and agricultural products of its CMEA partners. This exchange has reflected the relatively high level of development of the East German economy within CMEA. But it has also meant that the GDR has felt the effect of the price rise of its imports in CMEA trade as well as in trade outside the bloc, for the prices of finished goods change more slowly than those of unfinished goods. Unable to influence price trends in CMEA, the GDR has experienced trade deficits here also, especially in trade with the Soviet Union.

The worsening foreign trade situation of the GDR has had considerable influence on developments inside the country. Reducing imports and economizing on raw material consumption, on the one hand, and increasing the value and quantity of production for export, on the other, have become permanent and much emphasized components of competitive campaigns at and above the plant level, and have even found reflection in economic plan requirements. As examples of how the political leadership is trying to deal with the state of affairs confronting it, two items from the 1978 economic plan can be cited: the growth rate for foreign trade has been set at 11 percent (actual growth in 1977 was 7 percent); for investment, however, it has been set at a mere 2.1 percent (actual growth in 1977 was more than 6 percent).

The difficult situation which the GDR faces economically as a result of foreign trade problems is aggravated by weaknesses in the management and planning systems. Abandonment of the NÖSPL and ÖSS reform programs has led to an extensive recentralization of management and planning, which, in accordance with the general political line, has been interpreted as a strengthening of "democratic centralism."[53] The number of performance indicators in the plan has been raised again; but action has not been taken to refine the planning apparatus sufficiently to permit analysis of masses of data with the necessary measure of discrimination or in terms of systematic data correlations.[54] In like manner, the system of economic stimulation which developed around the notion of "profit" during the economic reforms has been abandoned in the wake of the rejection of "profit" as a decisive economic indicator, but no better, workable system has been devised to replace it.

The present system of management and planning is characterized by a high degree of inflexibility, which greatly complicates the desired process of integration of scientific-technological innovations into the economy, that is, the rapid application of research results to production. The results are higher production costs and technically less advanced products, both of which factors make it more difficult to sell what the GDR produces—at least on the world market.

In addition, though one goal of the economic reforms had been to develop a price system which more or less adequately reflected costs and performance, this pricing reform was never fully implemented and therefore never achieved the expected results. The perpetuation of price subsidies, especially for everyday necessities, thus continues to aggravate the problems stemming from the absence of an adequate method for evaluating economic performance.

In view of the overall situation just described, it is no wonder that pressure has mounted steadily on workers to improve their productivity, to economize on working time and working materials, and to better utilize modern production plant facilities. Nevertheless, results in these areas lag far behind expectations. In 1977, for example, "highly pro-

[51] These figures are in East German valuta-marks. On the special currency problems of intra-German trade, see *Handbuch der DDR-Wirtschaft*, p. 246, for a discussion of the valuta-mark; p. 265, for an explanation of the so-called "accounting unit" (*Verrechnungseinheit*).

[52] Ibid., Table 59, "Regional Structure of GDR Foreign Trade—Shares in Percent," p. 354. Also, Maria Haendcke-Hoppe, "On the Foreign Economic Situation of the GDR," in *DDR-Wirtschaft unter Effektivitätszwang* (The GDR Economy under Pressure for Efficiency), *FS-Analysen* (Berlin[West]), No. 4, 1977, pp. 13 ff.

[53] Stronger emphasis on political management in the economy found expression in the replacement of the "planning and management" formula by "management and planning."

[54] See *Handbuch der DDR-Wirtschaft*, pp. 88 ff.; and Kurt Erdmann, "Efforts to Intensify the Economic Mechanism," in *DDR-Wirtschaft unter Effektivitätszwang*, pp. 45 ff.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ductive machinery and equipment" was supposed to be utilized 15.6 hours per day, but the level of usage actually achieved was only 14.7 hours.[55] With regard to labor productivity, definite progress has been made in the GDR over the years. In spite of this, however, the lag in relation to the FRG has not diminished and has even increased a little since 1970. According to the computations of the *Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung* in Berlin, labor productivity in the GDR is still one third lower than in the FRG.[56]

This generally unsatisfactory and vexing economic situation of the country has by no means remained unnoticed in the GDR. On the contrary, in 1977 an intense discussion directed toward new reforms of the economic system began.[57] The clearly discernible goals of reform would be greater flexibility, greater innovative capability, and development of a system of indicators for measuring and stimulating performance. No clear official statements have been issued as yet, however, as to when and how such a reform project is to be initiated.

The Functions of Social Policy

Related to economic policy, in the GDR as elsewhere, is social policy. The basis for the development of an autonomous social policy in the GDR was provided by the political leadership's realization that there exists "no complete identity of the interests of the society, of the collective, or of individuals." "The establishment of harmony is a continuous process," and social policy plays a decisive supporting role in it.[58] Social policy is defined as the "aggregate of activities, measures, means, and methods through which the development of the socialist way of life, the various aspects of the material and cultural standard of living, and population dynamics are managed and molded."[59] It is expected to serve "in the framework of the overall policy, to achieve the desired social development and to eliminate, if not to avoid altogether, disproportions which impede the progress of the socialist society."[60]

As these definitions show, the task of social policy is considered to be twofold. On the one hand, its function is the same as it is normally in Western capitalist societies, namely, to compensate, after they have occured, for socially unsatisfactory results arising out of unequal opportunities and inequitable distribution procedures in the production process, and to assure certain disadvantaged groups (invalids, the elderly, etc.) a "suitable living standard in line with existing possibilities. On the other hand, the party considers social policy as a potential new instrument for influencing societal development: "The social structure and its development constitute the point of departure and the perceived goal of social policy."[61]

Up to now, however, social policy has been unable to fulfill these roles. In the first instance, there have not been sufficient means available to begin an effective, future-oriented redistribution process. In the second, not enough research has been done on actual sociostructural processes in the society of the GDR to permit systematic measures to be taken to influence them. Furthermore, the goals toward which societal change is to be oriented are still too broadly defined to be converted into concrete planning criteria. The 1960's discussion of ethics, it is true, has been replaced by a much more concrete debate on the contents of the "socialist way of life," which may eventually lead to results which permit sociostructural measures to be introduced. But the results that have become known thus far are not sufficient for the development of a system of social indicators which could be used for planning purposes.

Social policy has become important in the GDR in terms of its function of eliminating, or at least reducing existing wrongs. In this function, it is clearly linked to economic policy. With its help, reserves

[55] Erich Honecker, "The Socialist Revolution . . .," loc. cit., p. 4.

[56] See *Handbuch der DDR-Wirtschaft*, pp. 106 ff. According to these computations, labor productivity in the GDR was 67 percent of that of the FRG in 1967 and 64 percent in 1974. If the more extensive employment of labor reserves in the GDR is taken into consideration and if computations are made on the basis of the entire—instead of only the working—population, the lag of the GDR behind the FRG declines by about one fourth. East German productivity appears then to have been 78 percent of West German in 1967, 76 percent in 1974.

[57] Two recent examples with political significance are "On the Further Perfection of the Management, Planning, and Economic Stimulation of Social Production. The Development and Consolidation of the Collective in Socialist Production," in *Wirtschaftswissenschaft* (Berlin [East]), No. 8, 1977, pp. 1121 ff.; and Otto Reinhold, "Intensification—A Social Process of Historic Significance," *Einheit*, No. 1, 1978, pp. 62 ff. Reinhold is a member of the Central Committee of the SED and Director of the Academy for Social Sciences attached to it.

[58] *Marxistisch-leninistische Sozialpolitik* (Marxist-Leninist Social Policy), Berlin (East), Verlag Tribüne, 1975, p. 16. On the discussion which follows, see Hartmut Zimmermann, "Social Policy as Societal Policy?" in *DDR-Report* (Bonn—Bad Godesberg), No. 12, 1976, pp. 749 ff.

[59] *Marxistisch-leninistische Sozialpolitik*, p. 73.

[60] Ibid.

[61] Ibid.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



One of four construction teams working around the clock in 1976 to build apartments in the GDR city of Magdeburg.

—Eastfoto.

"for increasing the efficiency of the economy" are to be tapped, and problems detrimental to labor productivity are to be cleared up. Both of the programs of social policy which have been adopted thus far—the first after the Eighth SED Congress, the second after the Ninth—are identical in their social goal orientation.[62] Until 1990 housing construction is to be considered the cornerstone of social policy. From 1971 to 1975, 400,000 new housing units were built, and 209,000 were renovated. During the 1976-80 five-year plan period, an additional 550,000 new dwellings are to be constructed, and 200,000 more are to be modernized. In addition, rents in the GDR continue to be subsidized by the government and remain extremely low (between 0.80 and 1.25 marks per square meter). Clearly, the government's housing goals taken as a whole call for the investment of considerable resources. By the same token, the neglect of older buildings—most of which are still privately owned, but because of low rents are not kept in good repair by the owners—and an ebb in construction activity had created a truly desolate state of affairs in the housing sector; and the town-planning and architectural conception of newly constructed neighborhoods shows hardly any positive sign of system-specific, socialist sociopolitical considerations.[63]

[62] On the first program of social policy, see *Was der VIII. Parteitag beschloss wird sein! Neue sozialpolitische Massnahmen. Erläuterungen, gemeinsamer Beschluss und gesetzliche Bestimmungen* (What the Eighth Party Congress Decided Will Happen! New Sociopolitical Actions—Commentary, Joint Decrees, Statutory Regulations), Berlin (East), Verlag Tribüne, 1972. On the second package of measures, see *Sozialpolitisches Programm des IX. Parteitages der SED. Dokumente* (Sociopolitical Program of the Ninth Congress of the SED: Documents), Berlin (East), Verlag Tribüne, 1977.

[63] On housing construction, see *Sozialistische Wohnungspolitik: Textausgabe mit Anmerkungen und Sachregister* (Socialist Housing Policy: Texts with Notes and Index), Berlin (East), Staatsverlag der DDR, 1977. There was a specific change of policy concerning rents immediately after the Eighth Party Congress: rents were graduated according to income (up to a family income of 2,000 marks), and workers were accorded priority in the apportionment of living space. As a result, a situation was remedied which in the 1960's had led to the apportionment of new apartments mainly to members of the technical and economic intelligentsia.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Another area in which the political leadership of the GDR hoped to apply social policy was that of population dynamics. The declining birthrate of the country's population—a symptom of the stress to which women found themselves subjected as a result of their filling jobs while not being relieved in any meaningful way of household and family duties—had become a matter of particular concern. After abortion became legal in 1972 and once contraceptives could be obtained free of cost, the fertility rate (number of births per 1,000 women aged 15 to 44 inclusive), which had not been very high even before, declined rapidly. While in 1960 it had been 83.9, it was 69 in 1971, 58.6 in 1972, and 52.3 in 1975.[64] These rates no longer guaranteed full reproduction of the society. Other undesirable side effects of the increased employment of women included increased absenteeism in industry and a growth in the number of women working part-time.

To counter all of these trends and to lighten the extra burden placed on working mothers, pregnancy and confinement leave was extended from 18 to 26 weeks. Moreover, after the birth of a second child, the mother became entitled to a one-year leave and sick-pay during the whole of this period. Finally, on May 1, 1977, a 40-hour week at full pay was introduced for every mother with two or more children under 16 years of age in her own household.[65]

(The work week has been reduced for another category of workers as well—the shift worker. One of the economic goals pursued in recent years has been the introduction of shift work in factories so as to utilize at full capacity the modern production equipment which has been installed. Shift work is still widely rejected, however, by workers at the plant level. To overcome their resistance and, at the same time, to mitigate the social and health hazards incidental to shift work, the work week was reduced in 1977 to 40 hours for workers employed in three-shift systems and to 42 hours for those employed in two-shift systems. In addition, the annual vacation time of workers in both types of systems was extended by three days.)

Wage policy is equally a part of social policy. It is supposed to guarantee a minimum standard of living and a just distribution of rewards according to work performance, and also to help raise work productivity. To serve the first of these goals, the minimum wage was raised from 350 to 400 marks on October 1, 1976, while wages between 400 and 500 marks were raised by proportionately smaller amounts. The number of wage earners in these lowest income brackets remains extremely high—approximately 1 million—so that at least every seventh blue- or white-collar worker benefited from these measures.[66]

From the point of view of the national economy, the wage reform begun in 1976 has been the most important one.[67] Its intent has been once more to relate income more closely to performance. The present wage system has not fulfilled this sort of function for years. New job classifications, the improvement of production procedures, the establishment of corresponding (i.e., higher) work norms and better wages—all of these measures are to be implemented in all key industries as part of a unified process by 1980, and will affect 1.5 million persons employed there.[68] This wage reform had long been under discussion, but the GDR leadership had been wary of moving too quickly because of its earlier experiences with the compulsory introduction of higher work norms. During the early course of the wage reform, higher incomes were, in fact, achieved. (In any case, the wage increases provided for in the economic plans were apparently used largely for this reform.) However, since the new wages and salaries are being introduced only in certain branches of industry, and even there only gradually into all plants, existing discrepancies and the resentment which they create, as well as a corresponding, economically damaging fluctuation

[64] *Statistisches Jahrbuch der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, 1977.* (Statistical Yearbook of the GDR, 1977), Berlin (East), Staatsverlag der DDR, 1977, p. 410.

[65] For mothers who had three children under the age of 16 and for those who had two children and who worked in double-shift systems, the 40-hour week had already been introduced in 1972. Mothers of many children were accorded extra privileges in pension computation. Unmarried women living alone have also benefited from the new sociopolitical measures: since Jan. 1, 1977, they have received one day off a month for housekeeping chores.

[66] In 1976 there were 7.07 million workers and employees in the GDR. This figure includes those working part-time.

[67] On the wage reform, see Jürgen Strassburger, "A New Experiment in Wage Policy? Aspects of the New Regime of Base Wages in the GDR," *DA*, No. 9, 1976, pp. 950 ff.; and Hartmut Zimmermann, "The Wage System is Reformed in the GDR," *Die Quelle* (Köln), No. 3, 1977, pp. 114 ff.

[68] In this context the new Labor Code (*Arbeitsgesetzbuch*) of the GDR, which became effective on Jan. 1, 1978, must be mentioned also. It contains a number of sociopolitical improvements, especially in the area of labor protection, in the granting of leave for medical examination, etc. What may prove more important is the fact that a number of new contractual instruments were provided for which enhance job security. Special care was taken to guarantee maintenance of income and professional qualification in case rationalization measures are introduced. Finally, the code serves increasingly the cause of orderly settlement of labor conflicts. See Hartmut Zimmermann, "A New Labor Code of the GDR is Passed," *Die Quelle*, No. 9, 1977, pp. 351 ff.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in the labor force, are rather likely to increase over the coming years.

If one turns from wage to price policy, one sees that in the GDR the policy of "stable prices" plays an important propaganda role. In 1976, expenditures for "product-bound subsidies to maintain consumer prices and rates" were in the neighborhood of 13 billion marks (of which 7 billion went to food price subsidies)—some 780 marks per citizen.[69] The sociopolitical value of these expenditures seems doubtful, however, since those with high incomes benefit from them to the same extent as those with low incomes. These measures, therefore, have had no mitigating effect on existing social differences. Meanwhile, because the finances required to support prices are raised by means of a consumption tax on industrial products—the so-called "product-bound duty"—many of the taxed products become so expensive as to be hardly within the reach of low-income earners, while those who already dispose of higher incomes and draw additional benefit from price-subsidy policies can step forward as buyers. Despite these effects, and despite the fact that the function of prices as economic indicators is further diminished by current GDR price policies, all current statements of the political leadership indicate that the subsidization of prices will continue.[70]

Finally, as early as 1968 a new pension policy orientation was initiated. Up to that time the maximum income subject to pension tax was fixed at 600 marks, while the allowance made for periods of insurance before 1945 was unfavorable. As a result, pensions were very low, the average old-age pension in 1965 being approximately 173 marks a month.[71] This pension policy was the object of continued criticism until the limits on insurable income were removed by making it possible to cover monthly income in excess of 600 marks with voluntary supplementary insurance. In addition, the manner in which pensions were computed was improved, and on December 1, 1976, minimum pensions were raised to 230-300 marks, the exact amount depending on the number of years the pensioner had worked. Although the most recent measures are only beginning to become operative, and although the supplementary insurance program in particular has not yet greatly affected pensions which are now becoming payable, previously enacted regulations have already produced a substantial increase in pension incomes, as compared with conditions prevailing at the outset. In 1970, the average pension had been approximately 199 marks; by 1976, it had risen to approximately 300 marks.

This survey of the most important sociopolitical measures introduced in the GDR since 1971 illustrates the efforts which have been made to help certain groups. At the same time, it indicates that the social situation in the GDR continues to be far from satisfactory. Either problems have remained unrecognized too long, or no funds have been assigned to their solution. Under these circumstances, social policy in the GDR will hardly be able to fulfill its intended function as social development policy. For a long time to come its main task will be to ease the lot of those whose burden is particularly heavy or who belong to those social groups which have been neglected because they do not do "productive" work.

Education: Change and Continuity

The reorientation toward slower scientific-technological progress and the realization that in the foreseeable future fewer jobs requiring highly qualified personnel will be available than one might have wished are factors which have had substantial influence on educational policy since 1971. The most important changes took place in the realm of higher education. Universities and other institutions of higher learning had been expanded in accordance with the expectations raised by the scientific-technological revolution. But because the expansion of capacity (attained by adding to teaching personnel and converting trade and technical schools into university-level institutions) took considerable time, admissions began to soar only in 1968 and reached their high point of 44,000 in 1971. At that time, however, it had already become clear to the political leadership that there was no longer a need for so many graduates, or rather, that there would not be an adequate supply of suitable jobs for them. Since that time, the leadership has reduced the number of admissions, to about 32,000 in 1976.[72]

Those hardest hit by the increased difficulty of admission to institutions of higher learning were individuals already working who were seeking ad-

[69] Maria Elisabeth Ruban and Heinz Vortmann, "The Budget of the GDR as a Sign of Foreign Economic Pressure," *DIW Wochenbericht* (Berlin [West]), No. 5, 1978, pp. 53 ff., esp. p. 57.

[70] Erich Honecker, "The Socialist Revolution . . .," p. 4. Honecker specified that a total of 120 billion marks would be spent from 1971 until 1980 to "guarantee stable retail prices, rents and service costs."

[71] *Statistisches Jahrbuch* . . ., p. 382.

[72] Ibid., p. 331.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

mission to correspondence courses: the number admitted fell from 9,711 in 1971 to 3,405 in 1976. Such courses were intended precisely for people who, while pursuing their professional careers, wanted to acquire the additional qualifications necessary for positions they already occupied or were striving to occupy. Ideologically as well, the specifically vertical social mobility achieved in this manner had originally been greeted with approval. The courses seemed to guarantee that even later in life it was possible for persons of working-class origin to rise to leadership positions. In addition, the long years of practical work experience and the desirable social origins of graduates of these courses could serve to counteract tendencies toward the establistment of a sterotyped "socialist" university man. On the negative side, however, correspondence courses were and are "uneconomical" in comparison with other forms of education. The additional costs involved in supervising students, expenditures for paid educational leaves, etc., seem difficult to justify in light of a dropout rate far above average.

Because it came at a time when the composition of the student body in higher education was being subjected to criticism, the reduction of admissions to correspondence courses, with its sociological implications, took people by surprise. By 1971, 40-50 percent of the student body came from intellectual-class backgrounds, while the share of students from working-class backgrounds had undergone a steady decline.[73] As a result, it was decided to make university admission once again more dependent on social origin, as a means of blocking the trend evident in the 1971 figures toward the creation of a self-recruiting "socialist intelligentsia." No figures on the present composition of the student body are available, but since socialization conditions in the GDR are still different for the working class and for the intelligentsia (as seen, for example, by the important part "informal relations" play in university admissions), it would seem unlikely that a reversal of recent trends could be achieved solely by means of changes in admissions policies.



Experienced production worker Richard Titsch shows apprentice Christin Bauer how to operate a vacuum apparatus in the manufacture of light bulbs at the NARVA plant in Karl-Marx-Stadt district of the GDR.

—EUPRA.

At the lower-qualification level, efforts begun at the time of the educational reform to raise general training standards have been continued. The percentage of unskilled and semiskilled workers in the total working population decreased from 43.7 percent in 1970 to 32.9 percent in 1975, while that of skilled workers increased from 44.9 percent to 53.0 percent during the same period.[74]

This generally high level of training of the working population in the GDR creates substantial pressure in the direction of improved work standards, but only a limited response is possible. The consequences of the lasting "underutilization" (*Unterforderung*) of qualified workers have been labor dissatisfaction and a high rate of labor turnover.[75] Since

[73] See Berthold Knauer's contribution to the debate in *Protokoll des 8. FDGB-Kongresses vom 26. bis 30. Juni 1972* (Protocol of the Eighth FDGB Congress of June 26-30, 1972), Berlin (East), Verlag Tribüne, 1972, p. 97. Knauer asserted that more than 40 percent of the students in institutes of higher learning came from families of the socialist intelligentsia. Walter Sieber reported with respect to the situation in the Dresden district "that the share of children of workers and peasants in our institutions of higher learning in the Dresden district is only 40-50 percent, and among students doing research work it is only 20-30 percent, even though workers directly employed in production constitute more than 65 percent of the total working population of Dresden and about 80 percent of the working-class population of the district." Ibid., p. 543.

[74] See *Produktivität—Effektivität—Kontinuität* (Productivity—Efficiency—Continuity), Berlin (East), Dietz Verlag, 1977, pp. 49 f. It is important to realize that in the different age groups the percentage of those who have completed professional training varies widely. They constitute only around 45 percent of those aged 55 to 60, but more than 80 percent among those aged 25 to 30 years. This is an indication of the success of the GDR's educational policy. Significantly, the levels of qualification of men and women in the lower age groups have been equalized to a large degree.

[75] Ibid., pp. 50 ff.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in various individual branches of industry training expenditures are listed as "education capital," or perhaps as "social expense," and thus almost as "capital equipment," a more exacting use of the labor force would be desirable from the standpoint of efficiency also. Much is expected in this regard from the scientific organization of production,[76] even though the protracted nature and the contradictory character of technological developments are understood: "This task is undoubtedly a complicated one since, among other things, different levels of technological innovation make differing and partly contradictory demands on labor, and, for economic reasons, monotonous work at the conveyor belt cannot yet be dispensed with." [77] In order to reduce existing discontent by means of material gratification, if in no other way, the present wage reform considers training or education programs completed to be important criteria for promotion to higher wage brackets.[78]

Cultural Policy

Cultural policy and the cultural scene in the GDR, particularly in the literary realm, have received much broader attention in the West than any other trends or problem areas of the country's domestic societal development. Attention has been particularly great in the FRG. Interest has been stimulated, in the first place, by the GDR's noisy controversies with some of its writers and by the accompanying expulsion or departure from the country of a number of writers during recent years, and, in the second place, by the regard which at least part of the literature of the GDR has aroused in interested circles of the West German public. In addition, it has derived from the accurate observation that information on the situation in the GDR can be obtained from novels, short stories, poems, and, in part, works of fine art. Such information is either not to be found at all in scientific or journalistic publications, or is presented is so highly formalized and ideologically obscured a manner as to be accessible, at best, only to the specialist involved in continuous study, certainly not to the average reader. The many public readings which writers from the GDR have given in the FRG in recent years—during which more general discussions have taken place as well—have also facilitated the reception of literature from the GDR. The writers have been, in a sense, representatives of a real and vivid GDR—a place which in many other respects has seemed so intangible.

A positive appreciation of the role of East German writers is indeed justified, since literature—and the other arts—play a much more important role in the society of the GDR than, for instance, in Western societies. It is in literature that themes are treated, bits of information passed on, and relationships between personal fortune and sociopolitical processes and decisions illustrated, which often relate directly to the experience of the individual in the GDR, but which are publicly examined only through the artistic media. Literature and the arts in general encounter in the GDR a society which has learned to detect what is universal in the individual case, and which knows how to read between the lines. Forced "politicization" has contributed to this "sensitization." The country's educational policy as a whole, but in particular "mass cultural activities" intended to awaken an interest in cultural pursuits, created the preconditions for it. Receptiveness to art has grown even in social strata which traditionally have shown no interest in literature, theater, or the fine arts.[79] The contradictory nature of the results of the official policy of the party are thus revealed. Actions and educational programs intended to have an integrating effect, and in many respects oriented toward the creation of a narrow "party-mindedness," have in fact established levels of knowledge and developed capabilities which lead to and promote critical thought.

Since literature and art have an influence on a relatively large proportion of the society of the GDR, it is understandable that cultural policy is accorded high priority in the framework of SED policy. In trying to implement its cultural policy, however, the party encounters special difficulties. Unlike the level of influence it can exert on industrial production processes, there are limits to what it can accomplish in prescribing content, trends, and forms in works of art. It can prevent public presentation or exhibition and attempt by incentives and sanctions to promote certain tendencies. But the party has never succeeded in actually committing artists to its service.

[76] On the scientific organization of work processes, see Jürgen Strassburger, "Scientific Organization of Production in the GDR: Methodical Considerations for an Analysis," *DA*, No. 2, 1975, pp. 139 ff. and No. 6, 1975, pp. 611 ff.

[77] *Produktivität—Effektivität,—Kontinuität*, p. 51.

[78] See Hartmut Zimmermann, "The Wage System is Reformed in the GDR," p. 115.

[79] See Erik Nohara, "The Working Class and Culture," *DA*, Special Volume 1977, pp. 44 ff.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

East German dissident folk singer Wolf Biermann, seen in his East Berlin apartment in 1976, less than a year before the GDR deprived him of his citizenship while he was on a concert tour in the West.

—Black Star.

Among other things, the Eighth Party Congress of the SED drew some conclusions from this situation and tried to formulate a new policy line which would strengthen the influence of the party by expanding the limits of the permissible.[80] The introduction of a changed, more broad-minded approach to cultural policy was made easier for the SED leadership by its own perception that the further development of society was going to be more protracted and was going to involve more contradictions than it had previously been willing to admit. Aware that it often lacked clear insight into relationships and processes in many spheres of the society, the leadership felt that literature could make problems visible and thus contribute to a better understanding of what they were—to a kind of "self-enlightenment" of leadership and society.

This change in cultural policy was in no way intended to set the arts free or to allow the artist to express "noncommittal" subjective opinion. On the contrary, the selection of socially "useful" themes was to be tied to the principles of "party-mindedness" and "closeness to the people." But this, in turn, was contradictory to many of the views of a distinctly different tone which the leadership had expressed in preceding years. "The creative search for new forms" had been explicitly advocated, and the artist had been instructed to treat "contradictions to be overcome" in the society as well as what was "great and beautiful." [81] It was Honecker himself

[80] On the cultural policy of the GDR, see, in addition to the sources cited in note 19, Liliane Crips, "The Representation of Social Conflicts in the Novelistic Literature of the GDR" and Manfred Jäger, "Cultural Policy in the GDR after the Eighth Party Congress of the SED," both in *DA*, Special Volume 1975. See also *DA*, Special Volume 1977, which includes contributions on cultural policy, literary policy, fine arts, and architecture.

[81] See Erich Honecker, "Report of the Central Committee to the Eighth Party Congress of the SED," in *Protokoll der Verhandlungen des VIII. Parteitages . . .*," pp. 94 ff., esp. p. 95.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

who on December 17, 1971, at the Fourth Plenum of the Central Committee of the SED, gave clearest expression to the new party line when he said: "As long as one proceeds from the firm position of socialism, there can in my opinion be no taboos in the field of art and literature. This applies to questions of content as well as of style—in short, to those questions which constitute what one calls artistic mastery."[82]

This was the death knell of socialist realism insofar as it had been aimed at imposing mandatory rules of content and form. What remained was the "firm position of socialism," i.e., "party-mindedness." According to how the party defined socialism, to how narrowly it interpreted this concept, it could reject or even forbid certain works of art. When interpreted "broadly," the "position of socialism" could be perceived to embrace many things which in strained domestic or international situations might appear dangerous. It did not come as a surprise, therefore, that at the moment when the domestic situation became more tense—in the wake, among other things, of worsening economic conditions and the intensification of intra-German relations—controversies with the writers began. When the writers organized because they rightly felt that the Biermann case had a direct bearing on them all, they ventured into a political field in which the party had just stated its opinion. The leadership of the SED believed it had no choice but to take disciplinary action. Compared to what had happened in the past, the reaction of the party was "moderate," even if it was painful to those affected. It created, however, a lingering feeling of uncertainty and renewed doubts as to the credibility of official statements.

As the literary periodicals of the GDR—*Sinn und Form* (Sense and Form) and *Neue Deutsche Literatur* (New German Literature) especially—show, the measures taken in the wake of the Biermann resolution (expulsions from the Writers' Union, arrests, and expulsions from the GDR) do not indicate an end to the cultural policy established by the Eighth Party Congress, at least not so far. Nor have there been any of the customary "professions of repentance." Apparently the majority of the writers are resolved to persevere in this conflict and to preserve the ground which has been gained. Beyond this, there are many signs that the writers and artists have been used in the settlement of other political conflicts within the party apparatus itself.[83]

International Recognition

When on September 9, 1973, the GDR (simultaneously with the FRG) became a member of the United Nations, it achieved—or so it seemed—what it had been striving for since its foundation: international legal recognition of its statehood, and thus confirmation and assurance of its separate development as a second German state. This fundamental change in the foreign relations of the GDR has had a substantial impact on the country's domestic situation. Significantly though, it is mainly the "imperfections" of the GDR's status—included in the bargain which created the new situation, despite opposition from the East German political leadership—that have affected, and continue to affect, the official self-image of the GDR, the nature of the country's relationship with the Soviet Union, and the mood of East German society. Imperfections remained, of course, by virtue of the special nature of the GDR's relations with the other German state and by virtue of the failure of the agreements which had been signed to separate West Berlin from the FRG.

As already noted in the description of the conditions under which the present political leadership assumed power, the change in strategic orientation of the SED leadership took place in 1970, mainly as a result of pressure created by the negotiations

[82] Erich Honecker, *Zu aktuellen Fragen bei der Verwirklichung der Beschlüsse unseres VIII. Parteitages. Aus dem Schlusswort auf der 4. Tagung des ZK der SED* (On Current Questions Relating to the Implementation of the Resolutions of Our Eighth Party Congress. From the Closing Statement of the Fourth Plenum of the Central Committee of the SED), Berlin (East), Dietz Verlag, 1971.

[83] The complex nature of GDR literature cannot be treated within the context of this article. But the idea that the writers are basically opposed to the existing system is certainly misleading. On the contrary, the writers feel very much a part of this society. Indeed they are taking their "social responsibility" increasingly seriously, by determining its "content" themselves. Moreover, the contents and purposes of criticism are by no means uniform, but reflect a broad spectrum of opinion. The Writers' Union has more than 700 members, and this number can be taken as an indication of the size of this group in society. One has to keep in mind, however, that as a rule only writers who have already "arrived" are union members. Thus, younger writers are not included in this figure. On the other hand, some members are journalists rather than literary writers.

The relationship between citizens of the GDR and the writers as individual members of society is ambivalent. Literary works meet with a lively response, *Kultur* continues to be highly regarded, and the artist, therefore, enjoys high social prestige. On the other hand, artists are envied for their special position. As a rule, they have a much higher standard of living, earn Western currency, and enjoy incomparably greater freedom of movement—including travel to the FRG and other Western countries—than their compatriots. Among the writers themselves, there exist highly competitive relations, which are exploited by party and state organs and which often play a part in public controversies among the writers.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

between the USSR and the FRG that led to the signing on August 12, 1970, of their Treaty on the Renunciation of Force and the Normalization of Relations, and by the opening on March 26, 1970, of Four-Power negotiations on the status of Berlin (which culminated in an agreement being signed on September 3, 1971). These negotiations and agreements made it clear that the GDR would not be able to attain its maximum goals, since the Soviet Union, because of "overriding" considerations, was signaling the need for a *limited* readiness to make concessions. Although the agreement between the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic indicated the acceptance of existing borders, the Soviet side nevertheless took note of a letter submitted by the Federal Republic in which the latter stated its legal position on the question of German unity. The entry into force of the Four-Power Agreement, in which the Soviet Union guaranteed the transit of nonmilitary persons and goods between the western sectors of Berlin and the FRG and confirmed "that the ties between the western sectors of Berlin and the Federal Republic of Germany will be maintained and developed," not only showed that substantial concessions were expected from the GDR as well in its views concerning West Berlin, but made clear that the Soviet Union could exercise decisive influence on the foreign policy of the GDR and was not afraid to do so before the eyes of the world. The Four-Power Agreement predetermined the principal content of traffic arrangements between the FRG and the GDR by establishing a linkage between the Transit Agreement of December 17, 1971 (between the two German governments) and the Arrangement

GDR State Secretary Michael Kohl, left, and West German Minister-without-Portfolio Egon Bahr exchange copies of the Treaty on the Bases of Relations Between the FRG and the GDR at a signing ceremony on December 21, 1972, in East Berlin.

—Pictorial Parade.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

concerning the Facilitation and Improvement of Travel and Visitor Traffic of December 20, 1971 (between the Berlin [West] Senate and the GDR), on the one hand, and the Four-Power Agreement itself, on the other. All of the agreements were brought into force on June 6, 1972, by the Final Protocol of the Four Powers.

The way in which these negotiations were carried on demonstrated that even in the future the GDR would be unable to escape the consequences of the common German past, most notably, the after-effects of World War II. Like that of the Federal Republic—though some distinctions can be made—the existence of the GDR as a state remains a product of these shared experiences and is determined by them.

The form and content of the Basic Treaty between the GDR and the FRG which was signed on December 21, 1972, and which entered into force on June 21, 1973, reconfirmed this situation. Full international legal recognition could not be attained, and Honecker spoke rather of an agreement "conditioned by international law." The treaties made prior to this and those relating to matters of detail which have followed all show the effect of a common past which is still "present" and which, as such, will contribute to the shaping of the future.

As a result, it has not been possible for the GDR to achieve all important goals of the "defensive" strategy in foreign policy. The implications of the defensive concept would suggest that "delimitation" (*Abgrenzung*) from the Federal Republic should now be especially emphasized—at least verbally—by stressing the thesis of the development of a separate socialist nation in the GDR. But this argument would immediately lead to self-contradiction. Thus, the new Program of the SED dedicates a separate chapter in its foreign policy section to relations with the Federal Republic (the only capitalist country treated individually) and expressly attributes "German nationality" to the citizens of the GDR.[84]

The new Constitution of the GDR adopted on October 7, 1974, reflected the logic of the defensive strategy, though not entirely insofar as the national question was concerned. In the Constitution of April 6, 1968, the GDR still defined itself as a "socialist state of the German nation." In addition, in Article 8, Paragraph 2, it included a mandate for reunification: "The German Democratic Republic and its citizens will work, moreover, to overcome the division of Germany imposed by imperialism on the German nation and to effect a rapprochement by steps between the two German states until their unification on the basis of democracy and socialism." The new self-identification as expressed in the Constitution of 1974 dispensed with a national characterization of the GDR altogether, replacing it with an exclusively political one: "The German Democratic Republic is a socialist state of workers and peasants." The "offensive" stance vis-à-vis the FRG was replaced by a "defensive" bond with the Soviet Union: "The German Democratic Republic is forever and irrevocably allied with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics."[85]

Like the old constitution, the new one provides (in Article 65) that "fundamental laws . . . before being enacted will be submitted to the population for discussion," but while the Constitution of 1968 had been confirmed by referendum, the Constitution of 1974, which incorporated drastic changes for which the population was totally unprepared, was passed directly by the People's Chamber—a procedure which reflected the lack of self-confidence of the political leadership with regard to the treatment of the "national" question in the new document. Those who make policy in the GDR apparently wanted to avoid public discussion of the problem.

The special relationship of the GDR with the Soviet Union asserted in the new Constitution was confirmed by the treaty of friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance concluded by the GDR and the USSR on October 7, 1975. This treaty again speaks of "relations of eternal and inviolable friendship and fraternal mutual assistance in all fields," and it also contains declarations of intent concerning an integrationist policy. The special position of the Soviet Union is manifest not only in the stipulation that the GDR will become assimilated to the Soviet model, but also in Article 10's reservation to the Soviet Union of rights acquired by virtue of Four-Power

[84] See *Protokoll der Verhandlungen des IX. Parteitages der SED . . .*, Vol. 2, pp. 254 f., where the Four-Power Agreement on Berlin is made part of the Program of the SED. On the present state of the ideological debate, see Alfred Kosing, *Nation in Geschichte und Gegenwart. Studie zur historisch-materialistischen Theorie der Nation* (The Nation Past and Present: Study of the Historical-Materialist Theory of the Nation), Berlin (East), Dietz Verlag, 1976; and the contributions of the participants from the GDR in the international scientific conference on "Development and the International Cooperation of the Socialist Nations," which took place in Moscow on Oct. 23-24, 1973. The protocol of the proceedings of the conference was published under the title *Sozialismus und Nationen* (Socialism and Nations), Berlin (East), Dietz Verlag, 1976.

[85] On the constitutions, see the annotated editions by Herwig Roggemann, *Die DDR-Verfassungen* (The Constitutions of the GDR), Berlin (West), Verlag Arno Spitz, 1976.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

responsibilities in Germany after 1945 and its status as occupying power. Article 10 states that the treaty "does not affect the rights and obligations of the High Contracting Powers [deriving] from valid bilateral and multilateral agreements."[86]

When all of these treaties had come into force, there occurred a shift in the interests of the Soviet Union and the GDR. After the stipulations of the various treaties initiated the normalization and regulation of relations between the two Germanys, these relations began to develop a certain independent life of their own. So many unresolved questions had been left over from the time of "non-relations," and so many new ones kept emerging, that there arose on the state level a need for continuous communication and consultation. This does not mean that the relations evolved free of conflict. On the contrary, the GDR tried repeatedly to modify in its own favor concessions it had made. But the fact remains that intra-German relations acquired an undeniable, if conflict-ridden, intensity. Because of its interest in an all-European conference which would give de facto recognition to the results of World War II in Europe, the Soviet Union itself had prepared the ground for this development. But after the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) met in Helsinki in the summer of 1975, it became just as imperative a Soviet interest that intra-German communications not get out of control. The repeated statements reported by the press in which Soviet diplomats caution against too rapid and too far-reaching a growth of special intra-German relations, can be understood when viewed in this framework.

Inside the DDR as well, the outcome of CSCE had an effect. This effect was magnified by the Conference of European Communist Parties in Berlin in June 1976—a conference in which the SED played a special role as inviting and presiding party. The contents of Basket Three of the Helsinki Final Act as well as the coming to light of divergent opinions among the European communist parties caught the interest of the population of the GDR. Moreover, publication of the Helsinki accords as well as certain Eurocommunist statements in *Neues Deutschland*, the central organ of the SED, provided support for modes of thinking which the party could not as a matter of course discount as hostile.

[86] The text of the treaty can be found in *Die Entwicklung der Beziehungen zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik*, pp. 235 ff.

Soviet Communist Party General Secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev stands to propose a toast during the June 1976 European communist parley in East Berlin. Seated to Brezhnev's left is Erich Honecker, First Secretary of the GDR's Socialist Unity Party, which hosted the gathering.

—EUPRA.

Relative Opening of the Western Border

An important result of the various agreements concluded between the Bonn government and the Berlin (West) Senate, on the one side, and the government of the GDR, on the other, has been the intensification—or new beginning—of communication between the citizens of the two German states. Most conspicuous is the increase in visitor traffic, which seems at this point to have reached a constant level —with only slight fluctuations from year to year. In 1977 more than 2.9 million West Germans and 3.4 million West Berliners traveled to East Berlin and the GDR. To these figures must be added that for one-day visits by citizens of the FRG to East Berlin. These in 1977 numbered approximately 1.4 million. Traffic in the opposite direction is still mainly confined to visits by people already on pension. These, too, have reached a more or less constant figure. In 1977 they totaled 1.3 million. Younger inhabitants of the GDR receive travel permits for the FRG only in cases

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Eased passport and customs controls for West German visitors at the East German border in November 1972.

—EUPRA.

of pressing family matters. Even so, 41,500 such authorizations were granted in 1977.[87]

In addition to personal encounters, the opportunities for communication which have been made possible by the steady improvement since 1969 of telephone service between the two Germanies must be taken into account. The number of calls from the FRG and West Berlin to the GDR increased from 500,000 in 1969 to 9.7 million in 1975 (of these, 3.8 million were from West to East Berlin). Only estimates are available of how many calls were placed in the opposite direction during these years. A likely figure for 1975 is 5 million.[88]

An important, but also particularly conflict-prone, step toward greater communication was the GDR's acceptance of permanent media correspondents in East Berlin. At the beginning of 1977, 16 newspapers, journals, and radio and television networks had permanent editorial offices in East Berlin, and others had applied for and been promised admission by the government of the GDR.[89] In addition, of course, there were traveling correspondents who spent only short periods in the GDR at any given time.

These newly developed lines of communication between the FRG and GDR are of great significance: they are an integral link in the increasingly comprehensive foreign relations of the GDR which have developed in proportion to the extension of the country's diplomatic ties. The various foreign missions which reside in East Berlin, as well as correspondents from Western countries, constitute an important part of the country's present communications capacity with the West. This capacity, too, has its effects on domestic developments.

While it is impossible within the context of this article to evaluate in detail the more diversified com-

[87] Press releases of the Federal Ministry for Intra-German Relations, Jan. 18 and Jan. 26, 1978. The second press release contains, among other things, information on refusals of entry, searches, arrests, and transit traffic.

[88] *Die Entwicklung der Beziehungen zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik*, p. 29.

[89] "Answer of the Federal Government . . .," p. 12.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

munications structure which has developed between the GDR and the outside world—cultural and sporting events and other types of contact would have to be considered as well—three ramifications of it are worth underscoring here. The first is that the GDR, a relatively small country with a highly developed communications network, has become "transparent." Events of any importance which occur in public cannot remain secret for long. The second is that since the conclusion of agreements clarifying the international status of the GDR, there have been numerous and frequent contacts between citizens of the GDR and "Westerners." All kinds of information are exchanged during conversations; and, strict prohibitions notwithstanding, books, newspapers, and periodicals officially frowned upon do, despite the small number of copies available and their "accidental" selection and dissemination, find their way to those interested. Even party and state functionaries, who are generally forbidden to have direct contact with visitors from the West, are exposed, via family and friends, to the influence of these visitors and to information they bring. In a society with an intensive reading culture—a product, in great measure, of the SED's cultural policy—the literature carried into the GDR becomes an important supplement (and an even more important corrective) to West German radio and television transmissions, which can be received nearly everywhere in the GDR.[90] The third and final ramification is that personal meetings with Westerners, no longer complicated or a source of apprehension for the bulk of the GDR population, make it possible for the citizens of the two German states to sort out what they have in common and what separates them.

It is difficult to assess the impact of the relative opening of borders on the domestic situation of the GDR.[91] Not only are there insufficient quantitative data for an empirical assessment, but there are very many other factors which also affect the attitudes and behavior of individuals and groups. Existing economic circumstances must be taken into account just as much as the political climate in the narrower sense. Against background information of continuing unemployment and insufficient apprenticeship opportunities for youth in the FRG, and pictures of "strike," "disorder," and "waste" alongside "poverty" that West German television stations transmit, the "order" and "social security" of the GDR have come to be seen as positive elements, despite the fact that in a different context they are criticized as oppressive and unsatisfactory in material terms. Age and professional position are also important criteria which would have to be worked into an analysis of public mood in the GDR.[92] After all, on December 31, 1976, 57.1 percent of the population was under 40 years of age (21.9 percent was between 40 and 60, and 21 percent was over 60).[93] More than half of the population of the GDR has grown up under the political and social system of the Soviet Occupied Zone and GDR, and is itself, therefore, a product and a part of that system. It is no wonder that the standards, desires, and goals of these people are formulated on the basis of their own experiences and in the context of the lives which they have led and lead today.

The dominant goal under these circumstances seems to be to accommodate to the existing situation and to utilize one's capabilities and various relations of friendship so as to make oneself as comfortable as possible in one's private life. But there is apparently also an increasing number of people, most

[90] On the possibilities of receiving Western radio and television stations in the GDR, see Lothar Loewe, op. cit., pp. 122 f. The figure of 3 million television sets in the GDR which he gives is not correct. The *Statistisches Jahrbuch der DDR*, p. 305, notes that 92.7 percent of all households in 1976 possessed a television set. In the same year, the postal service of the GDR issued 5.35 million television licenses and 6.2 million radio licenses. All observers agree that the electronic media of the FRG are among the most important sources of information for the society of the GDR.

[91] To the relative opening of the borders toward the West there corresponds a similar limited opening toward the East. Since Jan. 1, 1972, travelers between the GDR and Poland and Czechoslovakia have no longer needed either visa or passport. Initially, difficulties were created by the enormous flow of travelers from Poland and Czechoslovakia who wanted to take advantage of the higher standard of living and the better supply of consumer goods in the GDR; but since then limits have been placed on the amount of money they are permitted to bring with them or exchange in the GDR. Nevertheless, travel between the GDR and its two socialist neighbors has become extremely intense. In 1977, 8.93 million citizens of the GDR visited socialist countries, while 9.42 million citizens of those countries entered the GDR. Among visitors to the GDR, the Poles ranked first with 6.87 million, followed by the Czechs with 1.72 million. In the other direction, 3.79 million citizens of the GDR journeyed to Poland, and 4.28 million, to Czechoslovakia. *Statistisches Jahrbuch der DDR*, p. 368.

Aside from creating greater possibilities for tourism, travel to and from other socialist countries has also had sociopsychological effects on the society of the GDR. Direct encounters with other CMEA countries have demonstrated in very tangible terms the relative superiority of the GDR's standard of living. Furthermore, these contacts have made the ways of thinking, ideas, and political experiences of those countries relevant for the GDR itself. To the extent that this is so, political debate in the GDR is likely to be fed increasingly by similar debate in Poland and other countries.

[92] Concerning the complexity of moods in the GDR, see Jörg R. Mettke, "To Try to Take the Holes Out of Swiss Cheese: Notes on the GDR Between Détente and Delimitation," in *Menschenrechte . . .*, pp. 346 ff., esp. pp. 352 ff.

[93] *Statistisches Jahrbuch der DDR*, p. 387.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

notably in the younger generation, who are beginning to think in terms of political alternatives. Their thoughts are often oriented toward a "better" socialism—as opposed to the "actually existing" variant. But in the absence of public debate and organization, discussions of such matters are restricted to small circles of friends and colleagues. To be sure, the small territory of the GDR does make random contacts beyond regional boundaries possible. However, since discussions of this kind depend on readings and experiences determined by chance, they often lead to incoherent and contradictory results.[94]

The Two-Currency Problem

One seemingly incidental by-product of the visitor flow from the Federal Republic and West Berlin into the GDR has had over time particularly serious socio-psychological consequences. In view of the GDR's hard currency shortage, its political leadership decided to loosen the legal provisions which had prohibited GDR citizens from possessing foreign currency. The Foreign Currency Law of December 19, 1973, permitted citizens to accept foreign currency presents of up to DM 500 from Western visitors and to spend this money in the so-called Intershops.[95] These shops sell mostly imported goods and goods produced under license in the GDR, for foreign currency.

This policy further widened the differences of living standards which already existed within the GDR. The situation thus created was made even worse by the fact that no relation could be established between the possession of Western currency and work performance. On the contrary, the differentiation in standards of living which resulted was a product exclusively of coincidental family relationships or friendships. A new competitiveness and feelings of envy such as had not existed before grew out of this situation and increasingly left their mark by complicating social interaction. These trends likewise strengthened significantly existing tendencies in the GDR toward the development of a consumer society in which the conspicuous consumption of rare and/or expensive goods is the principal means for trying to establish one's social status.

In addition, those who possess foreign currency do not use it solely for the direct purchase of goods. They also circulate it as a "second," "hard" currency, employing it to procure especially scarce services, spare parts, and high-quality and rare goods of GDR production. There is a growing susceptibility in the GDR to the influence of "Western currency gifts," which is unlikely in the long run to leave even government institutions—which so far have functioned in a rather bureaucratically correct way—unaffected. In this regard, it is politically relevant that middle- and upper-level functionaries, prohibited from having contacts with Westerners by a rule which is enforced with varying degrees of strictness, are practically excluded from the possession of foreign currency. They feel particularly discriminated against

An Intershop located around the corner from East Berlin's Metropol Hotel. Such shops sell imported and locally-produced luxury goods for Western hard currency, which has been allowed to flow into the hands of GDR citizens.

—DPA.

[94] On form, activities, and composition of discussion circles of the sort treated here, see the report by eight young people from Jena and Leipzig who were expelled from the GDR after having been temporarily arrested: "Go on over to the other side, leave your country! Don't resist it any longer!—Six Socialists Expelled from the GDR Report," *Berliner Hefte*, No. 6, 1978, pp. 107 ff.

[95] Hannsjörg Buck, "The New Foreign Currency Regulation Law: An Economically Effective Idea and Still More Perfect Controls," *DA*, No. 4, 1974, pp. 388 ff.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

because they are constantly confronted with the phenomenon of Western currency in the hands of family and friends. As a rule, they are not handy enough with tools to earn foreign currency by "moonlighting." On the contrary, they are among those who need services offered on this basis. Against this background their resentment is understandable.

The demoralizing effect of the availability of two currencies can be seen among production workers and other salaried groups also. As they see it, they are paid for their work in "bad money." This sentiment seriously jeopardizes hopes for the economically necessary increase of productivity which was to result from the introduction of material incentives. Those who are good craftsmen in fields that are especially in demand show a growing tendency to sell their labor at much better terms by "moonlighting" after working hours, usually for payment in Western currency.

Despite the expressions of discontent which have resulted from this development, the party leadership is apparently intent on continuing its foreign currency policy and accepting the risks inherent in it. Honecker, in any case, has expressly embraced it.[96] The country's urgent need for foreign currency seems to have priority over political concerns. The opening of more and more "Exquisit" and "Delikat" shops, which sell imported goods and goods produced in the GDR on license for GDR marks, has hardly deflated the social conflicts created by the two-currency problem. In part, it is rather likely to intensify them. For although it is true that the shops make it possible for those who do not possess foreign currency to purchase certain consumer goods, the high prices they charge demonstrate that the purchasing power of the GDR mark is substantially lower than that of the FRG's Deutsche Mark. To the population, therefore, the "Exquisit" and "Delikat" shops represent a visible daily admission by the GDR leadership that its assertions of the high value of the currency of the GDR do not correspond with the facts. At most, the sale of special goods by these shops has a desirable economic effect: it absorbs much of the populace's excess purchasing power.

Conclusion

In retrospect, a contradictory picture emerges from the various aspects of the situation of the GDR surveyed in this article. The GDR has succeeded in gaining international recognition as a state, but for this it has had to pay the price of maintaining certain special relationships with the FRG. At the same time, the leadership of the GDR does not see the agreements which it has reached with the Federal Republic as negative in all respects. These agreements correspond to the wishes of the society of the GDR, which considers itself German even if in many ways different from the society of the FRG. In addition, transit traffic, intra-German trade, the flow of visitors, and other results of the agreements bring with them advantages and foreign currency which the GDR cannot do without. On the other hand, some effects of the intra-German treaty system have aggravated domestic tensions and added new conflict areas to existing ones. Furthermore, the economic situation of the GDR has become difficult, and the number of unsolved problems which the country faces has seemed to be on the rise. Still, the most important goals of the various economic plans have been fulfilled, and sociopolitical promises have been kept.

It is difficult to assign relative weights to the various components of this picture and arrive at an overall evaluation. The more realistic policy of the present leadership, to be sure, is unlikely to develop much power to motivate or mobilize the East German population. Nonetheless, the widely held opinion that no alternative to the present political line holds out any hope of improvement has a stabilizing effect.

This is not to say that there are not differences of opinion even in the top echelons of the party. At that level, differences evidently exist concerning the concrete form and substance of intra-German relations, the effects of which are evaluated in a variety of ways. If one puts faith in information published in *Der Spiegel* and elsewhere, there is also discontent among those who once conceived and implemented the economic reforms of the 1960's. They speak of the "incompetence" of the present SED leadership and complain that they were not allowed to finish their work. As Jörg R. Mettke has rightly pointed out, the SED, as a mass party with—despite everything—some 2 million members, is itself a part of society in the GDR; changes in the general mood of society are immediately reflected in the party's ranks.[97] However, the caption "Rupture in the SED" (*Bruch in der SED*) with which *Der Spiegel* announced on its title page the publication of the "Manifesto" of the opposition hardly suits the complex and as yet insufficiently understood situation which exists inside the party.

[96] Erich Honecker, "The Socialist Revolution . . .," pp. 4 f.
[97] Jörg R. Mettke, loc. cit., pp. 351 f.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The room that the party and state leadership of the GDR has for maneuver is limited on the one hand by the difficult economic and complex societal situation of the GDR, and on the other by the unchanged position of dominance of the Soviet Union and its prevailing political line. Regardless of who holds what position in the GDR, in this context no meaningful alternative is discernible to the present policy of the SED leadership.

In assessing the situation in the GDR, it is imperative not to lose sight of the historical experiences which the political leadership as well as the mass of the population have shared since 1945. The Berlin uprising of June 17, 1953, the suppression of the reform discussions of 1956, the failure of the Prague Spring, the essentially unsatisfactory results of the Polish strikes of the 1970's, etc., are current events for leaders and masses alike. Both those who bear political responsibility and the population as a whole seem to have drawn the conclusion from these experiences that to proceed with caution and to limit criticism is preferable to imprudent behavior.

Within a context of détente, the implication of all of this is that the domestic situation in the GDR has to be included in all political calculations bearing on the GDR. In intra-German relations, difficulties are not to be attributed to the failure of *Ostpolitik* to produce results, but precisely to the policy's effects. The policies of both German states—their attempt to make an arrangement—have great influence on conditions in the GDR. The political-social system has become more flexible in the process, but also more diversified in structure and more fragile. The way in which the governments of both German states reacted to the conflicts which arose at the turn of the year seems to indicate that they are aware of this state of affairs.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Eurocommunism and Eastern Europe

By Jiri Valenta

There is an anecdote making the rounds in Prague these days. According to the story, a Czechoslovak government minister recently quoted the opening words of Karl Marx's *Communist Manifesto:* "A specter is haunting Europe—the specter of communism." Then he added: "But today it is the other way around. A specter is haunting communism—the specter of Europe!"

The point of the anecdote, of course, is that the phenomenon of Eurocommunism is being taken seriously by East European officials. In the West, too, the term Eurocommunism has ceased to be merely fashionable. Despite its geographic and historical imprecision, it is increasingly being accepted and used by political observers as convenient shorthand for the type of autonomous, pluralistic socialism now being evolved by several West European communist parties, particularly the Italian Communist Party (PCI), the Spanish Communist Party (PCE), and the French Communist Party (PCF).

The vitriolic Soviet attack on the General Secretary of the PCE, Santiago Carrillo, in June 1977 convinced even some of the most skeptical policymakers and political observers that the phenomenon of Eurocommunism is real and a cause of great concern in Eastern Europe and the USSR. Thus, one of the earlier skeptics, Austrian Chancellor Bruno Kreisky, now refers to the "genuine" character of the dispute between the USSR and the Eurocommunists.[1] Other observers go further, believing with Yugoslav thinker and philosopher Milovan Djilas that with the emergence of Eurocommunism "the church has to split." [2]

That Eurocommunism poses a challenge to Eastern Europe and the USSR has been particularly apparent since the famous Madrid meeting in March 1977. There, three West European communist party leaders—Enrico Berlinguer of the PCI, Santiago Carrillo of the PCE, and Georges Marchais of the PCF—clearly, if reluctantly, adopted the term Eurocommunism to signify their right to be independent and to adapt communist tenets to the conditions of their own countries, which were to be free of "limitations to liberty and authoritarian measures" noted in the USSR and East European countries.[3] When asked to explain Eurocommunism briefly, Carrillo described it as a dialectical synthesis of two concepts: "socialism running parallel to democracy, freedom with universal suffrage, and alternation of parties in the government"; and "independence without submitting . . . to any international discipline and without

Mr. Valenta is Assistant Professor and Coordinator of Soviet and East European Studies at the Naval Postgraduate School (Monterey, CA). He has contributed articles on Soviet and East European affairs to several scholarly journals and compendia. *The author wishes to express his gratitude to his colleagues Russell Stolfi and Peter C. Wang for financial support of a seminar on Eurocommunism that the author and Professor David Burke conducted at the Naval Postgraduate School in the spring of 1977, and to Robert Fossum and the Naval Postgraduate Research Foundation for support of the author's research on the subject. This article is a revised version of a paper presented at the 1977 Annual Convention of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, Washington, DC.*

[1] *Arbeiter Zeitung* (Vienna), July 6, 1977.

[2] *El País* (Madrid), May 10, 1977.

[3] This was stated by the three communist leaders at a press conference. For the press conference, see Radio Paris, Mar. 3, 1977. For the final communiqué of the meeting, see *Radio España Independiénte* (Radio Independent Spain), Mar. 3, 1977. Both are in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Western Europe* (Washington, D.C.—hereafter *FBIS-WEU*), Mar. 4, 1977.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

obeying orders from Moscow." [4] Similarly, Berlinguer defined Eurocommunism as "the joint evaluation" of the problems of democracy and of socialism at which the communist parties of Italy, France, and Spain had arrived in an autonomous manner.[5]

Despite the existence of differences among the Eurocommunists on a number of issues, the definitions of Carrillo and Berlinguer accurately pinpoint the basic features of Eurocommunism, and any effort to assess the impact of that phenomenon elsewhere must treat these two concepts as central to the analysis. This article will explore the effects of Eurocommunism upon Eastern Europe within such a framework. In doing so, it will address several crucial questions: What are the historical origins and turning points of Eurocommunism? What past and present linkages exist between Eurocommunism and autonomous and reformist trends in Eastern Europe? Is Eurocommunism likely to encourage reformism and liberalism or cold-war-like isolationism in Eastern Europe?

The Origins of Eurocommunism

Some analysts view Eurocommunism as a "new look" or sudden shift in the tactics of West European communist parties, designed primarily to reinforce domestic positions; [6] others see it as the product of profound changes in several European communist parties, but principally as a historic reversal in the basic flow of influence, from an East-West to a West-East direction.[7] In the opinion of this writer, Eurocommunism is a product of a long historical trend in the European communist movement and not a phenomenon limited solely to Western Europe. On the contrary, it can best be depicted as an outgrowth of a constant two-way flow of ideas, influences, and experiences between the East European and West European communist parties.

The political origins of Eurocommunism lie in the experiences of the communist parties in the Comintern, the Spanish civil war, and the Cominform, and in the dramatic suffering of communist leaders from outside the USSR during the period of Stalinist rule. Both of the fundamental aspects of Eurocommunism first emerged in concrete practice in Eastern Europe. In the sense that Eurocommunism means independence from the USSR, it had its beginnings in 1948-49 in Josip Broz Tito's Yugoslavia. Subsequent manifestations of it occurred, with differing degrees of success, in Poland under Wladyslaw Gomulka and Hungary under Imre Nagy in 1956, and in Albania under Enver Hoxha and Romania under Nicolae Ceausescu since the 1960's.

Insofar as Eurocommunism stands for a type of socialism that is democratic and pluralistic in nature, its intellectual roots lie in Marx's earlier philosophical works, particularly his *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts,*[8] and in the writings of many subsequent Marxist thinkers. While the most important of the latter have been West Europeans (Antonio Gramsci, Jean-Paul Sartre, Roger Garaudy, and Ernst Fischer), the group has included certain East Europeans (Georg Lukacs, Milovan Djilas, Robert Havemann, Karel Kosik, and in some respects Nikolay Bukharin and Roy Medvedev). More significant, elements of this type of socialism have thus far found practical form primarily in Eastern Europe—in the ill-fated experiment in Czechoslovakia between 1945 and 1948, in Yugoslavia after 1952, in Hungary for a short time in 1956, and in Czechoslovakia briefly in 1968 under Alexander Dubcek.

In tracing the emergence of Eurocommunism, it should be stressed that the West European communist parties, as well as those of Eastern Europe, have Stalinist pasts. All followed the Soviet lead in condemning Tito in 1948 and 1949; not a single one dared to raise its voice in Yugoslavia's defense.

Moreover, while a strong case can be made that the theoretical underpinnings of certain elements of pluralistic socialism were developed by West European parties (mainly by the Italian party under Gramsci) before they were considered in Yugoslavia, these parties on the whole seemed to lag behind Yugoslavia in the practical implementation of such ideas. Indeed, in the 1950's it was the Yugoslavs who exercised a strong influence on Palmiro Togliatti, the engineer of the PCI's "road to socialism," and supported the Italian party in its search for an evolutionary path to socialism.

[4] *Ya* (Madrid), July 14, 1977.

[5] Radio Rome, Sept. 19, 1977, in *FBIS-WEU*, Sept. 19, 1977.

[6] See, for example, Walter Laqueur, "'Eurocommunism' and Its Friends," *Commentary* (New York, NY), August 1976, pp. 25-30; Richard Pipes, "Liberal Communism in Western Europe?" *Orbis* (Philadelphia, PA), Fall 1976, pp. 595-600; and Michael Ledeen, "Eurocommunists Exposed," *The New Republic* (Washington, DC), Mar. 26, 1977, pp. 13-14.

[7] See a very perceptive essay by Charles Gati, "The 'Europeanization' of Communism," *Foreign Affairs* (New York, NY), April 1977, p. 539-53; and Arrigo Levi, "Italy's 'New' Communism," *Foreign Policy* (New York, NY), Spring 1977, pp. 28-48.

[8] For an English version of *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts*, see P. B. Bottomore, *Karl Marx's Early Writings*, London, C. A. Watts, 1963, pp. 61-219.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The PCI, inspired by Nikita Khrushchev's 1956 secret speech denouncing Stalin and by Khrushchev's subsequent program of destalinization, reestablished ties with the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) during Togliatti's visit to Yugoslavia in May 1956. Thereafter, the PCI began to take an increasingly critical view of the Soviet style of socialism and its application in Eastern Europe, and to endorse pursuit of a distinctively Italian model of socialism. It was in this spirit that Togliatti, in a famous interview published by the Italian journal *Nouvi Argomenti* in June 1956, rejected the notion of the USSR as the "single guide" of the communist movement. Togliatti stated that the "Soviet model is no longer obligatory" and spoke in favor of "polycentrism." [9] Even more important, he raised questions about whether Soviet society had not already reached "a certain form of degeneration." It is worth noting that the Soviet leaders immediately recognized, even at this early date, the potentially damaging effects of this West European judgment and subjected Togliatti to severe criticism.[10]

In 1956, however, West European criticism of the USSR was still in its infant stage. The PCI as well as the other West European communist parties basically supported the Soviet intervention in Hungary in November 1956, even though such a position was detrimental to their electoral chances at that time.

Nevertheless, the West European communists did not ignore the lesson afforded by the 1956 revolts in Hungary and Poland. They began to move—some slowly, some quickly—into a more independent and critical posture with regard to the USSR. The PCI under Togliatti's guidance took the lead in this process. As part of its effort, it even commenced to seek a better understanding of and to support reformist and liberal trends in Eastern Europe. Thus, even at this early date, Eurocommunist trends in Eastern and Western Europe were becoming mutually reinforcing.

During subsequent years, the PCI was influenced

[9] *Nuovi Argomenti* (Rome), June 19, 1956.

[10] *Pravda* (Moscow), July 2, 1956.

Secretaries general of the three leading Eurocommunist parties meet in Madrid in March 1977. From the left: Enrico Berlinguer of the Italian CP, Santiago Carrillo of the Spanish CP, and Georges Marchais of the French CP.

—SYGMA.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

by, at the same time that it supported, the economic decentralization reforms of 1958 in Yugoslavia and the establishment of Yugoslavia's "system of market socialism" in 1963, both of which grew out of earlier reformist economic thinking in Poland. The PCI's backing of the Yugoslavs in 1958 again produced criticism from Moscow. But Khrushchev's second effort toward destalinization, after the 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in 1961, emboldened the PCI to continue its search, under the leadership of Togliatti, for a "new model" of socialism—one that would be relevant to the countries of the West and different from the "undemocratic tendencies" of socialism in Eastern Europe.

Toward the mid-1960's, the PCI was joined in its endeavor by the exiled Spanish Communist Party, headed by Carrillo. Then in 1965, after the death of the pro-Soviet French Communist leader Maurice Thorez, the PCF, under Waldeck Rochet, adopted a somewhat similar course. Several other West European communist parties, such as the Swedish, also demonstrated a comparable shift in thinking. The process of destalinization and Europeanization of the West European communist parties had become a regional phenomenon.

Those who advocated the Europeanization of West European communist parties began to favor a policy of broad coalition with various political and social forces, including domestic religious elements, and of support for human rights. In this context, they were critical of the cultural orthodoxy of Walter Ulbricht's regime in East Germany, the antisemitic campaign in Poland in 1967-68, the distribution of antisemitic literature in the Ukraine, and the 1966 Moscow trial of Andrey Sinyavskiy and Yuliy Dan'yel.

In addition, reform-minded intellectuals of West European communist parties—Garaudy, Lucio Lombardo Radice, Fischer, and Franz Marek—had established, beginning in 1963, a promising *transnational dialogue* with leading East European reformist theoreticians at various symposia and meetings. This dialogue gave rise to differentiation between conservative and reformist elements in the European communist movement, a process which led eventually to the 1968 Prague Spring and to the subsequent invasion of Czechoslovakia by five Warsaw Pact countries. East German leader Ulbricht and his ideologists dated the origins of the "Czechoslovak counterrevolution" back to the famous 1963 conference in Liblice, Czechoslovakia, where Marxist theoreticians from the East and West rehabilitated Franz Kafka. Certainly, after 1963 the leading theoreticians of the West European communist parties came to perceive the process of destalinization in Czechoslovakia as a significant development of relevance to West European communism.

Nevertheless, up to 1968 the conflicts between the Eurocommunists and the conservative establishments in Eastern Europe and in the USSR remained muted and restrained owing to the generally shared belief in solidarity with the ruling parties. What dramatically altered this state of affairs was the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968.

The Prague Spring

The Prague Spring of 1968 was a product not only of the process of destalinization in Czechoslovakia but also of various reformist trends in European communism (both East and West). In terms of pluralism and human rights, Dubcek's "socialism with a human face" was much broader in scope than the programs of Nagy or Gomulka in 1956, and it went even further than any phase of the Yugoslav experiment. Thus, it is not surprising that the PCI, the PCF, the PCE, and other West European communist parties, as well as reformist elements in Eastern Europe (in Yugoslavia, Poland, East Germany, Hungary, and even the USSR), saw the Prague Spring as an example of democratic socialism in a Western-type country characterized by a well-developed and essentially democratic cultural and political tradition. After a visit to Czechoslovakia in May 1968, Luigi Longo, Togliatti's successor as Secretary General of the PCI, declared that the Czechoslovak experiment not only "helps the parties of certain socialist countries" but also assists "the communist parties of the capitalist countries in their struggle to create a new socialist society—young, open and modern." [11] In April of the same year, PCF Secretary Waldeck Rochet also praised Dubcek and pledged support for his program, which Rochet held contributed to the "expansion of socialism." [12]

Simply put, the Prague Spring can be considered the forerunner of Eurocommunism, and the Czechoslovak reformers can be considered its forefathers in their attempt to create a model of socialism that, rooted in the Western tradition, differs from that of the USSR. As Carrillo, another enthusiastic supporter of Dubcek's reformist program, later stated: "If the term 'Eurocommunism' had been invented

[11] *L'Unità* (Rome), May 8, 1968.
[12] *L'Humanité* (Paris), Apr. 20, 1968.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The invasion of Prague in August 1968 by Soviet and other Warsaw Pact forces—an event denounced by Austrian Communist Ernst Fischer as a case of Panzerkommunismus.

—Magnum.

in 1968, Dubcek would have been a Eurocommunist." [13]

Fearing that the conservative bureaucracies in the USSR and in Eastern Europe would attempt to crush reformism in Czechoslovakia, the PCI, PCF, and PCE mobilized 17 West European communist parties on behalf of the embattled Czechoslovak reformers. During the crisis, this coalition of West European communist parties applied considerable pressure to discourage intervention. Among other tactics, they threatened to convene a separate conference to condemn the USSR. French communist leader Rochet even served at one point as mediator between the Czechoslovak and Soviet leaderships. Although pressure from the West European parties did not deter the invasion, it caused much confusion and procrastination, and even moderated Soviet behavior during and after the intervention.

More important, the invasion, which Ernst Fischer labeled a manifestation of *Panzerkommunismus*,[14] laid bare the Soviet interpretation of "proletarian internationalism." In Carrillo's words, "the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 was the last straw." After that, "any idea of internationalism ended for us." [15]

After Czechoslovakia, the Leninist version of socialism in the USSR and in Eastern Europe became an even greater liability and embarrassment to the parties in Western Europe. This was particularly true for the PCF. In its case, the invasion marked a crucial turning point, for the PCF had never openly opposed the USSR on a major policy issue. Furthermore, support for Dubcek was the first joint anti-Soviet venture of the French, Italian, and Spanish communist parties, their first joint action as Eurocommunists.

On the whole, the invasion encouraged a broad trend toward greater autonomy for communist parties in developed states, particularly in Europe. As Manuel Azcárate, head of the PCE's Foreign Policy Department, has pointed out, "It posed for communist parties the need to assert their independence with renewed vigor."[16] More significant, the invasion spawned a new trend toward "socialism with a human face" that embodied even greater

[13] *L'Unità*, July 14, 1977.

[14] See a postscript by Franz Marek in Ernst Fischer, *Das Ende einer Illusion* (The End of an Illusion), Vienna, Verlag Fritz Molden, 1973, p. 387.

[15] Santiago Carrillo, *"Eurocommunismo"* y Estado ("Eurocommunism" and the State), Barcelona, Editorial Critica, 1977, pp. 166-67. The author is indebted to his wife, Virginia Lyda Valenta, for assistance in dealing with this volume in the original Spanish.

[16] Manuel Azcárate, "Europe and Eurocommunism," *El País*, July 30, 1977.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



Early advocates of a reformist strategy for Europe's communist parties: Roger Garaudy, left, expelled from the French CP in 1970, and Lucio Lombardo Radice, of the Italian CP.

—SYGMA and Elke-Petra Thonke.

departures from the Soviet model than the architects of the Prague Spring had contemplated. Although the idea that each party should enjoy autonomy was not new, the notion that democratic socialism constituted a relevant model for the West *was* new for at least most of the West European communist parties. Thus, Czechoslovakia's "socialism with a human face" served, if not as a model, perhaps, in Azcárate's words, as "the most specific point of reference" for the rejection of the "Soviet model" of socialism and "for pointing out the rise of the new trend in the communist movement which later took the name Eurocommunism." [17]

The Maturing of Eurocommunism

The post-invasion climate in Czechoslovakia exacerbated the long conflict still in train between the reformist and the conservative forces in the European communist movement; moreover, it made many West European communist parties increasingly willing to challenge Soviet authority and to adopt a critical attitude toward the authoritarian regimes in Eastern Europe. In some of the parties in both Eastern and Western Europe, conservative elements were able to slow the rise of Eurocommunism during 1969-70 by expelling the most outspoken critics of the invasion, such as Roger Garaudy (in France) and Ernst Fischer and Franz Marek (in Austria). Nevertheless, a number of parties—even the PCF, under the new leadership of Marchais (the invasion is believed to have crushed the health of Rochet)—gradually came to accept most of the reformers' critique. Indeed, the PCF even began to strive for a Eurocommunist alliance with the PCI.

In this evolutionary process, some exiled Marxist theoreticians and politicians from Eastern Europe exercised considerable influence on reformist circles in the West European communist parties, particularly the PCI. For example, one of the major indictments of East European political systems to appear in Western Europe, *Sistema Politico e Proprieta Sociale nel Socialismo,* was written by the exiled Polish theoretician Wlodzimierz Brus and printed by the PCI publishing house.[18] Furthermore, PCI officials developed a close relationship with exiled Eurocommunist-minded politicians and publicists from Czechoslovakia, such as Jiri Pelikan. Indeed, periodicals close to the PCI frequently lent their pages to appeals and messages of "socialist opposition" elements in Czechoslovakia and other East European countries in the 1970's. Among the items published were some major political documents that had been smuggled out of Czechoslovakia. The most significant of these—a letter from Dubcek, an interview with Josef Smrkovsky (Chairman of the National Assembly under Dubcek), and the latter's memoirs—appeared in the journal *Giorni/Vie Nuove*, whose editor-in-chief, Davide Lajolo, is a member of the Central Committee of the PCI. It is easy to see, then, that the flow of Eurocommunist ideas from East to West after 1968 has been an important, though often overlooked, factor in the rise of Eurocommunism.

Another significant stimulus to the development of Eurocommunism was the international climate of détente which evolved in Europe as a result of the protracted process leading to the 1975 Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. This climate encouraged the West European communist parties to demonstrate their increasing concern over the issue of human rights in Eastern Europe and in the USSR.

In 1969 and 1970, the West European communist parties had strongly criticized the final de-

[17] *Ibid.* See also a similar evaluation in "Nine Years from Czechoslovak Events," *l'Unità*, Aug. 21, 1977.

[18] Wlodzimierz Brus, *Sistema Politico e Proprieta Sociale nel Socialismo* (The Political System and Social Characteristics of Socialism), Rome, Editori Riuniti, 1974.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

struction of Czechoslovak socialism and the subsequent process of so-called "normalization" in that country, which French communist poet Louis Aragon referred to as "the Biafra of the human spirit." [19] Subsequently, in the early 1970's, the French and Italian communist parties exerted substantial pressure on Husak's leadership in the hope of preventing the trials that had been prepared for the reformists who supported Dubcek in 1968.

The PCF's adoption of a position as champion of personal liberties and human rights in Eastern Europe was remarkable, for it had once been one of the most pro-Soviet of parties. Nevertheless, when the spokesman for hard-line elements in the Czechoslovak party, Presidum member Vasil Bilak, failed to mention the PCF as among the communist parties "guilty" of assaulting the process of "normalization," the Marchais leadership is said to have sent a protest and demanded to be included among the heretics.[20]

The PCI-PCF rapprochement of November 1975 and the requirements of French domestic politics (specifically, of the Communist Party's alliance with the Socialist Party) hastened the efforts of the PCF to overtake the PCI in its criticism of the internal policies of the East European regimes and the USSR. For instance, the PCF denounced the banishment of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn from the USSR; and when a BBC film on Soviet labor camps appeared on French television in late 1975, the PCF joined with the PCI in unequivocally and openly condemning the oppressive policies of the USSR. About the same time, the PCF began supporting the coalition of autonomous parties of Eastern and Western Europe (particularly the ruling Yugoslav and Romanian parties, the PCI, and the PCE) in the preparatory meetings for a Conference of European Communist and Workers' Parties.

This conference, which finally took place in East Berlin in June 1976, marked a new milestone in the history of Eurocommunism. During the last stages of the preparation for the conference, the CPSU found itself supported only by some of the ruling parties in Eastern Europe and a few parties in Western Europe (among which the only significant entity was the Portuguese party),[21] and to convene a conference the CPSU and the loyalist parties reached an uneasy *modus vivendi* with the autonomist coalition by making concessions with respect to the notion of proletarian internationalism. These concessions the autonomous parties interpreted as amounting to an ideological justification for the independence of European communist parties. Thus, the conference produced a kind of institutionalization of Eurocommunism as it had evolved after the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia.[22]

In reformist circles in Eastern Europe, the results of the East Berlin conference were seen as, to paraphrase the East German dissident Wolf Biermann, a "remarkable and gratifying change" and "a clear step toward socialist democracy" which would have a positive effect on Eastern Europe. According to Biermann, "the Eurocommunists have encouraged dissidents to become more courageous and more clear-sighted." [23]

The Challenge of Eurocommunism

Obviously, it is still difficult at this point to assess the degree of commitment of the West European communists to human rights and to the cause of the dissidents in Eastern Europe, as well as to measure exactly the influence of Eurocommunism on developments in Eastern Europe. Nevertheless, the available evidence suggests that the Eurocommunist impact in Eastern Europe has increased since the East Berlin conference. Paradoxically, while some Western analysts still question the very existence of Eurocommunism and its commitment to human rights and pluralism,[24] many analysts and some policymakers in Eastern Europe express profound fear of Eurocommunism and its effects upon Eastern Europe and the USSR itself.

Indeed, since the East Berlin conference, the relationship between the Eurocommunists in Western Europe and the reformist and dissident circles in Eastern Europe seems more and more to have become one of mutual reinforcement. The latter,

[19] Quoted by Pavel Tigrid in the journal he edits, *Svedectvi* (Paris), No. 43, 1972, p. 4

[20] See Bilak's speech and editorial comment, *Listy* (Rome), March 1972, pp. 11-14.

[21] Some of these West European parties (namely, those of Luxembourg, West Berlin, West Germany, and Portugal) had earlier endorsed the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia.

[22] For the concessions of the CPSU and loyalist parties on "proletarian internationalism," see B. A. Osadczuk-Korab, "Brezhnev's Pyrrhic Victory: the Pan-European Conference of Communists in East Berlin," *International Journal* (Toronto), Winter 1976-77, pp. 178-93.

[23] See interviews with Biermann in *Le Monde* (Paris), Nov. 21-22, 1976, and *Der Spiegel* (Hamburg), Nov. 22, 1976, p. 38.

[24] Jean-François Revel, "The Myths of Eurocommunism," *Foreign Affairs*, January 1978, pp. 295-305. Also see his "A Note on Eurocommunism" in his *The Totalitarian Temptation*, New York, NY, Doubleday, 1977, pp. 297-311.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

some of whose representatives qualify as Eurocommunists themselves, drew encouragement from the results of the conference and intensified their appeals to the Eurocommunists in the West for moral and political support. The former, hoping that Eurocommunism would serve as a "reference point" for Eastern Europe and aid its "democratization," [25] willingly became the most outspoken allies of human rights groups in Eastern Europe and in the USSR. Said Lucio Lombardo Radice, "there must be complete freedom in socialist society, or else it cannot call itself socialist." [26]

Claiming that intolerant actions on the part of the regimes in Eastern Europe and in the USSR violated the final documents of the Helsinki conference and, even more important, the final documents of the East Berlin conference, PCI and PCF leaders began to participate in rallies demanding the release of political prisoners in Czechoslovakia and in the USSR, to protest against the oppression of Catholic priests in Czechoslovakia, and to intervene increasingly on behalf of dissidents in Eastern Europe. More concretely, Eurocommunist parties and trade unions extended their diplomatic, and in some cases their financial, support to the signatories of Charter 77 in Czechoslovakia (some of the signatories—workers and intellectuals—lost their jobs.) They offered similar backing to workers in Poland jailed in the wake of violent food riots and strikes in June 1976, as well as to the Workers' Defense Committee (*Komitet Obrony Robotnikow*) of Polish intellectuals that took up the cause of the jailed workers. They also protested the withdrawal of citizenship from East German dissident Wolf Biermann (who subsequently joined the Spanish Communist Party[27]), and supported his persecuted friend, the philosopher Robert Havemann—both of whom consider themselves to be Eurocommunists.

In all these instances, Eurocommunist pressures helped to moderate, at least for a time, the behavior of the regimes in the three East European countries. So far only a few of the signers of Charter 77 have been put on trial in Czechoslovakia. The Polish workers were not punished severely (indeed, many of them were released from jail). And Havemann has thus far not been forced to leave East Germany. Presumably, if there had not been fears about how the Eurocommunists would react, the repression would have been much harsher.

Certainly, reformists and dissidents in the three countries have regarded Eurocommunist pressure and the Soviets' fear that dissident issues might damage relations with the West in general and with the Eurocommunists in particular as the most important factors in some cases in moderating the behavior of local officials.[28] One of the signers of Charter 77 and the former Minister of Foreign Affairs under Dubcek, Jiri Hajek, described the important role that Eurocommunism played as a bargaining chip in his talks with Czechoslovak authorities:

[25] Santiago Carrillo in *l'Unità*, Nov. 1, 1976.

[26] See G. Urban's interview with Lombardo Radice, *Encounter* (London), No. 5, 1977, pp. 8-22.



East German philosopher Robert Havemann, who has been harassed by authorities for protesting the exclusion from the GDR of dissident folk singer Wolf Biermann in 1977. Havemann is shown with one of his works, Dialektik ohne Dogma? *(Dialectics without Dogma?).*

—Pictorial Parade.

[27] Radio Vienna, Sept. 1, 1977, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Eastern Europe* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS-EEU*), Sept. 6, 1977.

[28] See an interview with a signer of Charter 77, Zdenek Mlynar, *Arbeiter Zeitung*, June 18, 1977; an interview with Polish dissident Adam Michnik in *l'Espresso* (Rome), Dec. 5, 1976; and a report in *Le Figaro* (Paris), Apr. 21, 1977.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

It is no secret that the Eurocommunists are my strongest card in these constant talks with our authorities. I say, do you really believe that "Charter 77" is antisocialist? But then what are these articles in the French, Spanish and Italian parties' presses which support us? Are they also antisocialist? Are we talking about antisocialist parties? [29]

The general East European reaction to increasing intervention on the part of the Eurocommunists was twofold. On the one hand, reformist circles and dissidents saw it as a hopeful sign that Eurocommunism might aid the process of democratization and reform in Eastern Europe. Eurocommunist intervention, as Polish dissident-historian Adam Michnik put it, "helped to free many Polish workers from prison," and it also reinforced the people's hope that "it is possible to create 'socialism with a human face' " in Eastern Europe.[30] On the other hand, such intervention, notably that of the PCI, generated growing hostility on the part of several East European regimes, particularly those of Czechoslovakia and East Germany. Their fear of Eurocommunism was reflected in the prohibition of the sale of the Italian and French communist newspapers *l'Unità and L'Humanité* in some East European capitals, even while some noncommunist West European papers continued to be available for purchase. Also indicative was the attitude expressed by Czechoslovak periodicals toward Eurocommunism and the PCI. *Rude pravo* complained that the Prague regime would get better treatment from "many bourgeois newspapermen" than from "the editors of *l'Unità*." [31] Moreover, *Tribuna* maintained, "it seems almost unbelievable that people such as Jiri Pelikan, who lives in Rome and who has caused our party, country and the international communist movement no small harm . . . is being received with friendliness by PCI officials at various levels." The same applied, the article went on, to Zdenek Mlynar.[32]

Indeed, the ongoing debate among East European and Soviet elites about Eurocommunism and the pressures from some East European leaders for expulsion of the Eurocommunist parties from the world communist movement are unmistakable signs



Jacek Kuron, a spokesman for the Workers' Defense Committee in Poland.

—Vincent Mentzel.

of growing apprehensions about the effects of Eurocommunism in Eastern Europe. These fears appear to have triggered the frontal, public assault on Eurocommunism in March 1977 by the Czechoslovak hard-liner Vasil Bilak, who accused the Eurocommunists of pursuing "unprincipled and treacherous policies," [33] and the *New Times* attack on PCE leader Carrillo in June 1977.[34]

The Limits of the Challenge

To date, it is true, the number of times that West European communists have taken up the cause of reform in Eastern Europe is small; however, unlike some analysts,[35] this author believes it valid,

[29] See an interview with Jiri Hajek, *Svenska Dagbladet* (Stockholm), Nov. 13, 1977, in *FBIS-EEU*, Nov. 18, 1977.

[30] Interview with Michnik, loc. cit.

[31] *Rude pravo* (Prague), Nov. 23, 1976.

[32] *Tribuna* (Prague), Nov. 23, 1976.

[33] *Le Monde*, Apr. 1, 1977.

[34] "Contrary to the Interests of Peace and Socialism in Europe," *New Times* (Moscow), No. 26, June 1977, pp. 9-13.

[35] For good examples, see Michael Ledeen, "The 'News' About Eurocommunism," *Commentary* (New York, NY), October 1977, pp. 53-57, and Leszek Kolakowski, "The Eurocommunist Schism," *Encounter*, August 1977, pp. 14-19. Although Kolakowski concludes that Eurocommunism has not yet appeared, even he does not deny its potential impact if it should emerge in the future.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

particularly after the East Berlin conference, to view Eurocommunism as a potential challenge to at least certain regimes in Eastern Europe and to the USSR's interests in the region. At the same time, to say that Eurocommunism has destabilizing effects in Eastern Europe is insufficient. It is important to specify where in Eastern Europe Eurocommunist influence exists and to what degree, for Eastern Europe is a region in which historical, cultural, economic, and political levels of development vary considerably from country to country.

Eurocommunist influence appears to be strongest in Czechoslovakia, Poland, and East Germany, all of which have political and cultural traditions similar to those of Western Europe. It is essentially toward these countries that the Eurocommunists direct their concern, and insofar as they have an impact in Eastern Europe, it is concentrated in these states. With regard to the question of support for dissidents and human rights in Eastern Europe, for example, the attitudes of the Eurocommunists with respect to, say, Yugoslavia and Romania contrast sharply with their attitudes regarding Czechoslovakia and East Germany.

Although this double standard of the Eurocommunists weakens their claim to unwavering principles, they cannot be dismissed as mere opportunists. While elements of political opportunism enter into their policies, political realism plays a much greater part in determining the Eurocommunists' selectivity. Their condemnation of the human rights policies of the regimes in Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and Poland reflects certain objective political factors. The dissident movements in these countries are much larger at present than those in other East European countries. Furthermore, the regimes in two of these countries—Czechoslovakia and East Germany—have shown considerable hostility toward Eurocommunism. This is particularly true of the Czechoslovak regime, which has become a major force behind the anti-Eurocommunist campaign in Eastern Europe.

As for Hungary, the more tolerant Kadar regime has a relatively good record on human rights, and it has remained friendly toward the Eurocommunists, as indicated by Kadar's recent visit to Italy and his talks with Berlinguer. Indeed, Kadar himself is believed to see Eurocommunism as supportive of his program of domestic reform and his liberal policies. Hence, the Eurocommunists have tended to avoid criticism of his government.

The situation with regard to Romania and Yugoslavia is somewhat more complex. By and large,

Janos Kadar, left, First Secretary of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, welcomes Italian Communist leader Enrico Berlinguer to Budapest in October 1977.

—UPI.

the regimes in these two countries do not boast human rights records which would appear to be appealing to the Eurocommunists. Romania has one of the most authoritarian governments in Eastern Europe, and since 1971 the Yugoslav government has clamped down on domestic dissidents in an effort to reinstate centralized political control. According to Milovan Djilas, Yugoslavia has jailed proportionately as many political prisoners as has the USSR.[36] Yet the Eurocommunists seem to have their best relations with Yugoslavia and Romania—even in the face of Djilas's call for the Eurocommunists' support on questions pertaining to human rights.

In part, this state of affairs undoubtedly stems from the autonomous foreign policy stances of the two countries. As has already been noted, independence and autonomy are important factors in the phenomenon of Eurocommunism. In addition, both of these countries and particularly Romania, unlike Czechoslovakia and East Germany, have characteristics typical of underdeveloped states, and since the Eurocommunists hold the right of a communist party to adapt its policies to the prevailing conditions of its own country to be crucial to that country's independence, they probably view the regimes of these two states as to some degree responses to underdevelopment. That is, they see

[36] *The New York Times*, Feb. 2, 1977.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the highly centralized and authoritarian political system of Romania as more relevant there than the Eurocommunist model of pluralistic socialism. The same would be partially true in the case of Yugoslavia, for Yugoslavia's political system has to amalgamate the varied interests of many different ethnic and social groups.

Nevertheless, perhaps the key determinant in the Eurocommunists' attitudes and policies toward Yugoslavia and Romania is old historical ties and common interests. The special relationship between the PCI and the Yugoslavs has already been mentioned. Similarly, Romania has cultivated close relations with the PCE since the mid-1950's. *Radio España Independiénte*—the PCE's clandestine radio station—broadcast seven times daily from Romania via 11 separate radio frequencies from the mid-1950's until 1977, when the PCE won legal status in Spain.[37] In the late 1960's and the 1970's moreover, both Romania and Yugoslavia served as important allies of the Eurocommunists, who were struggling to become truly autonomous political forces in their respective countries. The two ruling regimes' utility in this regard was clearly demonstrated during and after the Czechoslovak crisis and during preparations for the East Berlin conference. To champion human rights in Romania and Yugoslavia, then, might work counter to the interests of the Eurocommunists, for such a course might force these two regimes closer to the USSR.

In sum, the Eurocommunists apparently do not wish to carry their interventions in Eastern Europe too far. They believe that an unselective, overly aggressive human rights crusade in that region could very possibly lead to the imposition of more rigid controls by hardline elements as well as to the deterioration of Soviet relations with the Eurocommunists and with the West as a whole. The perspectives of the Eurocommunists become easier to comprehend when viewed in light of the broader challenge associated with détente. To the Eurocommunists, a total break with the USSR and the East European regimes is highly undesirable, for it could force both East and West to adopt more hostile attitudes and could even precipitate a return to the cold war in Europe.

Finally, it should be underscored that the intrusions of the Eurocommunists on behalf of the dissidents in Eastern Europe have until now been limited to cases of severe violations of human rights. Although several Marxist thinkers and publicists from Eastern Europe, such as Mlynar and Pelikan, have urged thoroughgoing analysis by communists of the failings of the Soviet and East European regimes,[38] such critiques have not been undertaken. Perhaps if the Eurocommunists had carefully assessed Czechoslovakia's ill-fated experiments in 1945-48 and 1968, they would have concluded that some of the elements of their domestic programs (e.g., the PCF's insistence on immediate nationalization of most industrial firms) might be unrealistic and self-defeating.

The closest thing to a basic critique of this sort has been *"Eurocommunismo" y Estado* by PCE leader Santiago Carrillo. Carrillo's underlying thesis here is that Eurocommunism should be quite different from models of socialism now prevailing in Eastern Europe and in the USSR. This thesis brought him into serious collision with the Soviet leadership. While Carrillo received the backing of the PCE in the ensuing controversy, there have been indications that other Eurocommunist parties (notably, the PCI and the PCF) probably do not want to side unequivocally with their Spanish comrade, for they fear that this would inevitably precipitate an open break with Moscow.[39]

In fact, even though the Eurocommunists may genuinely be interested in promoting reform and human rights on a selective basis, none of the parties, including the PCE, has any desire to sever relations with the ruling parties. From the Eurocommunists' viewpoint, as argued earlier, that would be counterproductive and dangerous. Moreover, the Eurocommunist parties and the USSR still share important foreign policy interests, such as the weakening of US influence in Europe, the prevention of the rise of a strong West Germany, and promotion of national liberation movements in underdeveloped countries. Indeed, important elements in some of the Eurocommunist parties, particularly in the PCF, resist the process of estrangement from Moscow in foreign affairs.

As indicated, authorities in Eastern Europe and in the USSR have manifested a growing concern

[37] See David L. Helms, "The Eurocommunist Challenge and the Eastern European and Soviet Response," NPS-56 Va He 771101, unpublished Master's Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, June 1977, p. 117. (The author was Helms' thesis adviser). This station originally transmitted from the USSR until the 1950's. While it subsequently operated essentially from Romania, one of its transmitters was believed to be situated in Hungary.

[38] See, e.g., an interview with Zdenek Mlynar, *L'Espresso*, July 31, 1977, and an interview with Jiri Pelikan, *El Pais*, Feb. 26, 1977.

[39] For the differences between Carrillo's and the PCI's assessments of the USSR, see an interview with Italian Communist leader Gian Carlo Pajetta, *Der Spiegel*, July 11, 1977, pp. 91-92.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

about the "infection" of Eurocommunism and a preoccupation with its containment since the 1976 East Berlin conference. In fact, the increasing support of Eurocommunists for reformists and dissidents has now become an exceedingly sensitive issue in view of the fact that Eurocommunism presents an alternative model of socialism to that offered by and prevailing in Eastern Europe. Participation of one or more of the Eurocommunist parties (e.g., the PCI or PCE) in their national governments in the near future would make this challenge even more dramatic.

Eurocommunism: Promise or Threat?

Nonetheless, it would be premature, in the author's view, to conclude that the effects of Eurocommunism and the Soviet and East European responses to it are foreclosed. Eurocommunism may become an explosive question, but one cannot be sure "how" or "when" or even "if" this is going to happen. Eurocommunism has its own limits, and the Eurocommunists themselves, being political realists, remain cautious and selective in their support of human rights and personal liberties in Eastern Europe. In addition, Eurocommunist influence, for a variety of reasons, differs from one East European country to another. So do the attitudes and policies of the East European regimes toward it. The lack of consensus as to what should be done about it is amply demonstrated by the conflicting and contradictory behavior of East European and Soviet leaders toward it after the East Berlin conference. Their reactions have been very reminiscent of the debate on Czechoslovakia in 1968.

Yet in some East European countries the challenge of Eurocommunism may indeed be serious. So far, the most consistent and visible manifestations of a severe challenge have appeared in Poland and in Czechoslovakia. In Poland, which shares with Italy a Catholic heritage and with France an intellectual and cultural affinity, the Eurocommunists in 1976 and 1977 for the first time served as a supportive factor in the development of an alliance between the workers' opposition and the nonconformist intellectuals of the Workers' Defense Committee. The political and economic situation in Poland became so tense by the end of 1977 that it caused Polish authorities great concern. As a matter of fact, 14 former officials of the Polish communist party, including former First Secretary Edward Ochab, reportedly even addressed a letter to First Secretary Edward Gierek demanding the democratization of the country. This was to include: "political and economic democracy," "free debate" of all problems facing Poland, and free elections.[40]

In Czechoslovakia, a country close to both Italy and France in terms of political, economic, spiritual, and cultural heritage, the people are more attuned to the ideas of Eurocommunism than are the people of any other East European country except Poland, and the people of Czechoslovakia still show no signs of accepting "normalization." Indeed, thousands of Dubcek's former supporters from "the party of the expelled" see themselves as sharing the ideals and goals of the Eurocommunist movement, to which they look with hope and expectation, perhaps with some justification. The Eurocommunists gave their support to the signers of Charter 77—a broad coalition of Eurocommunist-minded and non-communist intellectuals, politicians, and workers (including several members of Dubcek's leadership). Like the Madrid declaration of the PCI, PCF, and PCE, Charter 77, as well as a newly reported Charter 78, sounded a strong defense of the civil liberties and political rights of citizens. Quite recently, Carrillo openly manifested his solidarity with Dubcek-era dissidents by receiving exiles Pelikan and Mlynar in Madrid. In addition, a Spanish Communist newspaper published an interview with another Dubcek colleague, Frantisek Kriegel, who still resides in Czechoslovakia.[41]

All this is not to say that East Europeans regard Eurocommunism with only a messianic hope. Many spokesmen for dissidents in Poland and Czechoslovakia neither believe in Eurocommunism nor display any concern about whether Eurocommunism represents a fundamental or a tactical move. Their main goal is to force the ruling elites of their countries into a defensive position, and they have been relatively successful in both cases during the past year.

It is possible, then, that Eurocommunism in Eastern Europe did not die with the Prague Spring in 1968, and that it may reappear in one form or another in Poland or Czechoslovakia, the countries most obviously susceptible. Even East Germany is not totally immune to the "infection." In the summer of 1977, Rudolf Bahro, a Communist functionary and executive of an East Berlin factory, urged the "Eurocommunization" of Eastern Europe through the formation of a Eurocommunist-oriented *Bund der*

[40] For the text of the letter, see *Der Spiegel*, Jan. 16, 1978, pp. 94-97.
[41] See report in *La Stampa* (Turin), Mar. 9, 1978.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Leading Czechoslovak reform figures, from the left: Frantisek Kriegel, a member of the Presidium of the Czechoslovak Communist Party during the Prague Spring; Zdenek Mlynar, a party secretary under Dubcek; and Jiri Pelikan, Director of Czechoslovak Television during the 1968 reform period.

—Kriegel and Mlynar photos by Vincent Mentzel, Pelikan by Pictorial Parade.

Kommunisten deriving its inspiration from Karl Marx's early work, the ill-fated reformist attempts in Czechoslovakia in 1968, and the Eurocommunist-oriented parties of Western Europe.[42] Following the publication of Bahro's book, there were even reports in January 1978 of a manifesto allegedly drawn up in secret by a communist opposition group dubbing itself "The League of Democratic Communists of Germany" (BDKD) and composed of "medium- and high-level officials" of East Germany's ruling Socialist Unity Party. According to the reports, the manifesto calls, just as Bahro had, for the "Eurocommunization" of East Germany. Specifically, it states:

Comrades, propagate our criticism, popularize the ideas of the European and Japanese reform communists, demand the publication of basic documents of fraternal West European and Japanese parties, unmask by all means the disgusting practice of self-appointed lifelong party bureaucrats! . . .

. . . The worldwide tendency of the international workers' movement will result in the decay of the Moscow theory and practice. Creative, undogmatic, democratic-humanitarian communism is developing.

It also claims that if Karl Marx were alive and writing his original *Communist Manifesto* today, he would probably begin: "A specter is haunting Eastern Europe—the spector of West European communism." [43] Whether the East German manifesto is authentic and what status its alleged authors have are still unclear at the time of writing, but if the document proves genuine, it would suggest that Eurocommunism has exerted some influence at significant levels in East Germany's ruling party.

[42] Rudolf Bahro, *Die Alternative: Zur Kritik des real existierenden Sozialismus* (The Alternative: A Critique of Actually Existing Socialism), Köln, Europäische Verlagsanstalt, 1977, especially pp. 297-483. Bahro was immediately arrested by the GDR's security officials "on suspicion of intelligence activities." See *Neues Deutschland* (Berlin), Aug. 25, 1977.

[43] For the text of the East German manifesto, see *Der Spiegel*, Jan. 2, 1978, pp. 21-24, and Jan. 9, 1978, pp. 26-30.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Some ruling elements in Eastern Europe, particularly in Czechoslovakia, see the Eurocommunist challenge in almost apocalyptic terms. Vasil Bilak, a member of Czechoslovakia's "healthy forces" who asked for "fraternal assistance" in 1968, views Eurocommunism as a mortal threat. He believes that "counterrevolutionary" domestic forces stirred up by the "anticommunist centers," along with Eurocommunists will attempt to launch various campaigns in connection with the 10th anniversary of the Prague Spring in August 1978.[44] Furthermore, the Czechoslovak press contends that the "anticommunist centers," utilizing Eurocommunism "as a means of ideological subversion," are striving to evoke a "new Prague Spring, . . . this time carried out in several socialist countries simultaneously."[45]

Such apocalyptic judgments, however, clearly run counter to the facts at present. As we have seen, the Eurocommunists have selectively criticized violations of human rights in Eastern Europe and the USSR, but they have by no means been wholly consistent on the subject. Nor have they directly attacked the East European or Soviet regimes.

At the same time, any attempt to characterize definitively what the effects of Eurocommunism on Eastern Europe will be simply on the basis of the Eurocommunists' failure thus far to take stronger public stands in favor of human rights in Eastern Europe and the USSR and to launch frontal assaults on the East European and Soviet regimes may be highly misleading. After all, no West European governments have pursued such policies either. Perhaps even more to the point, it appears that both the East European dissidents and reformists and the Eurocommunists themselves have an interest in avoiding a cold-war-like rupture with the USSR.

As long as the Eurocommunists are not excommunicated from the common fold and their Eurocommunist ideas are not condemned as heretical, the Eurocommunists may be able to pressure the East European regimes into moderation and prevent some of the extreme, repressive measures witnessed in Poland and Czechoslovakia in 1976 and 1977. Moreover, as long as the Eurocommunists stay within the communist movement, the hardliners in Eastern Europe and the USSR will find it difficult to monitor the two-way flow of reformist impulses and ideas between Eastern and Western Europe and prevent their flourishing in the East. Finally, as long as the Eurocommunists continue to work from within, they are able to provide not only support for the gradual, if limited, expansion of individual liberties in at least some East European countries, but also backing to the autonomous policies of other East European states (Yugoslavia and Romania) and a measure of hope for the future democratization of all the socialist countries of Eastern Europe and eventually the USSR itself.

[44] *Rude pravo*, Apr. 29, 1977.
[45] *Tribuna*, Sept. 14, 1977.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The East European Economies

By Alfred Zauberman

Today, a third of a century since the countries of Central and Eastern Europe embarked on the path to socialism, they find themselves faced with a number of long-term economic contradictions. In their current five-year plans—which will carry them into the decade of the 1980's—they have targeted growth in industrial output at a slower rate than that achieved since World War II. While continuing to gain on the industrial West in terms of gross output, these economies find themselves lagging significantly in terms of technology. The bias of growth strategy favoring industry at the expense of agriculture and the consumer has run into an at least temporary shift of world prices against industrial products and also risks increasing consumer dissatisfaction at home. Commerce within the region as well as with the outside world is handicapped in the former case by irrational pricing and in the latter by growing hard-currency debt. Finally, the imperatives of efficient economic management and planning clash as often as not with the continued commitment to mandatory centralized direction of the economies.

We shall investigate these issues as they affect the economies of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Romania, making reference to the Soviet economy only where its impact on these six economies seems particularly weighty and immediate. We shall concentrate on developments cutting across the boundaries of individual countries and shall address current phenomena basically as they illuminate longer-range themes.

By the very essence of our subject matter, we are forced to rely heavily on quantification. The state and motion of the concerned economies—their national product, gross and net output, capital formation, consumption, foreign trade—all these magnitudes, measured in absolute terms or on a per capita basis (against the total and/or working portion of the population), and at discrete points in time or dynamically, are grist for our mill. We operate with data expressed in *value* rather than *physical* terms even while recognizing that in Eastern Europe, perhaps more than elsewhere, value-termed indices suffer from original sin.[1]

The analyst's dilemma deepens when he further attempts to relate outcomes under the plans to developments in the Western industrial world. This is due both to differences in economic mechanisms and to differences in what, for lack of a better label,

Mr. Zauberman is a Professor at the London School of Economics, specializing on questions of optimal control and theoretical approaches to problems of planning. Among his numerous monographs on planning and economic developments in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe are Mathematical Theory in Soviet Planning, *1976;* Trade Coordination of Planned Economies (with a differential game model), *forthcoming; and* Mathematical Theories of Decentralization in West and East, *forthcoming.*

[1] The inbuilt limitations, both substantive and technical, of price-based indicators—particularly as they relate to optimality—have been explored, though not solved, by economists in both East and West. Yet, plan indicators expressed in terms of physical units of output offer few advantages. While free of many of the weaknesses of price-valued indicators (and thus in one sense more "truthful"), physical indicators suffer from the following drawbacks: (1) by their very substance, they are most difficult to aggregate; (2) their ability to picture "reality" declines sharply with technological and qualitative diversification of an economy; and (3) as often as not, quantification by physical measures turns out to be ambiguous with respect to economic meaning (e.g., in a more or less closed system, a growing output of intermediate inputs may reflect demand generated by expanding output of sophisticated final products as well as inefficiency in manufacture of the latter).

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

we have called metrics. Patently, as against the mechanism of the socialist economies, with its emphasis on continuous growth, that of the Western economies has an inbuilt cyclical, oscillatory motion. On the other hand, the metrics of the market economies are far more sensitive in "capturing" certain qualitative aspects of economic life that statistical series of the East do not adequately portray. The consequence is that, while the mature Western nations seem almost inexorably destined to be "overtaken" at some point in the future by the constantly advancing socialist economies, as mirrored in the latter's statistical series, the significance of such an eventuality is increasingly open to question.

Industrial Growth

In our discussion here, we shall concentrate first and foremost on the long-range development of industrial production in Eastern Europe. It seems reasonable to consider the post-World War II reconstruction of the area's industry, with accompanying rapid growth rates, as largely completed sometime in the early 1950's, but the half decade 1955-60 witnessed continuing "heroic" growth rates in individual countries. These very rapid rates reflected the immediate yield from restoring (i.e., reconstructing and, to a large extent, renovating) productive capacities. Since the 1950's, there has been more or less uninterrupted growth yet with an apparent, though not very pronounced, secular deceleration, which one may intuitively ascribe to the increasing maturity of these economies.[2]

For what the official value-term indexes are worth, they show that over the quarter of a century from 1950 to 1975 industrial output expanded by 19 times in Romania, 16 times in Bulgaria, 11 times in Poland, and between 6 and 7 times in the GDR, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. Soviet industrial output grew 10 times over the same period.[3] The plans for 1976-80 envisage both an overall slowing of the pace of industrial growth and a narrowing of the disparities in individual growth rates. Industrial output is expected to rise by 10.5 percent per annum in Romania, some 9 percent per annum in Bulgaria, 8.33 percent in Poland, around 6 percent in the three remaining East European countries, and 6.33 percent in the USSR.[4] In every case, the annual rate for a given country is lower than the rate recorded over the preceding 25 years!

Of course, in assessing plans of the socialist economies, one is well advised to allow for changes in the "planning climate" at given times, i.e., shifts from taut to relaxed targeting and vice versa. In this context, it seems safe to assume that in the present phase the school of thought which advocates "cautious" planning has the upper hand. Seen in this light, the industrial output targets for the second half of the 1970's do not seem to us unrealistic. Performance so far in 1976 and 1977 supports this supposition.[5]

Having noted the quantifiable "sweep" in the industrial advance of these countries, we turn now to

[2] That maturation of economies is accompanied by deceleration of industrial growth is no longer questioned by students of economics.

[3] N. I. Ivanov and A. Loshchakov, "Cooperation of CMEA Countries and the Equalization of Their Levels of Economic Development," *Voprosy ekonomiki* (Moscow), No. 6, 1977, pp. 3 ff.

Western economists have made several attempts to "translate" the officially recorded pace of economic growth in the countries of interest here into series corresponding to Western concepts and methods. The most recent effort—a highly impressive one—was offered by P. Marer in 1977. Borrowing from Marer, we find for the six East European states the following average annual growth rates of net material product over the years 1970-75 as officially reported ("O") and as recalculated ("R") according to accepted Western standards (in percent):

	O	R
Bulgaria	7.9	4.5
Czechoslovakia	5.7	3.4
GDR	5.4	3.5
Hungary	6.2	3.6
Poland	9.8	6.7
Romania	11.3	6.1

A very rough, unweighted averaging shows that such a recalculation would reduce the official annual growth rate for these six countries as a whole from 8 percent to 5 percent. Excellent as Marer's attempt is, the reader may be cautioned that there is no way to achieve an ideal "translation" of the kind offered. This is due to both substantive and technical factors. However, as Marer defensibly notes, "most Western experts believe that the recalculated series are better indicators than the official series of long-term economic growth trends." See P. Marer, "Economic Performance, Strategy, and Prospects in Eastern Europe," in US Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *East European Economies Post-Helsinki*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, Aug. 25, 1977, pp. 523-66. The technical aspects of this recalculation are presented in T. P. Alton, "Comparative Structure and Growth of Economic Activity in Eastern Europe," in ibid., pp. 199-266. This committee print, edited by J. P. Hardt, is a very important collection of studies on the area's economies.

[4] These projections of gross industrial output were derived from the respective official plans, averaged per annum and rounded.

[5] L. Tarasov, "The Economy of the CMEA Countries, 1976-77," *Voprosy ekonomiki*, No. 5, 1977, pp. 103 ff. According to this source, industrial output in 1976 increased by 8 percent in Bulgaria, 5.5 percent in Czechoslovakia, 5.9 percent in the GDR, 4 percent in Hungary, 10.7 percent in Poland, 11.5 percent in Romania, and 4.8 percent in the USSR. The same source reports that in 1976, national income grew 7 percent in Bulgaria, 4 percent in Czechoslovakia, 3.7 percent in the GDR, 3 percent in Hungary, 7.5 percent in Poland, 10.5 percent in Romania, and 5 percent in the USSR.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Part of the petrochemical plant at Brazi, a sample of Romania's rapid postwar industrialization.

—Liaison.

some important qualifications with respect to its qualitative aspects. Most important, there is the question of technological progress in the East.

The concept of "technological progress" is, of course, anything but unequivocal. Economic analyses in Eastern Europe quite prevalently identify it with a rise of output (national product, industrial output, and so on) per man, i.e., with labor productivity. The idea behind using the two concepts and terms interchangeably is that, in the causal chain, better technology ultimately finds its reflection in the average man's productivity. For the industries of the East European economies, the total rise in labor productivity during the last five-year plan period (1971-75) reportedly ranged between about one third and nearly one half—viz, 30 percent in the GDR, 34 percent in Czechoslovakia, 35 percent in Hungary, 36 percent in Romania, 39 percent in Bulgaria, and 45 percent in Poland. About 80 percent of the increment in industrial output for the period was reportedly accounted for by the increase in labor productivity.[6]

A more "truthful" or meaningful concept of technological progress would be growth of output unaccounted for by growth in inputs of the two prime factors, capital and labor: in other words, the unaccounted-for residual element of growth. This is assessed by employing a production-function approach (e.g., one using the Cobb-Douglas function). Such an approach is seen in the ambitious method devised by Soviet economist V. A. Trapeznikov, which seeks to picture the contribution to the growth of output directly for each of the contributing factors—i.e., labor, capital, and technology (in the parlance of Eastern Europe, "science and technology"; we would say "research and development").[7] The more or less arbitrary assumptions required by this method are fewer and less crucial than in the case of the labor productivity measure. Calculations carried out by two Soviet scholars using this method have yielded the following data for the relative percentage contribution of "progress in science and technology" to the growth of national income during 1966-70 in the six countries examined here: Bulgaria, 35 percent; Czechoslovakia, 58 percent; GDR, 53 percent; Hungary, 53 percent; Poland, 27 percent; and Romania, 28 percent.[8]

[6] See Yu. Kormnov, "Scientific-Technological Progress and Integration of the CMEA Member Countries in Machine Building," *Planovoye khozyaystvo* (Moscow), No. 5, 1977; and I. Ivanov, "Investment and Productivity Growth in CMEA Countries," ibid., No. 8, 1977.

[7] V. A. Trapeznikov, "The Rate of Scientific-Technological Progress," *Avtomatika i telemekhanika* (Moscow), No. 4, 1971.

[8] Y. P. Bliznakov and S. V. Dubovskiy, "Optimization of the Development of Large Economic Systems and Management of Progress in Science and Technology," *Jahrbuch der Wirtschaft Osteuropas* (Yearbook of the East European Economy), Vol. 6, Munich, University of Munich, 1975, pp. 11-20.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



Installation of the swivel base of a giant vertical lathe produced at the Skoda Works in Plzen, Czechoslovakia.

—Eastfoto.

However, it is safe to say that even such sophisticated methods of measuring fail to encapsule in a full and objective fashion the elusive truth about the qualitative aspect of economic growth. The employed method apart, measurements of technology for the area are very heavily affected by what we described above as the "original sin" in the value-based metrics utilized. It stands to reason that where the valuations of output and, even more so, of capital are distorted by this "sin," an observer of the quality of growth must also call on his intuitive judgment concerning observed symptoms. (Such a "symptomatic" approach may be relevant, say, in trying to understand why Czechoslovakia, which shows here the greatest contribution of technology, still, as we shall see shortly, is falling behind the GDR in output per capita.)

In any event, it seems fair to hold that economic policy-makers in the area are not really misled by statistical "images," whatever the methodology behind them, and that they are very conscious that their countries are continuously lagging behind the Western industrial world in technology. In this regard, East European strategies place great emphasis on bringing about technological advance. This is evident, among other things, in efforts to "bias" industrial expansion in favor of sectors and branches believed to be the most effective carriers and diffusers of technological innovations. Electronics are among the more recent leaders in this respect; more traditional vehicles have been the metal-processing and engineering sectors as well as power generation, oil processing, and chemicals. Today, in all of the economies under study here, the share of machine construction and metal processing ranges between a quarter and a third of total industrial output, which is quite close to the proportion observed in the leading Western economies. As further evidence of "biasing" of growth in these directions, we may note that over the two decades 1950-70 the share of engineering in industrial production nearly trebled in Poland and increased by about a half in Czechoslovakia. (In 1974, machine construction and metal processing accounted for 26 percent of industrial output in Bulgaria; just over 30 percent in Hungary, Poland, and Romania; 37 percent in Czechoslovakia; 42 percent in the GDR; and 40 percent in the USSR.)[9]

A related East European effort is the endeavor to "activize" capital formation: i.e., to increase the "active" part of capital stock, the part that immediately raises capacities, and within this to enlarge the share of capital embodying technology of recent vintage. Among measures taken to raise the efficiency of the newer vintages has been a drive to reduce the metal content of output of capacity-forming machinery. However, it has been discovered that flexibility in this respect is limited in countries with an established industrial "profile," e.g., the GDR and Czechoslovakia, and to some extent Hungary. Estimates suggest that it takes something like 10-15 years to change this profile,[10] which, let us note, comprises not merely "material" elements but also entrenched habits and modes of thinking.

Despite their care in mapping out a strategy for promoting technological advance and their determination to pursue it, policy-makers in the East European countries are justifiably concerned by the intractability of the technological lag. This lag is particularly serious inasmuch as earlier expectations that *expansion* of the industrial economy would overcome it seem unfulfillable if (as it is now claimed)

[9] See Kormnov, loc. cit., p. 70; and P. Alampiyev and E. Vorob'yev, "Changes in the Sectoral Structure of the Economies of the CMEA Countries," *Voprosy ekonomiki*, No. 7, 1976.

[10] Kormnov, loc. cit., p. 72.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the more mature socialist economies of Eastern Europe are nominally at the threshold of statistical parity with the advanced Western economies and hence may be expected to experience a further slowing of growth.

There is much food for thought in this regard in developments in the two German economies. While the GDR claims to have reached the efficiency level of the Federal Republic of Germany, we are more inclined to accept a very careful Western estimate that as of 1967 industrial output per employee in the GDR was only 72 percent of the comparable level in the FRG, and moreover that by 1976 this percentage had actually dropped—to 65 percent.[11]

The significance of this trend looms the greater when we look at the status of the East German economy among the East European economies. On one hand, there has been a tendency toward equalization of these economies, as measured by such statistics as the share of industry in overall national income (by this measure, the spread of percentage points has halved in the last quarter century—from 26 to 12), or industry's share in national product. On the other hand, when we look at the qualitative aspect of the respective economies, we find symptoms of the GDR's relative superiority. For example, we discover that, while the per capita national income of Czechoslovakia had almost caught up with that of East Germany by 1960, a decade later the Czechoslovak figure lagged by about 15 percent.[12] Also, it is becoming evident that, while Czechoslovakia still produces by far the largest *number* of machine-tool units of any East European country, the GDR is gaining a reputation for the *quality* and sophistication of its machine tools—and could possibly be exporting more to Western markets today were it not for what appears to be a preemptive demand for its output within the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA).[13] By the 1980's, the leading status of GDR industry within Eastern Europe may well be even more pronounced than it is today. (Note, parenthetically, that among the CMEA countries, East Germany devotes the relatively highest proportion of national income to "assimilation of new production."[14]) This, of course, is a development of relevance beyond the strictly economic sphere. However, for purposes of our analysis here the important thing to stress is that if this leading East European economy still trails—at increasing

An ultra-high-voltage electron microscope at the Institute for Solid-State Physics in Halle, East Germany, where research on semiconductors is performed by scientists from a number of East European countries.

—Eastfoto.

[11] For the estimate, see "Social Product of the GDR and of the Federal Republic of Germany in Comparison," *Wochenbericht* (publication of the Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung—Berlin), June 9, 1977.

On the symptomatic plane, East Germany obviously has been eager to expand inter-German trade in order to get West German hard-currency credits and technology. This effort has met with a rather cautious response from West Germany: FRG credits to East Germany amount to only some 15 percent of exports to the GDR, and machines and electrotechnical equipment comprise only about one fifth of these exports in value terms. See ibid., Mar. 11, 1976.

[12] It is maintained that between 1970 and 1975 the discrepancy between the maximum and minimum national levels of industrial output among the CMEA countries decreased from 5 times to 1.5 times; for agriculture the discrepancy reportedly decreased from 2 to 1.7 times. See Ivanov and Loshchakov, loc. cit., p. 6.

[13] See D. Lascelles, *Financial Times* (London), Sept. 20, 1977, Supplement, "European Machine Tools."

[14] The percent of national income devoted to "assimilation of new production" in 1974 was reported at 2.5 percent for Bulgaria and Poland, 3.2 percent for Hungary, 3.5 percent for Czechoslovakia, and 4 percent for the GDR. See N. Vlasova, "Assimilation of New Production in the Industry of European CMEA Countries," *Voprosy ekonomiki*, No. 1, 1978.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

distance, too—the leading West European economy, then the other socialist economies must be even worse off in the technological race.

The fact that the technological gap between the two Germanies—states that share much the same historical, technical, and behavioral background—appears to be growing raises the possibility of some fundamental imponderables at work.[15] Among such imponderables, one naturally suspects, are certain factors inbuilt in the mechanisms of the East European economies that inhibit the development and diffusion of progressive techniques. Quite possibly a consideration here is the degree of inflexibility in patterning R & D and resistance to taking the risks entailed in innovation.[16] Such suspicions tend to be all the more persuasive inasmuch as one would assume, on a priori grounds, diffusion of technology would be favored by an institutional framework which fosters free circulation of technological information among enterprises (and presumably to some extent among countries).

To be sure, the obstinate lag is no longer denied by serious analysts in the countries concerned. As noted in a recent Soviet survey of scientific-technological integration of CMEA in the field of machine building, "the technology of all countries [within CMEA] is 'averaging out,' although not on the highest world levels." [17]

Clearly, the attempt to close this gap is an important, if not always explicit, motivation for the East's expansion of trade with the West. Parenthetically, we note that this policy is not pursued without reservations. As the author just quoted states:

. . . attracting Western technology should, in our view, play an important but not the determining role in accelerating the scientific-technologic progress in the CMEA countries. . . . The expected expansion of economic links with developed capitalist countries should not lead to the creation of strategically or technically vulnerable loci in the CMEA community.[18]

These fears notwithstanding, economists in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union have devoted increasing attention to questions of technology transfer from West to East.[19]

Issues of Growth Strategy

The economic strategy of stressing industrial production which the East Europeans drew from Soviet conceptions has had a number of consequences. One is a chronic weakness of agriculture. (This has been aggravated by adoption of economic-organizational mechanisms in the countryside which correspond to the official social philosophy.) And, in fact, there seems to be an underlying—though not often articulated—awareness and acceptance of the price paid in agriculture for siphoning off the bulk of primary resources to industry to support the latter's spiraling tempo of growth. In this connection, it should be noted that the post-1965 decade has witnessed a truly spectacular drop in agricultural labor in Bulgaria and Romania (from 45 to 26 percent and from 57 to 37 percent of the respective labor forces), with lesser, though still sharp, drops in Czechoslovakia (from 20 to 14 percent), Hungary (from 27 to 20 percent), and Poland (from 38 to 30 percent). Even the GDR, which started the period with barely 14 percent of its labor force in agriculture, saw the figure fall to 10 percent.[20] Moreover,

[15] This is the case even if one allows for the fact that the technological race does entail very real, ponderable inputs in terms of the resources devoted to the increasingly costly process of research and development (as "generational leaps" in capacities and products occur with increasing frequency). See OECD, *Gaps in Technology: General Report*, Washington, DC, 1968, p. 87.

[16] A West German analysis sees East German technological advance as handicapped by a lack of flexibility in transferring results from the laboratory to the production place, as well as by inadequate allocation of materials and design facilities to research organizations. See *Handbuch DDR-Wirtschaft* (Handbook on the GDR Economy), rev. ed., West Berlin, Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, 1977, pp. 53 ff.

Decisions in the realm of technological R & D are by their very nature stochastic—i.e., they are based more on random guesses than on predictable outcomes. See M. I. Kamen and N. L. Schwartz, "Expenditure patterns for risky R & D projects," *Journal of Applied Probability* (Sheffield), 1971, pp. 60 ff.

[17] Yu. Kormnov, loc. cit., p. 79.

[18] Ibid., p. 73.

[19] Particularly valuable data on technology transfer in the 1960's and 1970's can be found in a study by the Polish scholar J. Monkiewicz, who was seconded to Vienna in 1977. See his "Closing the Technological Gap—The Experiences of the Socialist Countries," *Forschungsberichte* (publication of the Wiener Institut für Internationale Vergleiche—Vienna), April 1977. Monkiewicz identifies three channels of technology transfer: (1) purchases of Western licenses—specifically, the "licensing explosion" of the 1960's; (2) explicit firm-to-firm, firm-to-government, etc., arrangements for technological cooperation; and (3) joint ventures with participation of Western capital and management, an approach which has emerged in the 1970's. Monkiewicz reports that the first two of these channels have failed to meet expectations. As for the third, he suspends judgment. This wait-and-see attitude is shared by a recent Soviet commentary, which notes that such joint ventures have been attempted so far only in Romania, Hungary, and Poland. R. Yevstigneyev, "Integrated Programs in CMEA European Economies," *Voprosy ekonomiki*, No. 8, 1977, p. 103.

[20] These percentages are rounded from data in G. Lazarcik, "Comparative Growth and Levels of Agricultural Output and Productivity in Eastern Europe, 1965-1976," in US Congress, Joint Economic Committee, op. cit., Table 1, p. 292.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

at least in the case of East Germany, this drain would appear to have acted as a draw on agricultural productivity. While output per GDR agricultural worker in 1967 was 92 percent of the figure for West Germany in that year, by 1976 it had fallen to only 61 percent of the West German level.[21]

In some East European countries, the ability of rural manpower to continue to feed this "extensive" type of industrial advance is approaching a critical point. In 1966-70 and 1971-75, the total industrial manpower of CMEA increased some 15 and 10 percent respectively. For 1976-80, the planned increase is only 5 percent![22] While agriculture may still be able to release some additional manpower, industry increasingly must compete with non-industrial sectors (in particular, services) for these declining manpower increments. An obvious consequence is a still heavier dependence of growth on capital inputs and on "non-embodied" productivity factors (i.e., technology).

With the original goals of the industrial "push"—as set for the individual countries—broadly realized, the growth strategy has been variously adjusted throughout the region. The case of the USSR is both the most important (in terms of its impact on the East European economies) and the most illuminating. Suffice it to note that in 1971-75 the Soviet Union directed to farming as much as one fifth of its total productive investment. Yet it is significant that the half-decade as a whole was marked by serious failures in performance, as a result of unfavorable weather conditions in three of the five years. The "obstinate" persistence of climatic vulnerability, in spite of the effort to mitigate it by heavy allocation of resources, demonstrates *ad oculos* the randomness of the agricultural component in Soviet plans. "Jumps" in the Soviet harvest such as that of 1976—when nearly 300 million metric tons of grain were produced as against 224 million tons in the preceding year—only emphasize this planner's nightmare.

The weakness of Soviet agriculture has also contributed to a grain availability problem—and hence a food supply dilemma—not only for the Soviet Union, but also for Eastern Europe, for whose food needs Moscow provides the "reserve line." Rising food consumption has turned the USSR and Eastern Europe as a whole into an area of precarious self-sufficiency. To specify, while Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania are roughly balancing out their respective

[21] "Social Product of the GDR . . . ," loc. cit.

[22] The population of working age in the CMEA countries increased by about 8 percent in 1971-75. It is expected to grow by 6 percent during 1976-80, at half that rate in 1981-85, and one third that rate in 1986-90. See I. Ushkalov, "Efficiency of the Use of Manpower in the CMEA Countries," *Voprosy ekonomiki*, No. 4, 1977, p. 224.



Modern combines are employed in a July 1977 harvest at the Rousse Agro-Industrial Complex in the Bulgarian village of Chervena Voda.

—Eastfoto.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

domestic outputs and uses of food, the remaining East European countries have had to reconcile themselves to chronic deficits, which amount to about 15 percent of domestic consumption in Czechoslovakia and about 25 percent in Poland and in the GDR.[23] Such being the overall position, the group has become a continuous and sizable importer of grain (be this, in better years, to replenish stocks or, in poorer years, to supplement domestic output in order to meet postulated current domestic consumption). It would be surprising if what has thus become a more or less permanent feature of these economies drastically changed in the foreseeable future.

What has just been said about primary production of food suggests a more general long-term issue of economic strategy. One may ask: Does not the experience of the East European economies undermine one of their basic economic premises—the premise of a very long-run trend in the world's terms of trade against farm produce and in favor of manufactures? At the time the fundamental growth strategy was forged, that trend was considered to be a permanent feature of our world,[24] but as we all know, this tendency has been reversed in the 1970's. Is the reversal only temporary, and if so, when will the underlying trend be resumed? How should such anticipations influence the planners in the medium term?

Answers to these questions depend very much on how one interprets the price drama we have witnessed of late in world markets, a drama which would seem to weaken one of the potent justifications of a developing economy's out-and-out drive away from primary production, away from agricultural production in the first place. The distinguished economist Lord Kaldor offers one plausible interpretation for events. It is his hypothesis that the price dislocations have been, to a considerable extent, due to certain economic policies pursued by the leading countries in the world. He cites as an important case in point the drop in Western wheat stocks in 1973 to less than half of their usual level (the massive sales of grain to the USSR being one of the critical contributing factors); in this interpretation, the consequent jumpiness of commodity prices would be broadly accounted for by inflationary expectations.[25] If Kaldor is correct, one could visualize adoption of counteracting policies, which could possibly bring a drastic change in the situation and a consequent return to the "great trend," perhaps even sometime around 1980. (While I prefer not to commit myself on such speculative issues, I must confess that an interpretation of this kind is more congenial than any mechanistic one—one which, say, ascribes the happenings in the world markets to some inexplicable causes such as Kondratyev's waves, i.e., a cycle of half-century ups and downs in primary-produce prices.)

Among the primary materials required by industry in Eastern Europe, oil is of great interest. Indeed, it was oil that ignited the explosion of raw material prices in the 1970's. Oil differs significantly from grain in terms of supply, for supply of oil, at least in the shorter run, is not dependent on random factors. Here again the USSR is a massive producer and in fact has enjoyed rapidly rising output. But it is also a large exporter (even if, at the same time, a marginal importer). By the mid-1970's, Soviet annual output, exports, and imports of oil had reached about 490, 130, and 8 million metric tons respectively, with the bulk of the exports going to the countries of Eastern Europe. Of the latter, only Romania covers a substantial, though rather swiftly declining, share of her oil needs from domestic output. All the rest depend heavily on rapidly rising imports; from 1965 to 1975, net oil imports of the area collectively increased fourfold.[26]

Naturally, forecasts in this domain depend on a complex set of assumptions concerning requirements and availabilities. For relatively short-term projections, data obtained from suitable extrapolation do not involve great risks. Hence, one can without excessive hazard accept current forecasts that the Soviet Union by 1980 will produce, import, and use 640, 20, and 514 million tons of oil respectively.

[23] On the grain balance, see *Wochenbericht*, Feb. 19, 1976. To satisfy what is described as "scientific standards" of nutrition, CMEA needs to increase its output of meat by 40-42 percent, of milk by 28-30 percent, and of vegetables by 40-45 percent. See B. Frumkin, "Cooperation of the CMEA Countries in the Domain of Foodstuffs," *Voprosy ekonomiki*, No. 9, 1977, p. 99.

One is tempted to relate the issue of self-sufficiency in grain farming to that of efficiency. Romania excepted, all East European countries have higher yields per sown unit of land than the USSR. However, it is rather risky to draw conclusions from such comparative data, if only because of differences in the type of farming, caused by environmental factors.

[24] On the common assumption, see, for example, the noteworthy book published in 1942 by Colin Clark, *The Economics of 1960*, London, Macmillan.

[25] Nicholas Kaldor, "Inflation and Recession in World Economy," *Economic Journal* (London), December 1976.

[26] See J. Bethkenhagen in *Jahrbuch der Wirtschaft Osteuropas*, Vol. 6, pp. 279 ff. He combines official statistics and Western estimates. For an interesting appraisal of intra-CMEA oil prices as related to world-market prices, see idem, in *Wochenbericht*, Jan. 13, 1977.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Construction in 1973 on the Soviet-Czechoslovak-East German natural-gas pipeline in the GDR district of Karl-Marx-Stadt.

—EUPRA.

and that it will export 146 million tons, of which 100 million tons will go to Eastern Europe.[27] Admittedly, the prognosis for Soviet oil output is by no means uncontroversial among Western forecasters. One authoritative US source predicts a Soviet failure to meet oil output plans and, in fact, anticipates a peaking of production and even a drop in output from peak levels to some 400-500 million tons by 1985.[28] Were this latter forecast to be vindicated by actual developments, the Soviet Union would turn from an exporter into a major importer of oil. In such a situation, it would be reasonable to expect very important repercussions in the geography of oil supply and, indeed, of overall foreign trade of the countries discussed here. A considerable share of oil supplies would have to be made up of imports from outside CMEA.

Clearly such figures should be related to the *overall* dependence of the East European economies on foreign fuel. This dependence is very heavy only in the case of Bulgaria, i.e., roughly three quarters of national requirements; for Hungary, the figure is about two fifths; for the two industrial leaders of the group—the GDR and Czechoslovakia—the figure is between one third and a quarter; Romania is close to a balance; and Poland has a modest overall fuel surplus.[29] The USSR is *the* principal supplier of energy-carrying material to cover this region's deficit. According to current plans, the USSR during 1976-80 is to supply all its CMEA partners with some 800 million "conventional" tons of energy and fuel, or nearly half again as much as during 1971-75.[30]

When assessing the longer-run position of the Soviet Union as a producer and supplier of raw materials, its advantage in the peculiar, universal primary commodity, gold, must also be borne in mind. In 1976, according to various estimates, the USSR exported gold valued at US$1,000-1,500 million.[31] (This commodity has afforded the Soviet Union enhanced strength in world markets, and will continue to do so unless the Western industrial world actually demonetizes that material.) Whether, and—if so—to what extent, the Soviet Union's gold-exporting potentialities could be counted upon by East European states as a "reserve line" in case of need can be only a matter of conjecture.

Be all this as it may, we are facing a historically unusual economic situation. In the "classical" case, the leader economy serves as the sophisticated manufacturing backbone of the system, with the associated economies being the raw-material supplier base. The fact that the pattern is reversed in the case of the Soviet Union and the East European economies is of interest, particularly as one attempts to interpret very long-range trends in prices. Is the

---

[27] See, for example, *Wochenbericht*, Dec. 15, 1977.

[28] US Central Intelligence Agency, *Prospects for Soviet Oil Production*, ER77-10270, Washington, DC, April 1977.

[29] The author's estimate. B. Korda, in "Energy Consumption in the Soviet Bloc," *Forschungsberichte* (Vienna), No. 41, August 1977, offers a detailed assessment from which we derive the following figures (in millions of tons of conventional energy, rounded, for 1974):

	Consumption	Production
Bulgaria	34	13
Czechoslovakia	100	80
GDR	119	86
Hungary	24	37
Poland	158	182
Romania	75	77
USSR	1,324	1,533

[30] S. Pomazanov and A. Yakushkin, "Development of Integrational Processes in Energy Generation in CMEA Countries," *Voprosy ekonomiki*, No. 6, 1976.

[31] H. Machowski, in "Analysis of Imbalance in East-West Trade," *Wochenbericht*, Sept. 30, 1976, estimates Soviet gold exports for 1976 at between US$1,000 million and US$1,400 million.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The entranceto the Huta Katowice Metal Complex, one of Poland's major investment projects in the 1970's.

—Liaison.

USSR the beneficiary of a major secular shift in the terms of trade in favor of primary produce, or will its supplier status be proved detrimental in the long run by another reversal of the terms of trade—back in favor of manufactures?

Investment vs. Consumption

But enough of such conjecture. Returning to the operational growth strategy pursued in Eastern Europe, we note, as almost a platitude, that these economies have an immanent high-investment drive. Not only is this finding upheld by official statistics, but quite a few students of the matter have argued that the proportions of national product saved and invested, as indicated by these data, are indeed understated, owing to the peculiarities of the price structure. This bias in favor of investment has an obvious impact on the consumption rate. But continuity in growth of national product over the post-1950 quarter of a century (3-4 times in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland; around 5 times in the GDR; and 6.5-7 times in the two industrially most retarded economies, those of Bulgaria and Romania[32]) has cushioned the impact of the investment bias on consumption levels. Moreover, it stands to reason that as decades pass and these economies mature and decelerate, the burden of investment will be somewhat lessened.

Around the mid-1970's, the savings ratios of the countries of Eastern Europe generally ranged be-

[32] Ivanov and Loshchakov, loc. cit.

Since about the mid-1960's, the gross national product of the area has been growing at about 7 percent per annum. See B. Askanas, H. 'Askanas, and F. Levcik, "The Economy of the CMEA Countries and Planned Development to 1980," *Monatsberichte* (publication of the *Osterreichisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung*—Vienna), No. 3, 1976. According to these authors, the average annual growth of GNP for the area was 6.5 percent in 1966-70, 7.8 percent in 1971-75, and is targeted at 6.7 percent in the 1976-80 plans. Clearly, because national product has some strongly random components—agriculture in particular—its statistical series yield a picture of far less smooth growth than those of industrial output.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tween 28 and 31 percent. There were, however, two notable exceptions, i.e., the relatively low ratio of 23 percent in the GDR and the high ratio of some 37 percent in Poland.[33] The first exception seems to be explainable by the economy's maturity, and perhaps in part also by constraints imposed by a policy of improving living standards to lessen the psychological impact of the more favorable situation for consumers across the intra-German frontier. The Polish exception is due to the strategy of a "second breakthrough" in industrial development presently being attempted in that country.

Poland's effort to expand and modernize its industry in the 1970's has been striking. No less than half of its industrial capacities by 1976 represented equipment installed during the single quinquennium 1971-75. This effort is to continue in 1976-80, when Poland plans to spend 40 percent more on investment than in the preceding five-year period.[34] The fact that this figure includes investment to be supported by foreign credits mitigates to some extent at least its *current* "welfare cost." Moreover, during 1976-80, yearly investment is apparently to be frozen at the level of 1975.[35]

Several words of caution might be added here regarding interpretations of investment rates and of the impact of investment-consumption proportions on the consumer. First, in Eastern Europe just as elsewhere, the actual and planned volumes of investment often diverge rather distinctly in the short term—a reflection of variations in the planned and actual timetables for initiation, gestation, and completion of projects. Second, experience also suggests that the sensitivities of consumers about the ups and downs in the volume and pattern of consumption varies strikingly from one country to another. This variation stems from extra-economic factors, which are beyond an economist's judgment.

The heavy rates of investment in the East European economies as a whole have given rise to phenomena — e.g., market disequilibria — which some Western economists are inclined of late to discuss under the heading of "inflation." This discussion, in my opinion, has suffered from some basic misunderstandings. The point is that price in a command planned economy and price in a market economy are, in substance, two very different instruments. In the former, plan construction and implementation is carried out essentially in physical rather than price terms. "Inflation"—or upward changes in "prices"—has hardly any impact on production or capacity-formation of the kind it has in a market system. (Surely it is unthinkable that price movements could reverse a decision, say, to construct a factory or a railway, or to produce military equipment.) Nor is the economic and social impact of pseudo-inflation, or for that matter pseudo-deflation, on distribution processes in the planned economies in any meaningful way analogous to that of inflation in market economies.

So-called prices in the consumption sphere of the socialist economies are conceptually calculated to balance out—to "clear"—the planned commodity flows with the counterflows of purchasing power being supplied through planned wages and other earnings. Yet, there has been a time-honored

A crowded Budapest department store during a February 1976 sale.

—Eastfoto.

[33] Alampiyev and Vorob'yev, loc. cit.

[34] S. Gomulka, "Do New Factories Embody the Best Practice and Technology?" *Economic Journal*, December 1976, pp. 859 ff. Working with data from the previous plan period, Gomulka has demonstrated that Polish experience validates what is referred to in the literature as the "capital-vintage hypothesis" of the Johansen-Salter-Kalecki type, i.e., that most technological changes (new goods and new production methods) require a "young" stock of machines.

[35] S. Gomulka, in *Aneks* (London), No. 11, 1976. In his article cited in fn. 34 above, Gomulka attributed the advances of the Polish economy to (1) importation of industrial equipment on credit—to the tune of $3 billion—which doubled the pace of investment and increased productivity; (2) a 10 percent rise in industrial productivity secured by organizational reforms; and (3) a 6 percent rise in farm output over and above the long-range trend.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

mismatch in planning these flows, leading to queues, black and brown markets, and similar phenomena.[36] Of course, sometimes such imbalances have been fully or partly deliberate, conditioned by assessments of the likely reaction of society, again a matter outside the province of an economist's analysis.

The importance of such considerations has recently been demonstrated by the contrasting experiences of Poland and Hungary. In the first case, the attempt of Polish leaders in June 1976 to raise prices on consumer goods to market-clearing levels met with an adverse response, and most of the price increases had to be cancelled. In Hungary, a similar attempt to raise prices—but in a phased operation—appears to have gone more easily.

In fact, as far as its price mechanism goes, Hungary constitutes a case unto itself within Eastern Europe. The Hungarian reforms of 1968 created a mechanism of "mixed," flexible prices, one of the intended effects of which was to make prices reflect to some extent the relative prices obtained and paid in foreign trade. After five years, the mechanism was put to a severe test by the price explosion in world markets. As a result, in 1973 a new set of measures was initiated. These were designed to mitigate the dislocations stemming from the external development—through the use of budget subsidies and profit regulation, especially in regard to fixed (maximum) prices.[37] Drastic measures have also been taken with respect to consumer-goods pricing in an effort to counteract a price-wage spiral. All these steps have patently undermined the guiding idea of the original reforms.

Foreign Economic Relations

Above we have already touched both directly and indirectly on a number of matters relating to the foreign economic relations of the East European countries, but the subject merits some further discussion here. It can be addressed, first, in the context of CMEA and, second, in the context of relations between the socialist economies of Eastern Europe and the rest of the world.

With regard to CMEA, we have the perennial theme of the economic integration of its member

[36] This writer, for one, is surprised that, considering the planners' still very imperfect box of tools, the mismatches have not been even more severe.

[37] On these developments, see Bela Csikos-Nagy, "World Inflation and Price Policy in Hungary," *L'Est* (Milan), Nos. 3-4, 1976, pp. 115-35.

Containers from a Czechoslovak train are transferred to East German freighters in the GDR harbor of Rostock for delivery to Great Britain. The facility is part of an integrated system of container transport planned for member states of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance under a 1971 integration plan.

—Eastfoto.

states—a matter concerning which there is a good deal of confusion. To start with, there is the basic concept itself: I would suggest that, loosely speaking, it should be understood as securing the best possible—call it near-optimal—coordination of the economies' structure. This raises straightaway the question of near-optimal by what criterion. And who is to determine that criterion? The issue is exemplified by the well-known Romanian opposition in the 1960's to the idea that it would benefit Romania and CMEA as a whole if Romania continued to act as a large-scale raw-material supplier to the region (an issue, let us note, which itself has since been further complicated by the recent trends in world prices). Beyond this, there is a technical issue. For this group of countries, each of which is operating by command planning, to efficiently harmonize their activities calls logically for a mandatory plan for the group as a whole. Whatever the logic of the matter, however, the countries concerned do not seem prepared to draw that conclusion. To be sure, there has in recent years been growing support for this doctrine in Soviet theoretical writing. But there

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

has also been no less explicit opposition to it in some of the CMEA countries.[38] (Presumably, this counterdoctrine is concerned with more than just the admittedly formidable technical difficulties of devising a supranational plan on the scale required.)

As matters now stand, CMEA coordination is essentially confined to (1) the formulation of some very broad intercountry agreements for the development of certain specific production branches, especially those where the task of coordination is relatively tractable, e.g., steel, and (2) the undertaking of some joint industrial projects. Both approaches are fragmentary: neither secures a fundamental solution of the "nagging" issue of effective coordination of the family of command economics. The same is true of the "surrogate" of the overall plan (one with which the school of thought postulating such a plan has apparently had to reconcile itself)—the formulation of very long-term *"programs"* of cooperation and integration embracing some selected problems and the synthesizing of the results of information exchanges and consultations on issues of economic and economic-technological policies. Somewhat euphemistically this is sometimes described as "joint planning activity."[39] Of even less practical impact seem to have been declarations of intent such as the 1971 "complex program" adopted by CMEA. Likewise, the "coordination plan for multilateral measures in 1976-80" has been referred to seldom since it was first announced.[40]

There seems to be little likelihood that anything dramatic in the way of CMEA integration will occur in the foreseeable future. Indicative of the present mood is one commentary which suggests that integration requires the leveling-out of the technical competence of industrial manpower in all the East European countries, which, the observer suggested, will itself take until the year 2000.[41]

Another symptom of the failure of CMEA integration is the state of intra-CMEA pricing and the heavy reliance on bilateral commodity barter in trade within the group. On the first point, we find that in 1975 the price paid per ton of Soviet oil and oil products delivered to Eastern Europe varied from 28 "transfer rubles" in the case of the GDR to 40 transfer rubles for Poland and 41 transfer rubles for Hungary, with prices paid by Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia falling somewhere in between.[42] This state of affairs seems to validate our hypothesis that the "transfer ruble" is a pseudocurrency that largely reflects the physical quasi-barter of commodity for commodity. (In this context, it should be noted that among the socialist economies foreign "hard" currency, too, appears to be bartered as a commodity as well as used to clear accounts.) In these commodity transactions one can discern certain moderate and differentiated shifts in the terms of trade between member countries. Over the last few years there appears to have been an overall loss vis-à-vis the USSR of 9 percent for Hungary, 3 percent for Poland, and 4 percent for Czechoslovakia and East Germany, resulting, it would seem, from the commodity composition of the particular bilateral trade arrangements.[43] Where the shift in terms of trade has been most pronounced, in trade between Hungary and the Soviet Union, this has apparently necessitated the granting of some short-term credits to Budapest.

Despite such shifts in the terms of trade within CMEA there continues to be little correlation between intra-bloc prices and the structures of prices within the individual members' economies. At the same time, as we shall see shortly, intra-CMEA prices vary considerably from prices ruling in the world. This results in a double layer of insulation between domestic prices in Eastern Europe and competitive world prices—a situation that seriously affects the efficiency of the respective domestic economies, although it does serve in part to cushion the domestic impact of major swings in world prices.

Of course, in principle, the CMEA countries are committed to carrying out their mutual economic transactions in prices pegged to world-market prices. Specifically, contractual prices in these intra-CMEA relations are arrived at by annual bilateral revisions based on the average of world-market prices for a given commodity over the preceding five years.[44] Despite this mechanism, however, in the 1970's we have seen, if anything, a widening rather than a narrowing of the gaps between the intra-family prices and world-market prices. Evidence of this trend

[38] See A. Zauberman, *Trade Coordination of Planned Economies*, forthcoming, and the references cited therein.

[39] See P. Litvyakov, "Joint Planning Activity of CMEA Members and Ways of Improving It," *Planovoye khozyaystvo*, No. 8, 1977.

[40] For the text of the program, see *Ekonomicheskaya gazeta* (Moscow), No. 33, August 1971. The author has seen no text for the "coordination plan."

[41] See Kormnov, loc. cit., p. 77.

[42] *Wochenbericht*, Apr. 24, 1975.

[43] Problems of the "pseudocurrency" transfer ruble and of the quasi-barter and other related aspects of CMEA trade are discussed in the author's *Trade Coordination . . . .*

[44] See Paul Marer, *Postwar Pricing and Price Patterns in Socialist Foreign Trade (1946-1971)*, Bloomington, IN, Indiana University Press, 1972.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

is admittedly scarce and largely circumstantial, yet we do get some indication from what seems a dependable Western study of the pricing of Soviet energy-bearing materials. It would appear from that study that while the price charged by the USSR for oil exports to Western industrial nations rose fivefold between 1970 and 1975, the price of Soviet oil exports to the socialist economies of Eastern Europe did not rise much more than twofold. Moreover, most of the latter rise was recorded in 1975, with only marginal increases in the preceding years. On the other hand, prices of natural gas exported by the USSR to both areas over this period were moving more or less in step.[45]

Of course, pricing is just one symptom of the difficulties of integrating the socialist economies of Eastern Europe with the world economy through trade. The mechanism of a mandatorily planned and steered economic system alone is a very fundamental factor that tends to limit the nature and role of these countries' external trade. Organizational aspects aside, external trade in such a system tends to be viewed as but a means of procuring from outside the *minimum* of what is required to carry out the plan, for which there is set aside from domestic output the *minimum* needed to balance out such imports.

Nevertheless, during the past decade and a half there has been a striking expansion of trade between the CMEA states and the Western industrially advanced nations. This expansion of what is termed, rather imprecisely, "East-West" trade would seem to have been favored by specific developments and modes of thinking on both sides.

Given the present state of the area's economies, East European authorities have envisioned in trade with the industrialized West possibly much greater benefits than those foreseen in the traditional view of foreign trade as a means of obtaining essential producer goods simply to achieve plan targets. In the first place, East Europe's leaders have looked upon sales in Western markets as a means of gaining convertible currency, which in turn, it was hoped, would widen the area of maneuver. This hope would appear to have dimmed in the late 1970's as members of the family reconcile themselves to the fact that the aim of multilaterality in trade—without supranational planning—is unachievable. Secondly, trade with the West has been viewed as an opportunity for the East European economies to increase their short-term supplies of capital-forming goods by means of long- and medium-term credits. In fact, by the end of 1975 the net indebtedness of the six East European countries in convertible currency amounted, according to Western estimates, to nearly $20 billion. By far the heaviest borrower appears to have been Poland (about $7 billion), with the GDR coming next. In each case, the first half of the 1970's witnessed a fast growth of these figures, while there was an apparent slowdown in the growth rate thereafter.[46] Finally, trade with the West has been seen as a very major vehicle for acquisition of new technology. Although quantitatively both the credits and the technology imports are marginal, qualitatively they are of great importance.[47]



A meat plant in Warsaw, constructed in cooperation with the Chicago firm Allan Scott and equipped with machinery imported from West Germany, Sweden, and other countries.

—Eastfoto.

[45] See *Wochenbericht*, Apr. 28, 1977, and Jan. 13, 1977.

[46] See P. Hanson, "The Import of Western Technology," in A. Brown and M. Kaser, Eds., *The Soviet Union Since the Fall of Khrushchev*, London, Macmillan, 1975. Also see *Wochenbericht*, Apr. 28, 1977.

F. Levcik and Jan Stankovsky give the following figures for the net debt of the East European states at the end of 1976: Bulgaria—US$2.6 billion; Czechoslovakia—US$1.6 billion; the GDR—US$5.5 billion; Hungary—US$2.5 billion; Poland—US$10 billion; and Romania—US$2.7 billion. *Monatsberichte*, No. 5, 1977.

[47] On this point, see Hanson, loc. cit. He notes, for example, that Western equipment and technology has recently accounted for no more than 4 percent of total Soviet investment.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

On the Western side, the recession and unexpectedly slow recovery of the 1970's have stimulated a search for export markets in Eastern Europe, whose economies enjoy a solid reputation for having absorptive markets and being dependable in the repayment of credits. At least in this respect, the noncyclical economies of the East have been the beneficiaries of the cycle which affected the Western trading nations. (One should note that the recession in the West has to some extent decreased Eastern export opportunities.)

What about the future of East-West trade? Interesting projections about both the future volume and motivation for this trade were made in late 1975 by the Polish scholar A. Czopurko. He expected total turnover in the trade between the East European socialist states and the West (exports and imports) to reach some $36.5 billion each way by 1980. In this expansion of East-West economic relations, he saw the East as motivated by a continued desire to import Western technology and organizational and marketing know-how, and the West as attracted by access to protected markets as well as to the still *relatively* greater manpower reserves and low-cost production opportunities in the East.[48] One cannot, of course, guarantee that these assumed motivations will still prevail by 1980, particularly in the West, where recovery from recession might dampen interest in Eastern markets. Moreover, expanding East-West commerce has rapidly increased the hard-currency indebtedness of the socialist economies. An estimate in late 1975, which assumed a sharply declining rate of growth of indebtedness, projected a total debt by 1980 of some $47 billion for the East European economies.[49] The deceleration in the rate of growth of the volume of East-West trade observed since 1975 has been attributed in part by at least one source to an effort by CMEA lands to reduce indebtedness to the West.[50] However, at least one of the socialist states, Poland, seems to be maintaining its rate of importation—and on the basis of massive borrowing.

Reforms Manquées

We should not leave our discussion of East European economic life without some comment on the reforms initiated throughout the area at various points in the 1960's. Their failure to alter economic mechanisms substantially is an important factor conditioning the future of the respective economies.

At their inception, these reforms were believed by their architects—and indeed by some outside observers—to have initiated a very basic change in the management of the bodies economic of those countries. In general, the aim was to relax some of the organizational constraints on industrial administration, in particular in the operation of the lower echelons; to narrow down the area of direct, as opposed to indirect, controls; to provide within the production system more scope for material incentives; to secure within the *consumption* sphere greater sensitivity to the wishes of the ultimate consumer—a point of increasing relevance in light of the rise of consumption levels.

Unlike previous attempts, these reforms were to some extent individualized as between countries. It does not seem too arbitrary to say that, within Eastern Europe, the GDR and Czechoslovakia have been the most conservative and hesitant, with Bulgaria and Romania being somewhat less conservative, and Poland and particularly Hungary being relatively the most daring. Indeed, Hungary's economy has been, as it were, an experimental laboratory testing how far a socialist economy can move in operating quasi-prices and a quasi-market to replace the machinery of detailed planning and control.[51]

From the outset of these reforms it was the present writer's view that their possibilities would be strongly circumscribed by two factors. The first was the prevalent political philosophy in the area, which postulated the sovereignty of social preferences—both in the immediate and longer term—as expressed and enacted by the planning state. The second was the existing "state of the art" of planning: i.e., the technical potentialities of planning instruments. (The adopted premise has been that

[48] See A. Czopurko, "East-West Trade Prospects up to 1980," *Forschungsberichte*, No. 31, December 1975. His 1980 figure is based on projection of the respective rates of growth of East European exports to and imports from the West. These were 8.9 and 12.3 percent in 1966-70 and 29.7 and 32.7 percent in 1971-74. In the latter period, the expansion of exports and imports in real terms (as opposed to inflated prices) is seen as about half of the nominal figures. Czopurko makes additional projections past 1980 based on the postulate of a continued export-import balance after that year.

[49] F. Levcik, "The East's Debt and East-West Economic Relations," Wiener Institut für Internationale Wirtschaftsvergleiche, Reprint series, June 1977 (from *West-Ost-Journal* [Vienna], May 1977). Levcik observed that, if the USSR was included and interest and non-commodity items of the balance of payments were added, the projected debt would total some $80 billion.

[50] See *Wochenbericht*, Nov. 17, 1977.

[51] We may note on the theoretical plane that, even in Hungary, a distinguished school of thought (Janos Kornai and associates) continues to reject price as the exclusive or principal instrument for effective steering of the economy. On this point, see my study *Mathematical Theories of Decentralization in West and East*, forthcoming.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

socially-determined economic goals can only be pursued through mandatory planning, rather than through the mechanism of price and market.)

In retrospect, it is clear that the reforms have only marginally eased the rigidities of the economic machinery and have left its direct-mandatory nature largely intact. Even in Hungary, the reformist drive has come to a standstill. In fact, that country has had to trim its experiments, especially with regard to reliance on autonomous decision-making within the hierarchy and on competitive market processes.[52] One finds in Hungary an observable degree of re-centralization in the sphere of investment, which implies centralization of decisions concerning the volume and patterns of production capacities and hence of output. This development is crucial, for it is precisely in the sphere of investment that preferences—be they "social" or "consumer"—have their most telling impact on the long-term direction of a socialist or any other form of economy. Not only have the changes in the Hungarian planning and steering mechanism failed to be pushed, if only in some pragmatic fashion, to their logical conclusions; but there has been no inclination on the part of Hungary's associates in the socialist community to gradually recognize and assimilate these changes.

While thus writing an epitaph to the reforms of the 1960's, this author believes that the countries of Eastern Europe in the 1980's might again feel compelled to embark on yet another set of economic reforms. The imperative to improve the economic mechanism so as to make technologically more sophisticated use of limited materials and manpower resources to sustain production growth and to satisfy consumer demand will hardly diminish with time. If the necessity to reform is again recognized, these countries will once more confront a serious dilemma of how far to move to promote economic efficiency without violating the strong extra-economic fundamentals to which they continue to subscribe.

[52] See R. Portes, "Hungary: Economic Performance, Policy and Prospects," in US Congress, Joint Economic Committee, op. cit., pp. 766-815.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Books

East German Literature

By William Treharne Jones

WERNER BRETTSCHNEIDER. *Zwischen Literarischer Autonomie und Staatsdienst: Die Literatur in der DDR* (Between Literary Independence and Writing in the Service of the State: Literature in the GDR). Berlin, Erich Schmidt Verlag, 1974.
FRITZ J. RADDATZ. *Traditionen und Tendenzen: Materialien zur Literatur der DDR* (Traditions and Tendencies: Material on the Literature of the GDR). Frankfurt/Main, Suhrkamp, 1976, 2 vols.
REINER KUNZE. *The Wonderful Years*. Tr. by Joachim Neugroschel. New York, NY, George Braziller, 1977.
MARCEL REICH-RANICKI. *Zur Literatur der DDR* (On the Literature of the GDR). Munich, Piper Verlag, 1974.
JÜRGEN FUCHS. *Gedächtnisprotokolle* (Minutes Based on Memory). Hamburg, Rowohlt, 1977.
THOMAS BRASCH. *Vor den Vätern sterben die Söhne* (The Sons Die Before the Fathers). Berlin, Rotbuch Verlag, 1977.

ANY SURVEY of the current literary scene in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) is necessarily overshadowed by the crisis which followed the expulsion in November 1976 of the dissident poet and folksinger, Wolf Biermann. Twelve of the GDR's most distinguished writers and a leading sculptor, men and women who had hitherto pushed for more liberal cultural policies from inside the system, reacted by publishing in the West a letter asking the regime to reconsider its decision.[1] In the days which followed, nearly a hundred other writers and artists added their names to the petition. The leaders of the GDR's ruling Socialist Unity Party (SED), at first stunned by this unusual display of opposition, soon returned to the offensive. The loyalist/opportunist majority within the East German Writers' Federation was duly mobilized to condemn its independent-minded colleagues, many of whom were then expelled from the party. Those protesters who refused to eat humble pie were attacked, ignored, or encouraged, directly or indirectly, to leave the country. Many have done so, albeit with a heavy heart, for both the cultural dissidents and the critics of the regime within the literary establishment are, for all their criticism of GDR communism, Marxists who believe their country to be the better German state.

In such circumstances, the prospects for those writers remaining in the GDR, whether within or outside of the literary establishment, would seem bleak. Yet the East German regime has tried to suggest that the Biermann affair will have no important consequences, that the less restrictive *Kulturpolitik* introduced by Erich Honecker when he assumed the SED leadership nearly seven years ago will continue. The government has not, for instance, stopped the publication of works by authors who signed the letter of protest. Thus, not only did Christa Wolf's latest work, *Kindheitsmuster* (Childhood Example),[2] a fictional investigation of how the generation of the 1920's was compromised by Nazism, appear just a few days after she had been "severely reprimanded" for penning her name to the infamous petition, but the book was warmly praised by the critics. Yet *Kindheitsmuster* was conceived in a very different climate from that now prevailing. By interfering so drastically in cultural matters, the SED leadership has exposed the limitations of, even destroyed, a central principle of its own *Kulturpolitik:* namely, that the artists'

[1] The text, provided by Reuters, appeared in *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (Frankfurt/Main), Nov. 19, 1976, p. 2.

[2] The West German edition, Darmstadt—Neuwied, Luchterhand, 1977.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

organizations should settle their own affairs and decide themselves which works are permissible. Such autonomy presupposed an atmosphere of trust between writers and the party, an atmosphere which now has been destroyed. This turn of affairs can only inhibit the more talented and independent-minded among East German authors.

The present difficult situation will almost certainly interrupt or distort a literary development whose roots go back to 1960. Before that year, Werner Brettschneider argues in his scholarly and thoughtful book, East German writers were primarily concerned with the struggle against capitalism, fascism, and war and with the establishment after victory of a new order in eastern Germany. Many of these authors drew on their own experiences in the Spanish Civil War or in Nazi concentration camps. Much was written on the difficult task of postwar reconstruction and on the new consciousness which was supposed to grow out of the postwar changes. On the whole, writers were intent on describing an epic struggle which was to end in victory for their cause. Such an approach, with its tendency to regard individuals and stories as illustrations of a general theme and its reliance on conservative literary forms, resulted in works that were in harmony with the rather vague canons of socialist realism.

Since 1960, a new generation of writers has appeared on the scene, many of whom were still children at the end of the war. For them, the epic struggles of the past are history; the starting point of these writers is the new society in which they have spent all their adult lives. They have discovered conflicts between the individual and society, often antagonistic conflicts, which in the official view should have been eliminated by the establishment of the new order. Unlike the older generation, whose members either did not feel such conflicts or were content to ignore them, the younger writers have wished to express these tensions in their works. In that sense alone, the younger writers have written more realistic books. But sometimes the alienation, both observed and felt, has forced the writer to turn inward. The literary consequence has been an intense preoccupation with the self, what Germans call "flight (or escape) into privacy" (*Flucht ins Private*). Both tendencies—the greater realism and the greater inward focus—have, whether occurring singly or in combination, resulted in prose, verse, and plays which have little to do with socialist realism either in form or content. Yet it is important to remember that, for all the heretical aspects of their works, members of the younger generation do not write, in the words of Volker Braun, one of this generation's leading representatives, "against the existing society but [rather] for it, for its teleological change." [3]

THE 1960'S were frustrating years for the younger generation—and indeed for those older writers who wanted to write more critically than they had done in the past. The Ulbricht leadership disliked much of this new writing and, after a few years of unwilling tolerance, sent the portcullis crashing down at the end of 1965. A series of virulent attacks on the new literature took place at the 11th Plenum of the SED Central Committee; they were followed by the dismissal of several offending writers from cultural institutions and editorial offices and the banning of their works. In many ways this repression was cruder than that being experienced at present. It was also accompanied by efforts to force literature to reflect much more closely the regime's economic and political policies. Thus,

[3] "*Wir schreiben nicht mehr gegen die bestehende Gesellschaft, sondern für sie, für ihre immanente Veränderung,*" in *Neue Deutsche Literatur* (Berlin), January 1971, as cited by Brettschneider, p. 222.

Reviewers in this Issue

WILLIAM TREHARNE JONES—British journalist on the production staff of the Current Affairs Group, BBC Television; BBC correspondent in Berlin, 1970-74; contributor of articles on East German cultural affairs to such journals as *Encounter, Survey,* and *Deutschland Archiv.*

STEPHEN R. BOWERS—Assistant Professor of Political Science, Berry College (Mount Berry, GA); author of recent articles in *World Affairs* and *Naval War College Review.*

JANE P. SHAPIRO—Associate Professor of Political Science, Manhattanville College (Purchase, NY); author of articles in such journals as *Comparative Politics, Soviet Studies,* and *Canadian Slavonic Papers;* co-editor of *Change and Adaptation in Soviet and East European Politics,* 1976; *From the Cold War to Détente,* 1976; and *Communist Systems in Comparative Perspective,* 1974.

RAMON H. MYERS—Curator-Scholar, East Asian Collection, Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace (Stanford, CA); author of *The Chinese Peasant Economy,* 1970, and of numerous articles in scholarly journals including a forthcoming study on wheat production and distribution in the PRC in *China Quarterly.*

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

according to the so-called Bitterfeld Way, named after the conferences of writers, workers, and party leaders held in the town of that name, writers were expected to seek inspiration by spending more time with workers in factories, while workers were to consider writing themselves.[4]

Although a very few good new works were published—e.g., Christa Wolf's *Nachdenken über Christa T* (Reflections about Christa T),[5] widely judged to be one of the finest East German novels—party policies throughout the rest of the 1960's produced more resentment than literature. However, the accession of Erich Honecker as party leader in 1971 brought a change in the regime's approach. Although basically orthodox politically, Honecker believed that the regime was now secure enough to be more flexible in its attempts to win popular support. Thus, the more generous treatment of writers which now became noticeable was matched by concessions of a different nature to other sections of East German society. Such flexibility had two manifold advantages: it enabled the regime to concentrate on its main concern, the economy; and it corresponded well with the moderate image which the Soviet Union, then in full pursuit of détente, wanted to present to the West and to the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) in particular.

Honecker's declaration in December 1971 that in his view "there can be no taboos in the fields of art and literature so long as one's starting point is basically socialist,"[6] was a tacit admission that socialist realism, as it had been interpreted hitherto, was too narrow to accommodate the younger generation of writers. Works that have appeared in the last six years have confirmed this admission time and time again. Nowhere is this clearer than in poetry, where the preoccupation with self is—perhaps inevitably, given the poetic literary genre—very strong. Gone are the tractor lyrics and the hymns in praise of the new socialist man. They have been replaced by the poet's absorption with his immediate environment—individuals, home, life on his street, and nature.

Fritz J. Raddatz, in his two perceptive but rambling and not always consistent volumes, provides examples of how extensive this turning inward has grown, of how even the poet's immediate environment can seem alien. Eva Strittmatter's poems, for instance, are overshadowed by loneliness and pessimism. Her poem "Balance" begins:

We have all lost very much
Don't fool yourself: both
you and I
We were born open and outgoing
But now we keep the doors
firmly closed . . . .
(Raddatz, Vol. 2, p. 713)

Moreover, the poet is quoted as saying:

I want to start by coming to terms with myself—anything else would be self-deception. I hope I never try to make myself agreeable. Up till now I have written without taking notice of anybody or anything. . . . I have no pedagogic intention, nothing is further from my mind than to want to reach other people. I want to learn to live . . . . (Ibid.)

Such premises could hardly be called "basically socialist." Yet not only has Eva Strittmatter's verse been published, but, as Raddatz illustrates rather amusingly, it has even been praised.

The toleration shown to writers like Eva Strittmatter, while difficult to justify even in the light of Honecker's more flexible cultural guidelines, has been easy politically. Such inward-looking poems do not threaten the party's supremacy by encouraging members of the public to ask awkward questions. More problematic, however, has been the second tendency of literature in the 1970's—the greater realism, the portrayal of conflicts between individual and society, the determination, to quote the author Rainer Kirsch, "to know the whole burden of the truth."[7] This tendency is found among poets such as Kirsch and Reiner Kunze, but it is also strong among many novelists and dramatists.

Perhaps the most notable example of the new social realism is the play *Die neuen Leiden des jungen W* (The New Sufferings of Young W)[8] by Ulrich Plenzdorf, a hitherto unknown screenplay writer in his early 40's from the state film company. Plenzdorf's box office triumph is the tale of a teenage dropout who proclaims "jeans are an attitude to life," leaves town after rows at home and at work, and finally dies in circumstances which strongly suggest willful negligence, if not suicide. Alienation is the play's central theme—alienation from the endless pressure to conform, alienation from authority, from the

[4] "Bitterfeld Conferences" were held in 1959 and 1964. For details, see Raddatz, Vol. 1, pp. 58-61.

[5] The West German edition, Darmstadt—Neuwied, Luchterhand, 1969.

[6] *Neues Deutschland* (Berlin), Dec. 18, 1971.

[7] "*Die ganze Last der Wahrheit kennen,*" comes from the last line of Kirsch's poem "To My Friends, the Old Comrades" quoted in full by Brettschneider, p. 258.

[8] The West German edition, Frankfurt/Main, Suhrkamp, 1973.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

(broken) home, and even from the girlfriend. This motif, combined with the hero's Salingeresque slang and the play's skillful Western-style staging, explains the work's enormous appeal, especially to many young East Germans. The latter may not be dropouts themselves, but they sympathize with the hero's motives.

Even if this work appears to take Honecker's promise of no taboos quite literally, it does contain one direct link with the more traditional hero of socialist realist fiction, as Marcel Reich-Ranicki, literary editor of the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,* explains in his stimulating collection of essays. Plenzdorf's hero may die, an ideologically inexplicable occurrence given the supposedly unlimited opportunities for personal fulfillment in socialist society. Yet his death is not entirely in vain. For he leaves behind him a labor-saving invention—a paint-spraying machine—that he had been working on. And the machine is found to work, thus benefiting society.

Perhaps the party leadership noticed this positive feature. Still, the play raised an issue, the age-old issue which any totalitarian system finds itself facing once it eases up on the brakes: how far can the regime go? If it allows one writer to raise a subject as sensitive as the alienation of youth, what (or who) is to stop others from going further, from depicting the system even more graphically and analyzing its roots? Certainly not the writers themselves, as the party leadership rapidly discovered. They could be counted on to press ahead.

In 1975, three years after the appearance of *The New Sufferings of Young W*, the country's leading literary journal, *Sinn und Form,* published a story which took Plenzdorf's theme of youthful alienation much further. Whereas Plenzdorf had described only the symptoms of the sickness, Volker Braun, a well-established writer in his late 30's, described the sickness itself. Moreover, he did so without the humor and romanticism which softened the impact of *The New Sufferings of Young W.* Braun's "Incomplete Story" is probably the most damning criticism of the regime which has yet been published in the GDR.[9]

The story itself is very simple, and yet, as anyone acquainted with East Germans knows, it depicts a typical enough occurrence in a state which operates according to the "principle" that "trust is good, but control is better." The tale describes how the authorities in a small provincial town try to break up the love relationship between two teenagers, Karin and Frank. One of the officials involved is Karin's father, chairman of the local county council. The reason for interfering in the couple's private life is a paltry one: the secret police have opened a letter from an old schoolmate of Frank's who has escaped to West Germany. The friend has written that he knows of a way that Frank could get out too, should he want to do so. Frank, who had once been imprisoned for rowdyism but who has since become a respectable citizen and a supporter of the regime, did not respond to his friend's offer — as the secret police could easily have learned. However, the mere suspicion that Frank *might* answer was threat enough for the authorities, always nervous about potential defectors. The suspicion was also sufficient for Karin's father, for whom the safety of the state against hypothetical danger was more important than his daughter's happiness. Braun skillfully exposes the authoritarian mentality of Karin's father and of the other officials who relentlessly pressure her into leaving Frank. The author also vividly records the confusion and anguish of a girl who had previously believed in the regime's claim to infallibility and had always done as she was told.

The story ends with Karin and Frank together, although only after an attempted suicide by Frank causes the authorities to leave the couple alone. Yet the conclusion is not a happy one, and the title of the tale, "Incomplete Story," indicates that the future is uncertain. Not only have Karin and Frank been subjected to an emotional trauma as harrowing as it was unnecessary; they have also had their faith in East German communism destroyed.

THAT SUCH a devastating story could be published in the GDR suggests that the autonomy of literature—the supposed hallmark of Honecker's *Kulturpolitik*—actually did exist at the time. However, the survival of such autonomy was soon to be in doubt. Unfortunately for literature, Braun's exposé appeared at a time when the Honecker leadership, having set out with high hopes, was beset with serious and unexpected problems. The higher prices of imports, especially Soviet oil, had slowed the improvement in domestic living standards. Millions of West German visitors to the GDR annually, the message of "Eurocommunism," and the prescriptions of "Basket Three" of the Helsinki Agreement on Security and Cooperation in Europe all were perceived as forms of subversion, unsettling the East German populace and encouraging

[9] Volker Braun, "Incomplete Story," *Sinn und Form* (Berlin), May 1975, pp. 941-79.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

popular hopes of internal liberalization. The regime was particularly agitated by the fact that some 120,000 citizens, citing the human rights provisions of the Helsinki pact, had the temerity to submit applications for emigration to the FRG.

Such worries had evidently sapped the SED leadership's earlier confidence in the regime's security. Now, according to one East Berlin source, both the Politburo and the Central Committee rose in revolt against the pessimism and political ambivalence expressed in Braun's story.[10] The party leaders were not assuaged by the fact that the specialist nature of *Sinn und Form*—only 10,000 copies of the journal were printed — meant that Braun's readership would be small and exclusive as compared with the huge numbers of young people who had seen Plenzdorf's play. Rather, it was decided that some action was necessary which would make clear both that the party remained completely in control and that no basic change in political philosophy or policy was forthcoming. Thus, the "primacy of internal security policy (*Primat der inneren Sicherheitspolitik*)," to turn Ranke's precept on its head,[11] outweighed any more narrowly cultural considerations. The direct result of this determination was the way in which GDR authorities made examples of two writers, Reiner Kunze and Wolf Biermann. Both authors were indeed controversial, but neither had done anything so terrible or unprecedented that they deserved the drastic punishment meted out to them.

Reiner Kunze, at 44, has long been one of the GDR's leading younger poets. "By nature, he [Kunze] is a lyrical poet of delicate perception," the English critic Michael Hamburger has written, "not the satirical, let alone polemical poet he was forced to become when his right to these perceptions was questioned or denied." [12] Out of favor in the late 1960's, when he was attacked for both his concentration on the inner world and his supposed anticommunism, Kunze initially benefited from Honecker's policies of relaxation, and an anthology of his verse appeared in 1973. His crime in 1976 was to publish *The Wonderful Years* in West Germany, where, incidentally, his other books had previously been published. Kunze's latest work, reviewed here in an unimaginative and sometimes inaccurate translation by Joachim Neugroschel, is a collection of prose and short stories about both Czechoslovakia (Kunze resigned from the SED in 1968 as a protest against the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia) and that by now popular theme, East German youth.

Kunze repeatedly and movingly depicts the petty but relentless way in which East European officialdom harasses its young people. Perhaps the most striking story, entitled "Element," concerns the fate of a young man who has refused to remove the bible from his bookshelf in the apprentices' hostel where he lives. His curiosity about religion—it is no more, he is not a Christian—results in his having to exchange his regular identity card for a temporary one. The loss of the ID card now means that he cannot go on his previously planned holiday of hiking and mountaineering in Czechoslovakia. So, he decides to go instead to the Baltic coast. But his trip coincides with the World Youth Festival then under way in East Berlin, and on his way to the Baltic he is repeatedly stopped by the police, whose job it is to make sure that only the most loyal members of the country's youth get to the festival in Berlin. Kunze's hero is interrogated, bullied, humiliated . . . and then sent back. The boy, Michael, tries to find other routes, but each time he is stopped. Finally, he goes home. On his arrival, a policeman checks his papers and tells him, "You may go now." "Where to?" Michael asks.

Admittedly, Kunze's vignettes yield an unflattering picture of one aspect of East German life. Yet it can be argued that they are no more critical than was Braun's "Incomplete Story." Indeed, by mentioning the unmentionable secret police, and by showing what havoc it and the civil authorities can together wreak on the happiness and convictions of young people, Braun surely wrote to greater effect. However, such considerations do not seem to have bothered the East German authorities. The latter were "gunning" for Kunze, and in October 1976 he was expelled from the Writers' Union, explicitly for publishing *The Wonderful Years* in West Germany, despite the author's claim that he had received permission to do precisely that. Months later, Kunze, who is a

[10] Private conversation in East Berlin, August 1976.

[11] Many 19th century continental theorists believed that the state's struggle to survive in an uncertain international situation obliged statesmen to subject internal politics to the demands of foreign policy. The German historian Leopold von Ranke (1795-1886) dubbed this belief "the primacy of foreign policy (*der Primat der Aussenpolitik),*" a consequence of the natural tendency of states "to direct all their internal forces toward the goal of self preservation. This is their overriding law." Quoted in E. Fraenkel and K. D. Bracher, *Das Fischer Lexikon: Staat und Politik* (The Fisher Lexicon: State and Politics), Frankfurt/Main, Fischer, 1957.

[12] *The Guardian* (London), May 8, 1975.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

man of weak constitution, emigrated to West Germany after having been told by a senior official: "You won't survive what we've got in store for you." [13]

The regime's second victim was, of course, Wolf Biermann. Biermann was not only a controversial figure; clearly a dissident, he also enjoyed a kind of official recognition by the state. Although banned from public performances since 1965 (when he was 29), Biermann had maintained contact with his East German public by means of the Western media. West German television and radio stations—the main source of information and entertainment for most East Germans—broadcast films and recordings of Biermann's songs, which had been smuggled out of his East Berlin flat. The songs usually offer a vigorous and a biting indictment of the shortcomings of East German socialism, delivered in humorous down-to-earth language. Biermann's message is: remove the stultifying encumbrance of Stalinist bureaucracy, and the true revolution, in the form of a humane socialist democracy, will triumph.

The GDR regime had long been anxious about the strength of Biermann's appeal and had frequently been irritated by his lampoons of its "leading representatives." During the early years of Honecker's rule, attempts were made to coax Biermann back into official East German cultural life. However, Biermann's terms of agreement were high: it was the regime, not Biermann himself, which must compromise. Thus, when he unexpectedly received official permission in the autumn of 1976 to make a tour of the FRG, Biermann seems to have believed, rather naively, that the trip was but the first step in a process of rehabilitation on his own terms, and that at the concerts in West Germany he would be able to sing and say what he pleased. This he did, providing the regime the excuse it needed for depriving Biermann of his citizenship and thereby barring his return to the GDR.

But Biermann had done nothing during the preceding months that would explain why this little maneuver was executed in November 1976 rather than at some point earlier. Indeed, his most recent record album had been made up largely of love songs, which probably were the least provocative verses he had ever recorded. Instead, the treatment of both Biermann and Kunze was more a response by the regime to a general situation than it was a reaction to the writers themselves. And yet the choice of these two writers to serve as examples was not accidental; they stood as symbols for those in the GDR who hoped that the system would be reformed.

Furthermore, Kunze and Biermann had provided inspiration for numerous other writers and folksingers, many of whom inhabit a shadowy world located on the fringes of the East German pop scene but also encompassing some seats of higher learning. Little known until Western correspondents reported their arrests for signing the Biermann petition noted at the outset, they present in their work—or that proportion of it which has since reached the West—a relentless depiction of the shortcomings of life in the GDR.

One member of this dissident underworld arrested in the wake of the Biermann affair was Jürgen Fuchs, a 27-year-old of working-class parentage. He and members of a disbanded pop group were detained for nine months before being expelled to West Germany. In fact, Fuchs had been in trouble with the authorities before, and his *Gedächtnisprotokolle,* published in the FRG early last year, is in part a documentary description of the lengthy examinations and interviews which led up to Fuchs' "exmatriculation" from the university and expulsion from the party in 1975. The rest of the book is devoted to material which precipitated his fall from grace: short pieces of prose which he had read at private meetings and which range from the anxious thoughts of a friend contemplating an invitation to call at the local office of the Ministry of State Security to a piece aptly entitled "The Interest," of which the following is an excerpt:

We are vigilant, show us your poems, before they are printed, before they are read, before they are heard, before they are praised, before they are criticised, before they are written. Tell us your thoughts, your feelings interest us very much, ask us when you have questions, but where did you get that idea or those views, and how and by what tricks, who said that to you, when and where have you said something, you have ten minutes to answer. . . . (p. 27)

By comparison, the alienation of the younger generation is a central theme of Thomas Brasch's collection of stories and short prose. Brasch, another writer hitherto unknown in the West, made his work doubly unpalatable for the regime by also depicting the alienation of the working class precisely where they are supposed to be the masters: at

[13] *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,* Apr. 20, 1977, p. 25.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

work. Brasch, a 32-year-old son of a senior SED official, draws on his own experiences in factories, whither he himself was dispatched after repeated clashes with the authorities. His characters are no happier in their interpersonal relationships than they are at work. To escape the emptiness of everyday life, they get into fights, indulge in petty rebellion, disappear from work on little adventures—or try to escape to the West. But the STASI (secret police) usually catches up with these living proofs of the failure of the new society. Not surprisingly, the East German authorities refused to publish this book, so Brasch emigrated to the West early last year.

THE WORKS of Brasch and Fuchs, and of Braun, Kunze, and Biermann, are the logical conclusion of a development which got under way in the 1960's. What began in Christa Wolf's novel *Reflections about Christa T.* as a subtle and almost unworldly meditation about a young woman's rejection of life has ended less than ten years later in a series of works depicting often in harsh terms the alienation of many East Germans from socialist society and identifying as well some of the factors responsible for this state of affairs. Despite the protestations of many of the authors that their premises are basically socialist, the evolving liberalization of East German literature has nonetheless come to an end, and it is difficult to imagine how the trend could be revived.

Such a prospect is no discouragement for the literary hacks—or for those skillful craftsmen like Hermann Kant or Gunter de Bruyn, who combine style and the gift for spinning a yarn with a resolute refusal to pen anything which contradicts the party line. Nor need the poets who have turned inward for their inspiration worry about being disturbed. But those writers who are concerned about social reality will probably have to compromise their own goals with those of the regime or give up writing entirely. Their only alternative is to confuse the authorities with subtlety or parables.

And the recent exiles? What will become of them? Will they, cut off from their sources of inspiration, stop writing, too? Or will they, stimulated by both the cultural heritage which the two German states share and the similarity of many of the problems facing people in both East and West, become slowly integrated into West German literature? In the latter event, the Democratic Republic's loss would be the Federal Republic's gain.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Youth Policies in the GDR

By Stephen R. Bowers

KLAUS FRANKE and GERHARD KRAUSE. *Kommunisten und Jugend in der DDR* (Communists and Youth in the GDR). Berlin, Dietz Verlag, 1976.
ARTHUR HEARNDEN. *Education in the Two Germanies.* Boulder, CO, Westview, 1976.
HERBERT AUE. *Die Jugendkriminalitat in der DDR* (Juvenile Delinquency in the GDR). Berlin, Arno Spitz, 1976.

FEW TOPICS are more vital or controversial than that of the role of youth in society. For example, sociologist Ruth Benedict observed many years ago that the usually subordinate position of the wife in modern cultures and the emotions of jealousy arose from the desire of men to amass possessions and multiply the occasions for their display. Attitudes toward children, she explained, serve equally well as evidence of this cultural imperative, for a child is typically viewed as a special responsibility rather than an individual whose rights and tastes are respected from infancy.[1]

This "custodial" orientation toward youth has other roots as well, however. All societies are invariably concerned that their collective norms and values endure the succession of one generation by another. And nowhere is this concern stronger than in the case of a revolutionary society whose leaders aspire to a fundamental transformation of public orientations and attitudes. For in the long run, attaining the goals of the revolution depends on the success which the revolutionary regime achieves in training and shaping its society's youth.

It is not surprising, then, that authorities in communist states have traditionally exercised the most careful guardianship over the upbringing of the younger generation. The Marxist-Leninist approach to youth starts with the assumption that youth are a product of society and at the same time the potential assurance that a revolutionary society will be able to realize its socialist aspirations. When a state actually begins to train its first "socialist generation," as did the German Democratic Republic (GDR) after World War II, this concern becomes particularly compelling. During such a period, it is felt, social objectives cannot be fulfilled simply by legislation alone. Law is regarded as an imperfect instrument for the shaping of society; it needs to be supplemented by other, extensive measures. The most significant device in this respect is a comprehensive "youth policy," which emerges as a composite of educational and organizational efforts designed to accomplish the party's custodial mission vis-à-vis the nation's youth.

The role of youth in communist society, however, is more often explained in ideological than sociological terms. In *Kommunisten und Jugend in der DDR,* Klaus Franke and Gerhard Krause set out the official view of East Germany's Socialist Unity Party (SED). They point to an "increasing ideological explanation" of the role and place of youth in society, which demonstrates the important part that youth play in "the ideological class struggle of our time" (p. 7). In particular, this ideological significance demands on the part of youth the development of certain personal characteristics which are deemed vital if youth are to fulfill their present and future social responsibilities. One need is for the cultivation of a "socialist personality," a concept embracing a variety of sometimes vague qualities and including a "party-like standpoint," an internationalist attitude, a disciplined attitude toward work, socially responsible behavior, and deep knowledge. Equally important is the growth of socialist patriotism, defined as love for the socialist fatherland and a willingness to give one's life in

[1] Ruth Benedict, *Patterns of Culture,* Boston, MA, Houghton Mifflin, 1934, p. 245.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

order to strengthen the fatherland. The authors devote an entire chapter to East German youth and the socialist state community, in which they insist that their nation's youth regard their homeland as extending, geographically, beyond the territory of the GDR alone so as to encompasses the entire socialist region stretching from the Oder River through the USSR (p. 33). It is this perspective which is supposed to promote socialist patriotism, and which is encouraged through officially organized travel to other socialist countries and by participation in such projects as the Drushba-Trasse (or "Friendship" Pipeline).[2] The authors proudly contrast (p. 39) this "unity among the peoples of socialist states" with what they see as the fiction of a unity of the German nation that allegedly binds the GDR to the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG).

As a result of the successful development of these two attributes, according to the official conception, the GDR's young people identify fully with party goals and can therefore be brought directly into the administration and direction of state and society in the GDR. Franke and Krause simply elaborate this view in contending (p. 60) that there is no generational conflict in the GDR similar to that in the West and that every young East German, whether in the classroom or the lecture hall, whether on the workbench or a construction site, is struggling to develop a complete communist perspective on life.

Unfortunately, in many respects this study seems calculated to inspire incredulity. Most sections of this book are simply propaganda tracts, in the worst sense of that term, filled with clichés and unsubstantiated generalizations. *Kommunisten und Jugend in der DDR* is little more than a compendium of themes that have been conveyed in superior fashion by articles in the SED's theoretical monthly *Einheit*. This journal and the essays in the Free German Youth publication *Junge Generation* actually afford a much fuller understanding of the GDR's youth policy by providing more detailed analysis and even criticisms of specific applications of that policy.

THE SPECIFIC IMPORTANCE of education policy and the contribution it makes to the GDR's youth policy are evaluated in considerable detail by Arthur Hearnden in *Education in the Two Germanies*. Such a close analysis is necessary for an adequate appreciation of the various components of the East German regime's approach toward the younger generation. In addition, it is particularly valuable in light of the SED's increased reliance on the use of normative measures to build system support. East German educational authorities have fully recognized both the important role which education plays in political socialization and the basic connection between socialization and the defense and continued development of society. Given the commitment of the GDR, like communist states in general, to social transformation, education policy has thus become a vital concern.

The effort to transform East German society began promptly with the end of World War II and the period of Soviet occupation. Allied occupation authorities in the four zones of Germany, Hearnden observes, were well aware of the potential political value of the school, a value which the Nazi's had demonstrated earlier. However, Soviet authorities, working with the support of left-wing forces they had mobilized within their zone, were the most willing to make use of these lessons. The Western Powers, particularly the United States, did carry out programs of denazification of the teaching profession and advocated such reforms as the introduction of social studies into the curriculum, the promotion of instructional methods allowing free discussions, and the involvement of parents and pupils in the internal operation of the school. But beyond these concerns the Western allies had neither an agreed-on, clearly defined plan for reshaping German society, nor a willingness to demand an education policy that was in open contradiction to the wishes of local electorates. Soviet authorities, in contrast, were determined to realize the maximum political-social benefits available from the educational system and, in the process, to foster a "new authoritarianism." The issue of social class was an immediate and major element in the Soviet approach. According to Hearnden,

The educational system was seen as an instrument for redressing of the grievances of generations of underprivilege by ensuring that the mass of the people would no longer be educated merely to the minimum level required to enable capitalist industry to operate

[2] Work on the "Friendship" natural gas pipeline was begun in 1975. When completed, the pipeline will stretch from Orenburg to the western frontier of the USSR. In 1977, 5,000 members of the Free German Youth (FDJ) organization were working on the project. See "Tales from the Friendship Pipeline," *GDR Review* (Berlin), No. 12, 1977, p. 12. It should be noted that East Germany also benefits from such exchanges. In 1976, for example, some 3,000 youths from other East European countries helped the FDJ in its own "Student Summer" projects. See *Neues Deutschland* (Berlin), Aug. 24, 1976, p. 2.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

profitably, but rather to a point where they would themselves be capable of becoming the controlling force in society. (p. 65)

In addition to the effort to aid the proletarian class collectively through a series of compensatory measures, the SED sought to use the school as of means of mass political reeducation. Party-directed youth organizations were assigned the important task of assisting the schools by working to create the combative political atmosphere deemed most conducive to learning. The ultimate objective was to foster "new socialist men" conforming to the official model for East German youth.

While designed from the outset to produce the maximum in political-social benefits, the GDR's educational system initially reflected little emphasis on economic objectives. Consequently, the balance between economic and ideological considerations was tilted heavily in favor of the latter. Symptomatic of this situation was the effort to compensate working-class children for the past deprivations of their class by giving them special consideration in the allocation of educational benefits (Hearnden, pp. 65-67). Moreover, during the 1949-55 period, the school system was regarded primarily as an instrument of social revolution, with its fundamental task the inculcation of socialist ideology. As a result, the political and ideological reeducation of the population assumed a higher priority than the provision of skilled workers for East German industry, although the latter objective was not forsaken.

As the relatively low level of technical education among GDR industrial workers emerged in 1956-57 as an obvious economic problem, the authorities did begin to speed up development of the *Betriebsberufsschulen* (factory trade schools) as instruments for the linking of vocational education more directly with production while at the same time raising the overall standard of technical education (Hearnden, p. 108). The increased emphasis on provision of kindergartens, which enabled more women to join the labor force, also reflected a growing concern with economic goals. Still, there was no reversal of priorities. Instruction in production continued to be combined with political-ideological lessons, while the ideological justifications for education policy were stressed ahead of all others (Hearnden, p. 136).[3] Accordingly, the potential economic value that might result from the optimal utilization of the GDR's more gifted young people was not officially recognized lest this appear to be reinstitution of privilege. (Until the late 1960's the elimination of all vestiges of class privilege in educational opportunity remained a principal, ideologically-driven concern. By the 1970's, however, this objective appeared to have been largely satisfied, although the improvement of access to education in rural areas did persist as an issue.[4])

Official recognition of the need to give special attention to above-average students finally became evident in the 1960-65 period, even though changes in policy were still justified on ideological grounds. Furthermore, more sophisticated approaches to educational research, in the later 1960's, succeeded to a significant degree in drawing greater attention to more purely economic considerations (Hearnden, pp. 174-76).

THE EDUCATION-ORIENTED research examined by Hearnden has been matched during the 1970's by more general research designed to increase the party's effectiveness in molding the attitudes and personalities which the regime views as compatible with ideological and political requirements. The immediate objective of youth research now being conducted under the direction of the Bureau for Youth Affairs of the GDR Council of Ministers is the formulation of a "Marxist-Leninist theory of the development of socialist personalities." Such personalities are developed, in the view of East German specialists, as "the creative forces of the working people are . . . tapped throughout the process of the developing and perfecting of socialist democracy. . . ." The most important organizational form employed in this process is the "socialist competition," a device which "challenges and encourages the skills and knowledge, the sense of responsibility and the creative abilities of the working class."[5] East German scholars now believe that there is a direct connection between personality development and the development of productive economic potential.

[3] Even today, East German education authorities display unhappiness with the prominence of ideological concerns in education policy. In 1976, Gerhart Neuner, president of the GDR Academy of Pedagogic Sciences, complained that classroom instruction was being overloaded with ideological matters. See *IWE-Tagesdienst* (Berlin), Nov. 19, 1976, p. 4.

[4] The GDR has not been alone in this respect. For example, the quality of rural education facilities has continued to be a topic of controversy in Poland. For a summary, see *Radio Free Europe Research: Poland* (Munich), Feb. 18, 1977, pp. 1-5.

[5] Dr. Gerwin Udke and Gisela Kadershafka, "Democracy and Personality Development in Our Society," *Einheit* (Berlin), October 1976, pp. 1129-32.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

While not minimizing the role of physiological factors for an individual's accomplishments, they insist that "effectiveness in the labor process still mainly depends on psychological characteristics." [6] This view was reflected in passages of the 1974 Youth Law that spelled out the obligations of educators to aid in developing socialist personalities in young people, as well as in requirements for the promotion of socialist competitions involving youth in schools and factories.[7]

It is clear in retrospect that by the end of the 1960's, with the support of research findings, there was emerging on the part of the East German education establishment an official "awareness that the curriculum was a foremost instrument for determining the future pattern of society . . ." (Hearnden, p. 195). Accordingly, policy has since been directed toward the development of a curriculum that promotes the proper ideological convictions among the school population while at the same time ensuring the formation of a "socialist intelligentsia" composed of individuals capable of making specific functional contributions to a planned society. In this respect, a paramount consideration is that the curriculum be designed to channel students' individual interests in directions which the state views as productive in both economic and noneconomic terms (Hearnden, pp. 206-08).

On the one hand, the "class" content of the curriculum demonstrates how East German schools are expected to foster the proper ideological convictions of their students. Thus, Walter Hahn has provided a brief but illuminating overview of the content of the GDR's textbooks, in which he finds thoroughly politicized lessons not only in history and civics courses but even in such areas as geography and language instruction.[8] On the other hand, functional demands have been addressed by the introduction of carpentry in the first year of the ten-year polytechnical school program; gardening in the second year; and socialist production, production work, and technical drafting in the seventh year. In the third and fourth years courses in needle work are included in the curriculum, while in the fifth and sixth years gardening instruction is integrated into biology classes.[9] Behind all of this, obviously, is the government's concern that young people recognize and accept the party as the proper arbiter of their real interests.

An additional task of the GDR education system which Hearnden does not consider but which nevertheless constitutes an important element of the SED's custodial orientation is the development of skills that will subsequently be of use to youth in the course of their military service. The 1974 Youth Law assigns teachers the responsibility of preparing young people to, in the words of a recent *Einheit* article, "consciously fulfill their moral obligation to defend socialism."[10] Most premilitary training is integrated into the school curriculum and is implemented with the assistance of the FDJ. This training is designed to supplement the broader effort to create a new socialist man by equipping students with basic military skills and by inculcating the "proper foe image" so that young people will fulfill their "military class mission" with a greater degree of enthusiasm.

WHILE IT IS possible to describe the process and measures by which the GDR seeks to satisfy its economic demands and to inculcate socialist values, as Hearnden does so thoroughly in *Education in the Two Germanies,* it is much more difficult to evaluate the impact of the GDR's overall youth policy on the collective consciousness of its younger generation. In *Die Jugendkriminalitat in der DDR,* Herbert Aue attempts such an evaluation by examining one aspect of the behavior of young people in the GDR: their conduct in regard to the law. Specifically, Aue endeavors to penetrate the layers of verbiage of SED propagandists such as Franke and Krause and arrive at both qualitative and quantitative assessments of juvenile delinquency in the GDR. Considering the severe limitations placed on research of this type, he does a remarkable job. While he does not conclude that East German youth policy has failed absolutely, he shows that the SED has not achieved its stated objectives. In this fashion, his study questions the credibility of major tenets of official pronouncements that the GDR's young people are preoccupied with the fulfillment of the party's plans for their lives and with little else.

Using official statistics, Aue charts the drop of criminality

[6] Dr. K. H. Blueher, "Greater Effectiveness Through Conscious Action," *Die Wirtschaft* (Berlin), Dec. 2, 1976, p. 16.

[7] *Jugend Gesetz der DDR* (Youth Law of the GDR), Berlin, Staatsverlag der DDR, 1975, pp. 10-17.

[8] Walter Hahn, "Education in East and West Germany," *Studies in Comparative Communism* (Los Angeles, CA), Spring 1972, pp. 57-60.

[9] See *Education for Today and Tomorrow,* Dresden, Verlag Zeit im Bild, 1971, pp. 27-31.

[10] Gunter Böhme and Wolfgang Spitzner, "The Defense of Socialism Is a Right and a Moral Obligation," *Einheit,* May 1977, pp. 557-58.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

among the young up to the 1960's. However, he goes on to demonstrate that there was a subsequent reversal in the trend, and that the incidence of those phenomena which Westerners describe as juvenile delinquency began to increase. Apparently in response to this embarrassment, the authorities ceased publication of all crime statistics shortly thereafter (Aue, pp. 18-21). Despite the paucity of data for ensuing years, Aue still has succeeded in illuminating the configurations of the GDR's problems in this area by examining those nonquantitative studies available to Western researchers.[11] Many of his findings could accurately be applied to nonsocialist states: abuse of alcohol is a serious problem among youth, criminal recidivism is increasing, the poor and less educated are relatively more likely to be involved in crime, large towns are plagued with a more serious crime problem than are small towns, access to automobiles seems associated with delinquency, and boys are more likely candidates for trouble with the law than are girls (Aue, pp. 23-26, 41-42). In short, East German society has much in common with the FRG's society, which Aue uses as a basis for comparison.

Having examined and discounted the GDR's efforts to develop a theoretical explanation for the upsurge in delinquency (pp. 81-91), Aue then considers briefly the situation in other communist states. He concludes (pp. 226-27) that these nations, together with East Germany, are finding that change in the socioeconomic system does not immediately eliminate crime. Aue argues that any complex society, socialist or nonsocialist, is threatened by youthful as well as adult law-breaking, because crime is not simply a product of socioeconomic structure. Thus, Aue's study indicates, although he makes no explicit statement to this effect, that the SED's efforts to establish a personal code of conduct for its youth have met with less than complete success. Such a failure must be regarded as a serious deficiency in the party's performance of its custodial mission vis-à-vis the younger generation.[12]

THE MOST VISIBLE concerns in East Germany's youth policy are related to the unending effort to build support for the SED's policies by preventing a preoccupation on the citizen's part with his own private life. The central dimensions stressed in this undertaking are loyalty to the state, which receives primary emphasis, and participation in both political and economic activities. The latter, although easier to quantify given the existence of overt activity, is less vital for regime stability than the sometimes amorphous quality of loyalty. The extent to which the GDR has succeeded in effecting both participation and loyalty cannot be determined with any precision by a physically distant analyst. Until such time as East Germany opens itself to objective researchers, we will be able to evaluate the SED's performance as custodian of its younger generation only on the basis of inference from published East German accounts or the analysis of selectively released data. For now, Hearnden and Aue have given us the maximum feasible results in research on this topic.

[11] Taken together, numerous discussions in the specialized professional journals and in the regional newspapers provide a frank picture of official views of this situation. For example, see *Neue Justiz* (Berlin), *Staat und Recht* (Berlin), and *Volkswacht* (Gera).

[12] This problem is explored within a theoretical context in the author's "Alienation in Socialist Society: The East German Example," in the British journal *East-West Digest* (Richmond, Surrey), July 1977, pp. 514-21.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Biographies of Communist Leaders

By Jane P. Shapiro

HELEN FOSTER SNOW. *The Chinese Communists: Sketches and Autobiographies of the Old Guard.* Westport, CT, Greenwood Publishing Co., 1972.
GEORGES HAUPT and JEAN-JACQUES MARIE, Eds. *Makers of the Russian Revolution: Biographies of Bolshevik Leaders.* Ithaca, NY, *Cornell University Press,* 1974.
PHYLLIS AUTY. *Tito: A Biography.* New York, NY, McGraw-Hill, 1970.
RONALD HINGLEY, *Joseph Stalin: Man and Legend.* New York, NY, McGraw-Hill, 1974.
JOEL CARMICHAEL. *Trotsky: An Appreciation of his Life.* New York, NY, St. Martin's Press, 1975.
ROLF H. W. THEEN. *Lenin: Genesis and Development of a Revolutionary.* London, Quartet Books, 1974.
WILLIAM SHAWCROSS. *Crime and Compromise: Janos Kadar and the Politics of Hungary since Revolution.* New York, NY, Dutton, 1974.
DONALD CATCHLOVE. *Romania's Ceausescu.* Tunbridge Wells, Kent, Abacus Press, 1972.

A BIOGRAPHY IS often regarded both as art and as history. The prospective author is advised to carefully read and reread all of his subject's writings, to literally walk where his subject once walked, and to try to relive, however imperfectly, his subject's experiences. For the author's chief objective, declares well-known biographer Leon Edel, is, or should be, the recreation of inert material, the recapturing and rendering anew of human feelings, perceptions, and motivations.[1]

On perhaps a more mundane but more fundamental level, good biography requires adequate research. In the case of political biography in particular, such research ideally includes unrestricted access to original documents and archival materials and the opportunity to probe the memory of, if not the subject himself, then at least his family, friends, and associates, either through personal interviews or recorded memoirs. Whatever the method, any effort to reconstruct the past accurately depends on multiple, independent accounts of events and behavior that must be assessed and balanced.

While such ideal conditions seldom exist for the study of Western political figures, they are still less likely where communist leaders are the object of attention. Yet, confronted with the task of writing about past and present leaders of communist states, Western authors seem to have been either undeterred by insufficient data or improperly encouraged by their publishers to proceed without adequate documentation. Biographies of communist leaders have proliferated in recent years, despite the fact that little new material has become available and the virtual impossibility, except in the case of Josip Broz (Tito), of talking personally and in depth with the leaders themselves or with reliable informants.

All of the books reviewed here testify to the continuing Western interest in communist leaders. Two of the volumes should be considered separately, because they are not extensive biographies but, rather, short sketches based on materials first published many years ago. Much of Snow's *The Chinese Communists* is, in fact, a new edition of her 1952 work, *Red Dust*,[2] an annotated set of 24 autobiographical portraits or "spoken narratives" of a diverse group of Chinese communists, whom the author encountered during the five months that she spent in Yenan in 1937 with her husband, Edgar Snow. However, the new volume does contain additional brief biographical and autobiographical portraits which, because

[1] Leon Edel, *Literary Biography,* Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1957, p. 57.

[2] Published under the pseudonym Nym Wales, by Stanford University Press, Stanford, CA.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of their brevity, are not nearly as interesting as the reprinted sketches.

The volume by Haupt and Marie (first published in 1969 as *Les Bolchéviks par eux-mêmes*) also provides a collection of short biographical and autobiographical accounts, in this instance of 56 revolutionary and post-revolutionary Soviet communist leaders. Each was written during the mid-1920's, and most appeared in Volume 41 of the Granat encyclopedia, which carried biographies of 246 Old Bolsheviks and was published in 1927-29.[3] Following each entry, the authors append a commentary designed to provide additional background information on the particular individual and to correct "the most flagrant errors and omissions" in the original Soviet materials. The result is a useful and convenient reference work, which also offers some insight into political historiography of the early Soviet (pre-Stalin) period.

OF THE REST of the present volumes, only one—Phyllis Auty's *Tito: A Biography*—can claim much success in satisfying the research demands outlined above, and it is the only one which can be said to add significantly to our knowledge of a communist leader. The others offer either a reinterpretation of existing materials on long-dead Soviet figures or largely undocumented and basically unsuccessful attempts to explore the personal histories, characters, and political impact of the two men who today lead Hungary and Romania, respectively.

Auty, a historian who has written extensively on Yugoslavia and spent considerable periods of time there, was afforded unusual research opportunities. She had two interviews with Tito himself (the first in 1951, the second in 1968), as well as interviews with several other Yugoslav leaders who have been closely associated with him at one time or another (including Milovan Djilas and Edvard Kardelj). Additionally, she was granted access to archival material that previously was unavailable to Western historians. Still, the bulk of her narrative focuses on Tito and the Partisan struggle in the years prior to, during, and immediately after World War II; she does not concentrate on Tito's life and views in more recent years, particularly the 1960's. And, despite her special research advantages, Auty has chosen to depend heavily, as she freely acknowledges, on earlier biographical writings by Vladimir Dedijer, Konni Zilliacus, and Sir Fitzroy Maclean.

Each of the volumes on Stalin, Lenin, and Trotsky also depends heavily on prior published biographies, but all strive to reinterpret the existing data. Hingley's biography of Stalin is designed to dispel myths expounded by other biographers, namely, that Stalin was a man of mediocre intelligence and talents. "A very evil man may yet be very clever, as I hope to demonstrate," writes Hingley (p. xi). A graceful stylist, well-steeped in the Russian literary as well as historical tradition, Hingley also seeks to contrast those authenticated facts about Stalin's life both with what he calls "the Legend," created by Soviet biographers and historians writing in accord with Stalin's dictates, and with "the counter-legend" of myths created by Trotsky and adopted by many Western biographers.

While Hingley succeeds in producing a very lively, readable biography that reinterprets much of the existing material (there is no indication that he has uncovered any new sources), popular historian Joel Carmichael unfortunately does not. *Trotsky: An Appreciation of His Life* is designed to reexamine Trotsky's personality and "public performance," which, Carmichael believes, have been obscured in other biographies as the result of undue attention paid to Trotsky's political ideas and ideologies. Carmichael relies very heavily on Trotsky's own writings, particularly his autobiography, and on Deutscher's three-volume biography. He focuses on events, rather than ideology, yet in the end does not even provide a new interpretation of Trotsky's contributions to the creation of the Soviet state.

Rolf Theen, author of *Lenin: Genesis and Development of a Revolutionary*, also depends primarily on existing documentation, although with occasional efforts at psychological explanation. Theen, a historian who has written widely on Lenin and on 19th century Russian sociopolitical thought, focuses on Lenin's early years (between the ages of 19 and 20), which in general receive little attention in existing biographies. It was during these years, the author writes, that Lenin formulated his revolutionary *Weltanschauung*. The result is not an especially revealing biographical account, but it is a useful and compact volume on the evolution of Lenin's political thought.

ALTHOUGH NONE of these volumes provide much in the way of new facts, each author is careful to document the data on which he

[3] *Entsiklopedicheskiy slovar' russkogo bibliograficheskogo instituta Granat* (Encyclopedic Dictionary of the Russian Bibliographic Institute Granat), 7th ed., Moscow, 1927-1929.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

constructs his biography. Unfortunately, the same cannot be said in the case of either the Shawcross or Catchlove volumes. William Shawcross's study of Janos Kadar, communist party leader of Hungary since 1956, includes only an occasional footnote (mainly citing the Western press) and no bibliography. The author, a noted English journalist, himself laments his especially poor research opportunities. His book is a profile of modern Hungary rather than of Kadar, and it seems designed for the reader who knows little of Hungary under communist rule and who seeks an impressionistic, nonscholarly account of the country and its leader. Only the barest outline of Kadar's biography emerges, embellished with some anecdotes concerning the man. Shawcross adds little to what has already been published about Kadar elsewhere.

Donald Catchlove has assembled even less information for his biography of Romanian leader Nicolae Ceausescu. This scant volume contains no footnotes, no source documentation, and no bibliography. Further, it is so laudatory of Ceausescu and of the political system he heads—"Already he [Ceausescu] has become Nobel Peace Prize material and his speeches and writings are taken up by the United Nations as set-pieces for international behavior" (p. 10)—that it might as well have had the regime's approval as an "official" biography.

TAKEN TOGETHER these books clearly demonstrate the importance of empirical documentation for establishing a biographer's credibility, as well as for providing a basis for useful and illuminating analysis. True, biographers of communist leaders have long been hampered by well known and severe research restraints that unavoidably limit data collection and corroboration. Still, a determined biographer might have unearthed hitherto unavailable documentation and put together existing information in more insightful ways than had previous biographers.

Beyond this, however, these volumes certainly demonstrate how little we know in detail about communist leaders, living or dead, and how many difficulties confront us in trying to understand the motivations and behavior behind their adoption and implementation of important public policies. Let us hope that future biographers will be afforded the opportunity to fill some of the countless existing lacunae in our knowledge of these leaders.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Scarcity and Ideology in Chinese Economic Development

By Ramon H. Myers

ALEXANDER ECKSTEIN. *China's Economic Development: The Interplay of Scarcity and Ideology.* Ann Arbor, MI, University of Michigan Press, 1975.
BRYANT C. GARTH et al., Eds. *China's Changing Role in the World Economy.* New York, NY, Praeger, 1975.
MICHEL OKSENBERG, Ed. *China's Developmental Experience.* New York, NY, Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science, Columbia University, March 1973.
MARTHE ENGELBORGHS-BERTELS. *La Chine Rural: Des Villages Aux Communes Populaires* (Rural China: From Villages to People's Communes). Brussels, L'Université de Bruxelles, 1974.
WILLIAM BRUGGER. *Democracy and Organization in the Chinese Industrial Enterprise, 1948-1953.* Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1976.
STEPHEN ANDORS, Ed. *Workers and Workplaces in Revolutionary China.* White Plains, NY, M.E. Sharpe, 1977.
STEPHEN ANDORS. *China's Industrial Revolution.* New York, NY, Pantheon Books, 1977.
JACK CHEN. *New Earth.* Carbondale, IL, Southern Illinois University Press, 1972.

THE CHINESE HAVE long refused to publish adequate information on their economic progress and problems, and there is continuing controversy among Western specialists over the extent of progress achieved and the kinds of problems that persist.[1] Yet there does appear to be general agreement at least regarding the basic outline of economic development in the People's Republic of China (PRC) since it was established nearly three decades ago.

First, the Chinese economy expanded very rapidly after 1949. Between 1952 and 1976, gross national product (GNP) grew at an average annual rate of 6 percent, industrial production at 10 percent, and agricultural production at 2 percent, although from a per capita income base of less than US$100.[2] The 19th century's capitalist countries, late developers like Russia and Japan, and today's rapidly developing countries, in contrast, began their modern growth from much higher per capita income platforms. In addition, the Chinese economy achieved and maintained a comparatively high ratio of gross domestic capital formation to gross domestic product—between 23 and 31 percent after two decades, depending on the prices used for measurement.

Second, the fact that China has remained an overwhelmingly rural country in spite of its industrial success sets the PRC apart from even its socialist counterparts. The Chinese economy's relative sectoral shares of GNP generated by industry and agriculture have increased and decreased, respectively, while the share of national income deriving from services has remained approximately the same. However, China's overall employment structure and rural-urban population ratio seem to have changed scarcely at all (Eckstein, p. 45). In contrast, most industrializing countries have experienced steady growth in the urban share of their populations as economic development has usually resulted in substantial urbanization and rural-to-urban migration.

Third, China has made the most of relatively low levels of foreign trade and aid in building a small modern industrial complex. Until recently, Peking's foreign trade

[1] I wish to thank Robert Dernberger and, particularly, Thomas A. Metzger for their comments on earlier drafts of this essay.
[2] See Dwight H. Perkins, "Growth and Changing Structure of China's Twentieth-Century Economy," in Perkins, Ed., *China's Modern Economy in Historical Perspective,* Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 1975, pp. 140-42.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

has expanded very slowly in real terms, never amounting to more than 5 percent of GNP.[3] And except for a (relatively) small quantity of economic assistance from the Soviet Union in the 1950's, the PRC has received almost no external aid. Still, China's economic success has been due in no small part to a carefully selected assortment of industrial imports and to the Soviet aid which Peking did receive.[4]

Finally, the human costs of industrialization in the PRC seem to have been rather high when compared to the effects of industrialization elsewhere (with the notable exception of the USSR). There was enormous loss of life during the period of land reform (1949-52), as well as additional casualties in the years that followed. Estimates of the number of people that perished between installation of the regime and the winding down of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in 1969 vary widely, but some have ranged as high as 25 or even 60 million lives.[5] In addition, the regime continues to manage at great cost a system of labor camps, an archipelago invisible to foreign visitors in which, according to a Chinese government spokesman, possibly 40-45 million persons are currently undergoing "reeducation through labor."[6]

That China has remained so exceedingly rural in character, despite considerable industrialization, is probably the most striking feature of its particular developmental experience. However, the imbalance between the levels of industrial and agricultural modernization should not be viewed simply as evidence of a lack of concern with rural development on the part of Chinese leaders. In 1962 in the wake of the recession that followed collapse of the Great Leap, the state began supplying additional resources to agriculture, such as chemical fertilizers and construction materials (Oksenberg, pp. 59, 61-62). The government also encouraged the expansion of light industry in rural areas (p. 75). During the Cultural Revolution it pushed educational reform that compelled professionals to spend more time in the field and less time in their offices or laboratories (pp. 84-85). Finally, it has promoted paramedical facilities that stress preventive medicine and has managed to increase the availability of medical services to people in the countryside (pp. 113-14). In fact, the extent of recent state support for agriculture and the efforts to expand rural employment and narrow the rural-urban gap in living standards reflect state policy commitments which rarely have been matched by governments in other industrializing countries.

Yet, as the late Alexander Eckstein perceptively observed, these recent policies have not been entirely successful, because of persisting resource scarcities that have been aggravated by political interventions—the product of factional strife within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the influence of Maoist ideology. Eckstein pointed out that the party leadership was very sensitive to the country's lamentable backwardness in 1949 and sought to remedy the situation by following the Soviet economic model (Eckstein, p. 263). The government ordered the centralization of economic planning through new state organs and then used this machinery to create new capital-goods-producing enterprises in order to ease the conditions of backwardness. Revival of the economy proved relatively easy at first, but real problems appeared after 1952 when the CCP began demanding more resources for industrial expansion than the economy had the capacity to supply. Significant shortages of food, fibers, and skilled manpower quickly developed.

The economic crisis prompted factions within the CCP to offer a variety of solutions. The alternatives ranged from scaling down the pace of development, thus easing the demand for scarce inputs, to Mao's argument for more intensive mobilization of the population in order to speed up development. Mao's strategy envisioned massive campaigns to mobilize the people and reeducate them in a new work ethic and life style. Individuals were to comply with the party's will and the demands of the state and, therefore, were

[3] As David L. Denny points out, "China's total foreign trade in real terms fell sharply between 1959 and 1963 and not until 1971 did it rise to the level it had reached in the late 1950's. In 1972-74 total trade reached record levels. But in real terms it was only 30 percent or so higher than the level reached 15 years earlier." See Denny's chapter in Garth et al., pp. 164-65.

[4] In particular, Professor Robert Dernberger believes that China's foreign trade and the borrowing of technology have been much more important for China's industrial development than most specialists have thus far contended. See his essay in Allen S. Whiting and Robert F. Dernberger, *China's Future: Foreign Policy and Economic Development in the Post-Mao Era*, New York, NY, McGraw-Hill, 1977, pp. 95-96.

[5] See, for example, US Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws, *The Human Cost of Communism in China*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1971, pp. 16-17.

[6] For a Chinese official's statement that roughly 5 or 6 percent of the population is undergoing "re-education," see William Safire, "Chinese Say Purging of 'Gang of 4' Will Not Better Ties With Soviets," *The New York Times*, Mar. 25, 1977, p. A9. With a current population of more than 800 million, this would mean about 40-45 million—which is probably too low an estimate.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

expected to strive willingly for national goals rather than for personal desires or gain. The masses were to work harder and longer, limit their consumption, and participate in endless meetings in order to better absorb the party's ideology.

Such, in fact, was the essence of Mao's policy orientation throughout his life, and mass mobilization served under Mao's stewardship as one of the PRC's most central and basic policy techniques. Yet, these mass mobilization campaigns periodically strained the Chinese economy's capacity to produce enough of the goods demanded by the state. Shortages of agricultural products in turn provoked raw materials shortages for industry, often leaving food in short supply (Eckstein, pp. 72-75, 309-11). Then, popular resistance to the campaigns would stiffen and the party would retreat. Various party factions would interpret differently the extent and causes of the economic difficulties and propose their respective solutions. Factional conflicts and personal rivalries even led occasionally to conspiratorial attempts to seize power within the party. Thus, it can be argued that factional strife and the mobilization campaigns inspired by Maoist ideology have contributed to the persistence of serious resource scarcities even up to the present.

Eckstein's concept of an interplay between scarcity and ideology helps explain why Chinese economic development has been erratic, at time peculiar, and probably less successful than it might have been had another approach prevailed. On the other hand, neither the Eckstein nor the Oksenberg volume fully confronts the complementary problem of explaining China's economic success. Even accepting the proposition that resource scarcities were unnecessarily aggravated, how do we account for the fact that the PRC was able to fashion organizations which have coped with so many of the scarcities confronting the regime at its birth? In particular, did the PRC benefit from an organizational "inheritance," deriving from Chinese economic history and political culture, which has helped mitigate the effects of scarcities inherent in underdevelopment?

From this perspective, intraparty factional conflict and Maoist ideology might properly be viewed as factors inhibiting the optimal exploitation of the potentialities furnished by China's organizational heritage. In the discussion which follows, we will examine, first, the character and implications of such a heritage and, then, the consequences of ideology and party conflict for economic growth in the PRC. In our conclusion, we consider the possibility that the post-Mao era in China may witness a different developmental course than has obtained thus far, one which could facilitate a more complete utilization of China's organizational legacy. This legacy is not just a historical phenomenon. If its exploitation is vital for accelerating economic development, its study may help us to better understand the strengths and weaknesses of the various develoomental strategies pursued so far in various parts of China during the 20th century.

SEVERAL OF THE studies under review present the familiar picture of economic stagnation and general hardship for the Chinese masses as conditions worsened following the Opium War of 1840 until the communist revolution in 1949. It is usually argued that merchant monopoly power and landlord control over the rural marketed surplus discouraged new forces of production (Eckstein, p. 96).[7] Villages dependent upon handicraft production and specializing in cash crops became increasingly vulnerable to fluctuations in world demand (Engelborghs-Bertels, p. 69). New capitalist enterprises in the treaty ports, such as the South Seas Brothers Tobacco Company, exploited their work force (Andors, Ed., *Workers and Workplaces,* pp. 141-86). Finally, weak political rule by the Kuomintang (KMT) government, together with a long, costly war with Japan, contributed to further economic and social decline (Engelborghs-Bertels, p. 75).

These studies, however, neglect the findings of recent research, pointing to certain organizational features which, to a considerable extent, may explain why resource scarcities did not become serious toward the end of the imperial era —despite enormous population growth—and why rapid industrial growth could take place after 1949 despite such a low per capita income base. This organizational heritage may be defined as consisting of certain internalized norms and beliefs which made mass behavior energetic, rational, predictable, and responsive to authoritative cues; various transactional procedures which encouraged not only exchange but also utility-maximizing behavior; and, finally, institutions and organizations which facilitated, either separately or collectively, control, cooperation, and exchange.

Political culture. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the Ch'ing

[7] Eckstein asserts that "the market structure was inevitably peppered with strong monopolistic and monopsonistic tendencies" which had restrictive effects on consumers and producers alike.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

bureaucracy demonstrated great flexibility and efficiency in managing large-scale organizations such as the grain tribute system and the salt monopoly. Individual bureaucratic behavior was rooted in a moral world in which officials sought to improve both themselves and the world around them:

Trying to inject morality into a base world, Confucians simultaneously disdained and seriously dealt with law, administrative details, and economic and fiscal considerations.[8]

Although much corrupt behavior indeed existed, and although the imperial state depended on a strong disciplinary system to keep its personnel in line, officials nonetheless internalized what Thomas Metzger has perceptively described as a "probationary ethic." Many Confucian bureaucrats felt profound shame and accepted humiliating punishments, while trying to limit their corrupt practices, which, they realized, not only harmed society but also endangered their own careers and families.

Possessed of such attitudes and a sophisticated understanding of commerce and agriculture and of the links between them and the state's fiscal health, Ch'ing officials were able to carry out complex management activities in the economic field, as illustrated in the case of the salt monopoly. Thus, the economic role and success of the Ch'ing state cannot be understood without appreciating how the probationary ethic was combined with a complex variety of "ambivalent" attitudes, especially regarding the propriety of engaging in commerce, to produce widespread managerial behavior that was both energetic and flexible.[9]

Economic culture and behavior. At the grass-roots level during the Ch'ing dynasty, households continually cooperated with each other on projects of water control and village defense. Mirroring the traditional fiscal principles of the state, households often sought to distribute local tax burdens among themselves progressively. They believed these steps necessary because cooperation sometimes produced benefits that could not have been achieved through individual efforts alone.[10] Furthermore, the widespread use of customary law permitted households to exchange resources with each other to a greater extent than would otherwise have been the case in a world of great risk and uncertainty.[11]

Such behavior on the part of peasants reflected widely held attitudes that must be called economically rational, a good example of which was the extensive appreciation of the benefits stemming from long-term contracts. Many families were strongly motivated to strive even harder for social status, to accumulate wealth, and thus to maintain a distinguished family line for the generations to follow.

Institutions and organizations. The rural market system, moreover, encouraged the clustering of villages around market communities, so that households could emphasize specialized production for the market. Agriculture in imperial China seems to have been far more commercialized than it has been in many peasant societies.[12] Rural households also engaged in handicraft activities in the same market towns and even in villages as well. In the context of varying transport conditions, this rural market system was integrated into a higher order of markets; it remained unusually competitive;[13] and it adapted readily to changing demand patterns. As total population expanded to a peak of about 400-425 million in 1850, increasing numbers of families acquired some private property by entering into contracts of customary law, by participating in household cooperative arrangements, or by tak-

[8] Thomas A. Metzger, *The Internal Organization of Ch'ing Bureaucracy: Legal, Normative, and Communication Aspects*, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1973, p. 90. This masterly study is the first to set forth some of the positive characteristics of the Ch'ing bureaucracy, but it should be read in conjunction with the study by Metzger cited in footnote 15 below.

[9] Ibid., p. 265.

[10] Ramon H. Myers, "Cooperation in Traditional Agriculture and Its Implications for Team Farming in the People's Republic of China," in Dwight Perkins, Ed., op. cit., pp. 265-70; and Ramon H. Myers, "Economic Organization and Cooperation in Modern China: Irrigation Management in Xing-tai County, Ho-bei Province," in The Late Professor Yuji Muramatsu Commemoration Board, Comp., *Chugoku no seiji to Keizai* (The Polity and Economy of China), Tokyo, Toyo keizai shimposha, 1975, pp. 180-212. For a recent study of local organizations working effectively without state support, see James Hayes, "Rural Society and Economy in Late Ch'ing: A Case Study of the New Territories of Hong Kong (Kwangtung)," *Ch'ing-shih wen-t'i* (Stanford, CA), November 1976, pp. 33-71.

[11] Fu-mei Chang Chen and Ramon H. Myers, "Customary Law and the Economic Growth of China during the Ch'ing Period," *Ch'ing-shih wen-t'i*, November 1976, pp. 1-32.

[12] For documentation of this argument, see the author's "The Commercialization of Agriculture in Modern China," in W. E. Willmott, Ed., *Economic Organization in Chinese Society*, Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 1972, pp. 173-92.

[13] See the author's *The Chinese Peasant Economy: Agricultural Development in Hopei and Shantung, 1890-1949*, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1970, pp. 241-58; and Yoshida Koichi, "The Circulation of Raw Cotton in One Regional Marketing of China in the First Half of the Twentieth Century," *Shirin* (Tokyo), March 1977, pp. 171-205.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ing advantage of the marketplace.[14] At the same time, state-managed organizations like the salt monopoly also increased supply in response to the population explosion, although bureaucratic malfunctioning limited the state's fiscal flexibility as well as the burden placed on the private sector by state controls.[15] Still, the ability of the Ch'ing economy to support such a huge population cannot be explained without taking into account the positive organizational patterns described above.

This is not to argue that economic stagnation was not serious in China of the early 20th century and that abominable conditions did not persist for villager and urban worker alike, nor is it to ignore the Nanking government's failure to pursue policies which might have reduced the ills of acute backwardness. The point is rather that, given the long-standing propensity of officials to manage fiscal affairs flexibly and skillfully, the antecedents of cooperation in the villages, the existence of a market network linking rural and urban areas, and a preponderance of handicraft activity near various raw material sources, it should not be surprising that certain familiar developments after 1949 occurred as they did.

For example, the commune would seem a natural successor to the old market town with its satellite villages.[16] The formation of teams of households to farm the land in common made good sense in light of the heritage of rural cooperation and village units of control such as the *pao-chia*.[17] And the effective management of new enterprises and state organizations under communist rule may have been based partly on responsible officials' internalized values transmitted from the past. Continuities with the past should not be exaggerated, of course, but they do exist and must be considered among the possible reasons for China's striking economic progress since 1949.

If, in fact, China's organizational heritage deserves much of the credit for the PRC's economic success, the relative contribution of Mao's mobilization philosophy and techniques to economic growth perhaps needs to be reexamined. This philosophy may even be *blamed* in part for persisting resource scarcities and for the fact that the Chinese economy has not developed still further.

IN A FREE MARKET, price fluctuations reveal what goods or services are scarce. Producers observe these signals, and as prices rise, they respond by increasing supply. In a centrally planned economy, on the other hand, authorities learn about scarcities through the flow of information in official channels, and they respond in light of both their own ideological predilections and party-determined priorities. Planners may allow scarcities to continue, impose rationing, and increase taxes on incomes and profits. Or they may raise commodity prices and thereby provide an income incentive for producers to expand supply. They also may purchase new capital and technology from abroad and in this way enable producing units to increase production. Finally, authorities may physically reallocate additional resources to the units currently producing scarce goods. Whatever the case, since policy is the product of a hierarchical, administrative organization, changes in policy may occur abruptly when one or another party faction feels that certain measures are not working well enough to overcome the scarcity in question.

Since 1949, zigs and zags in party policy on economic issues have taken place when dominant party factions perceived that scarcities of one kind or another might threaten party goals. Four of the studies under review shed some light on these changes and on why they occurred. William Brugger's meticulous study of enterprise organization makes the important point that on many occasions enough party factions became sufficiently sensitive to various shortages to respond and initiate new policies.

For example, the party began to manage urban industry in 1949-50 but did not immediately insist upon drastic organizational change (Brugger, Ch. 2). Former managers remained at their posts, worker organizations did not take over managerial responsibility, and labor unions even cooperated with management. A shift in party policy first surfaced in late July 1950 when Teng Tzu-hui, member of the Central People's Government Council, suggested to

[14] Illustration of these processes can be found in the evolution of the rural economy in northeast China in the 19th and early 20th centuries, as described in Ramon H. Myers, "Socio-economic Changes in Villages of Manchuria During the Ch'ing and Republican Periods: Some Preliminary Findings," *Modern Asian Studies* (Cambridge), No. 4, 1976, pp. 591-620.

[15] Thomas A. Metzger, "The Organizational Capabilities of the Ch'ing State in the Field of Commerce: The Liang-huai Salt Monopoly, 1740-1840," in W. E. Willmott, Ed., op. cit., pp. 9-47.

[16] G. William Skinner, "Marketing and Social Structure in Rural China," *The Journal of Asian Studies* (Ann Arbor, MI), May 1965, pp. 363-99.

[17] See Ramon H. Myers, "Cooperation in Traditional Agriculture and Its Implications for Team Farming in the People's Republic of China," pp. 262-63.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

government officials, enterprise managers, and union leaders that the unions had been confusing their functions with those of management (Brugger, p. 100). Teng's speech apparently was sparked by intraparty debate on the question of how long to continue union and managerial practices which were perceived as preventing a rapid increase in industrial production. The party began mobilizing workers to campaign for the selection of new union leaders who would attack management for alleged graft, waste, and bureaucratism.

This phase of violent attack on management lasted only a year or so. In 1953, the party tried to institute the vertical system of management control which Kao Kang had earlier established for urban industry in the Northeast. As time passed, the Soviet-style one-man management structure caused a proliferation of personnel at the middle ranks of factory organization, which further separated managers at the top from personnel at the bottom and promoted confusion and inefficiency. By 1958, the dominant party factions had concluded that this organization model was working poorly—a result which, in Brugger's view, was due to the shortage of skilled, experienced personnel needed to carry out the tasks which managers delegated to them (p. 253). Although the leading party factions did not express their dissatisfaction with the one-man management model in exactly this way, new policies enacted during the Great Leap provided that factories should establish special training programs for students and encouraged workers to educate and train themselves, in both cases with the aim of increasing the supply of skilled middle-level management personnel (p. 256; and see Andors, *China's Industrial Revolution,* p. 84).

The volume of essays translated from the Chinese and edited by Stephen Andors, and the same author's *China's Industrial Revolution* take the history of industrial management through the late 1960's and early 1970's. Between 1966 and 1968, during the Cultural Revolution, Mao's faction sought to mobilize industrial workers to criticize "old administrative regulations" in modern industrial enterprises and eliminate those "irrational regulations seriously hampering the socialist initiative of the masses" *(Workers and Workplaces,* pp. 342-43). Behind this rhetoric lay the following Maoist logic:

Although industrial enterprises were controlled by the state, managers were still able to use wages and informal coercion to induce and elicit greater effort and compliance from workers. But such methods helped to perpetuate bad attitudes. On the one hand, workers became concerned with only their money wages and ceased to care about the national goal of increasing production. On the other hand, managers, caught up in bureaucratic regulations and red tape and fearful of losing their jobs, scorned and dismissed suggestions from workers for the improvement of production. In other words, managerial dependence on wage incentives resulted in the isolation of managers from the realities of production, the restriction of labor productivity, and a consequent retardation in industrial growth.

To solve this dilemma, Maoist prescriptions called for the creation of management committees consisting of managers, cadres, and workers. These new committees were to devise new working procedures and in the process promote new work styles and a higher level of moral enthusiasm (*Workers and Workplaces,* pp. 272-78). In effect, then, the campaigns of the Cultural Revolution broadened participation in management and established new working rules as an approach to increasing output and eliminating key resource scarcities, although we should not in this connection reduce Maoist thought to a simple focus on the problem of economic scarcity.

However, such a scheme raised some important practical questions. How were committees to operate, and what were the new rules that would increase industrial production more rapidly than in the recent past? On these matters the Chinese writings in the volume edited by Andors offer only some vague guidelines. First, factory committees were supposed to "consult" workers when difficult problems arose (p. 368). But how difficult did the problem have to be, and how frequently should consultation take place? Must management accept the suggestions by workers on technical matters? And how were disagreements between workers and engineers over technical matters to be resolved? Did administration have to be simple? How were workers or the foreman in one section of a factory to become familiar with the complex operations elsewhere in order to judge whether the administrative lines were properly drawn? Second, accounting should be accurate and should often consider the *use* value of a good instead of just its exchange value (p. 361). But who was to check accounting accuracy if not the accountants, and which accounting principles should be used to determine the valuation of different goods and their mar-

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

gins of profit? To be sure, PRC leaders, in line with the principle of *yin-ti chih-i* (devise procedures appropriate to locally peculiar circumstances), clearly anticipated that local groups would generate detailed rules and norms to flesh out the centrally enacted laws; however, it is far from clear that the creativity of local groups can solve management problems better than more centralized methods.

The Andors monograph on industrial management describes how factories adopted revolutionary committees in the late 1960's, but because of a lack of information, it does not document how this new management structure influenced production. Information now filtering out of China suggests that during 1975-77, a virtual mini-civil-war raged in many provincial factories after factions of workers attacked managers, and that these violent struggles forced many plants to shut their doors.[18] Moreover, the revolutionary committees have doubtless undermined the morale of workers and managers alike. Finally, the formation of the revolutionary committees shifted many cadres from factories into local government and many workers into managerial functions in the factories (*China's Industrial Revolution,* p. 213), but it does not seem to have altered the wage structure (pp. 218-21). As factories return to normalcy, the critical question of the method of future factory management remains open: will factories be run by revolutionary committees or by some hierarchy of experienced managers? [19]

EVEN IF MAOIST policy has been partly responsible for the considerable degree of success in the industrial sector—especially in machine tools, iron, and steel—its appropriateness for the agricultural sector remains in doubt. Since 1949, the growth of agricultural production has barely matched population growth, and the slight improvement of performance in the late 1960's and early 1970's does not guarantee that the annual growth rate of farm output will continue to exceed population growth on a sustained basis. Yet, a rate of agricultural growth outpacing population expansion has characterized the majority of developed countries and even the densely populated industrializing societies of prewar Japan and postwar Taiwan.[20]

Nor has a regime illegitimate in the eyes of most Chinese prevented comparable agricultural growth rates from being realized in parts of China itself during the present century. For example, between 1920-21 and 1935-37, population increased at an annual rate of 5.7 percent on the Japanese-controlled Liaotung Peninsula in northeast China, a remarkable rate due in part to immigration from North China. Yet, grain production there expanded at a rate of 6.2 percent a year over the same period.[21] The province of Taiwan experienced similar agricultural success while under Japanese rule before World War II. During the periods 1910-20 and 1921-37, Taiwan's population increased at annual rates of 1.0 and 2.3 percent respectively, while total farm production in comparison expanded at annual rates of 1.6 and 4.4 percent.[22] Thus, in two Chinese regions controlled by a foreign power per capita grain output increased, whereas elsewhere in China during the same years farm production either declined or stagnated.

Admittedly, the Japanese administrations of Liaotung and Taiwan enforced discriminatory economic policies that favored Japanese businessmen and that worked to the great disadvantage of the wealthier, urbanized Chinese. Yet, the Japanese meddled far less in the countryside, at least in terms of organization and management. However, they did codify rural property rights and simplify the levying and collecting of the land tax. They also improved the transportation and marketing systems and expanded irrigation facilities. And they supplied public health facilities, promoted primary education along with training in industrial arts, and made available to farmers modern farm technologies such as high-yield

[18] Ross H. Munro, "Chaos in a Chinese Factory," *The Christian Science Monitor* (Boston, MA), June 7, 1977, p. 34.

[19] Reports from China in early March 1978 strongly suggest that the management committees are to be discarded and a new management hierarchy created. See *The Washington Post,* Mar. 7, 1978, p. A12; and *The New York Times,* Mar. 7, 1978, p. 2.

[20] During 1867-1937 agricultural output in Japan expanded at roughly 1.8 percent per annum, compared to an annual population growth rate of 1.0 percent. Between 1950-52 and 1972-74, Taiwan's farm production grew at 4.7 percent per annum, compared to an annual population growth rate of 3.0 percent. Estimates of the growth in farm production are based on 1971 price weights. See Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan, The Republic of China, *Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of China, 1975,* Taipei, 1976, p. 80.

[21] These calculations are based on a study by Ramon H. Myers and Thomas R. Ulie, "Foreign Influence and Agricultural Development in Northeast China: A Case Study of the Liaotung Peninsula, 1902-46," *The Journal of Asian Studies,* February 1972, p. 340.

[22] See Ramon H. Myers, "The Economic Development of Taiwan," in Hungdah Chiu, Ed., *China and the Question of Taiwan: Documents and Analysis,* New York, NY, Praeger, 1973, p. 38.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

seeds and new fertilizers. As the Japanese established rural peace and order and increased the supply of modern services, the Chinese prospered and delivered more produce to the market. Furthermore, a similar picture can be drawn with respect to KMT agricultural policies in post-1949 Taiwan.

Comparisons of agricultural performance in KMT Taiwan, Japanese Taiwan, Japanese Liaotung, and the PRC demonstrate that in 20th-century China the problem of agricultural development has been tackled with a variety of strategies, all of which have been successful to some extent. But the PRC's policies appear to have been less successful than those of the others. This suggests that, at the very least, the story of modern China's agricultural success is not simply that of the communist victory. On the contrary, this success should perhaps be seen in terms of organizational capacities present in each of the cases we have compared, capacities which derive from China's traditional organizational heritage. Moreover, having recognized that agricultural growth in the PRC has been less rapid than in the other three cases, we need to ask whether Japanese and KMT policies were not more successful *precisely because* they allowed Chinese farmers and middlemen to better utilize their own cultural heritage of organizational habits. The contrary theory—that Maoist collectivization, in liberating the Chinese peasant from the trammels of tradition and imperialism, awakened previously dormant productive forces and therefore is responsible for the upsurge in agricultural growth in the PRC—may be less tenable.

To be sure, it seems clear that in 1949 only the communists were able to bring to the mainland the peace and order needed as a prerequisite for agricultural development. This political achievement, however, should not be confused with the question of the effects of collectivization per se. In this respect, Jack Chen's panegyric about cooperativization is euphoric indeed. The veracity of his narrative about cooperativization in Hsinteng County, Chekiang Province, is questionable on several counts. First, his judgments must be evaluated within the context of countrywide developments in agriculture over the previous quarter of a century. Thus, the assertion that Hsinteng County was one of the poorest of Chekiang's 81 counties is simply not true. In the early 1930's, the average annual wheat yield in Hsinteng *exceeded* that of the province as a whole, while the averaging rice yield was only slightly below that for the province.[23]

In *New Earth* we also find the familiar claim that because the wealthy exploited the peasants and stifled production, only land reform and the creation of mutual aid teams could free productive energies. According to Chen (p. 60), by the spring of 1951 mutual aid team members themselves wanted to form cooperatives, and for this reason county cadres "felt it wise to encourage the next step forward." Chen implies that the "next step" was delayed only because cadres did not recognize the desires of the enlightened peasants. This conclusion, however, is neither substantiated by the author nor borne out by the available facts. In December 1951 the *Chekiang Jih-pao* could only record that in 40 out of Chekiang's 81 counties, 21.8 percent of the villages had developed mutual aid teams,[24] and this statement failed to make clear whether these teams enjoyed the support of their households. Moreover, in other southern provinces such as Hunan and Kiangsi, officials reported the formation of even fewer mutual aid teams.[25] Even by early 1952, probably only one out of five households in China had joined mutual aid teams, and in this respect the South generally lagged behind the North. Chen's assertion that the majority of farmers were eager to join cooperatives in 1951 therefore seems a dubious one indeed.

Some of Chen's own evidence reveals the difficulties which party cadres encountered during the cooperativization campaign. In 1953, according to Chen, many farm families, characterized throughout the book as "rich peasants," opposed the system of allocating cooperative farm proceeds whereby income was divided more on the basis of a family's labor input than on the basis of its original land contribution. Chen notes that many of these families hoarded grain, bribed mutual aid team leaders, and created phantom organizations to buy goods from the state for resale (at a profit) to the peasants (pp. 70-71).

[23] Nor was Hsinteng significantly different from the province as a whole in terms of its labor/land ratio or the percentage of arable land that was irrigated. These prewar data were obtained from Toa kenkyujo, *Shina nogyo kiso tokei shiryo* (Basic Statistical Materials on Chinese Agriculture), Tokyo, Toa kenkyujo, 1940, Vol. 1, p. 55.

[24] Chung-kuo nung-yeh sheng-ch'an ho-tso tzu-liao hui-pien, Comp., *Kuo-min ching-chi hui-fu shih-ch'i nung-yeh sheng-ch'an ho-tso tzu-liao hui-pien* (Compiled Materials on Agricultural Producer Cooperatives during the Period of Recovery of the National Economy), Peking, K'o-hsüeh ch'u-pan-she, 1957, Vol. 2, p. 859.

[25] Ibid., p. 907.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Such sabotage was widespread. In 1956, some peasants even slaughtered their livestock and refused to join cooperatives.[26] In the face of such resistance, the party retreated. Cadres returned some livestock to their former owners, allowed production teams to rent land to other households, and reinstated veteran farmers as managers of production teams.[27] However, these concessions were short-lived, because late in the summer of 1958, the party ordered that village organizations be militarized: communes were to be created and large brigades directed to work on capital projects.[28]

Chen admits that cooperativization alone did not raise crop yields in Hsinteng County. As he reports (p. 237), only in 1955 did farmers begin receiving new rice seeds. Crop yields at the time were just slightly above those of the 1930's—around 400-500 catties per mow, or 3,000-3,750 kgs. per hectare—but later these more than doubled when early-maturing seeds were introduced, thus permitting the growth of two rice crops a year. However, Chen makes no reference to the rice seed research carried out in Chekiang during the 1930's, which probably contributed to the development of these early-maturing, high-yield seeds. Instead, he claims (pp. 238-39) that only the cooperatives could make the required financial investment and mobilize enough labor to expand irrigation, prepare the soil, and supply more fertilizer.

Chen's argument implies that the family farming system could not have used these new seeds as efficiently as did cooperatives. Yet family farms elsewhere had done so years before. In Taiwan, where rice farming conditions are similar to those in Chekiang, family farms in the late 1920's quickly adopted the new *ponlai* rice seed introduced by Japanese rice seed breeders, and rice yields rapidly increased for both the first and the second rice crop.[29] Since the PRC case demonstrates the crucial role of seed technology in raising crop yields, while the Taiwan case demonstrates the ease with which family farms could adopt the improved rice seeds, the contribution of cooperativization per se to the expansion of agricultural production in the PRC is not obvious. The very existence of such a contribution certainly is not demonstrated by Chen's study.

Generally speaking, therefore, a major shortcoming of all the studies reviewed here is their failure to examine the extent to which party policies were related to China's organizational heritage and to compare the utilization of this heritage in the PRC with that under noncommunist regimes governing various parts of China in the same century. Several essays in the Oksenberg volume make a point of stressing how distinctive PRC rural policies have been, but this distinctiveness is not judged within the context of all the organizational elements involved. The Eckstein collection of essays and the studies of enterprise management by Brugger and Andors show clearly how economic development has been enormously influenced by policy changes and Maoist ideology. Still, Maoist policies have constituted only one organizational input into the matrix of factors determining economic growth. Among the others has been the heritage of traditional organizational habits. Moreover, in any assessment of likely future patterns of economic development in the PRC, the particular relationship between scarcity and all of these organizational factors must occupy a central place. It may be that further economic growth in China will depend increasingly on the Chinese government's ability to take advantage of those potentialities offered by China's organizational heritage.

AT THIS POINT, perhaps, we might usefully draw a distinction between *transformative* and *accommodative* economic policies. Both kinds confront the problem of scarcity with concern for what and how much is produced, the time horizon to be used in choosing among investment alternatives, and the desired distribution of income. Transformative policies attack the problem of scarcity through sudden, radical organization changes and with mobilization tactics emphasizing normative and coercive rather than remunerative sanctions. Such policies are animated by a voluntaristic faith that the status quo is malleable and can be vastly altered. In the case of accommodative policies, on the

[26] Kenneth R. Walker, *Planning in Chinese Agriculture*, Chicago, IL, Aldine, 1965, pp. 64-67.

[27] Kenneth R. Walker, "Organization of Agricultural Production," in Alexander Eckstein et al., Eds., *Economic Trends in Communist China*, Chicago, IL, Aldine, 1968, pp. 425-31.

[28] Union Research Institute, *Documents of Chinese Communist Party Central Committee: September 1956-April 1969*, Hong Kong, 1971, Vol. 1, p. 300. As is well known, agrarian difficulties increased between 1958 and 1961. It appears that at certain times farmers even deliberately withheld produce from the market. For evidence of this in Hunan Province, see Michel Oksenberg and Sai-cheung Yeung, "Hua Kuo-feng's Pre-Cultural Revolution Hunan Years, 1949-66: The Making of a Political Generalist," *The China Quarterly* (London), March 1977, p. 41.

[29] Ramon H. Myers, "Taiwan's Agrarian Economy Under Japanese Rule," *Journal of the Institute of the Chinese University of Hong Kong* (Hong Kong), No. 2, 1974, pp. 461-67.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

other hand, human conditions are perceived as not very tractable. Accommodative policies meet the problem of scarcity more gradualistically; they stress remunerative sanctions such as material incentives.

Some of the books under review describe both kinds of policies. J. B. R. Whitney's essay in *China's Developmental Experience* (pp. 96-98) shows that historically the Chinese gradually modified their environment through hillside terracing, irrigation and flood-control systems, and certain dredging techniques. However, Maoist policy, placing politics "in command," aimed at the transformation of the physical environment through campaigns to irrigate dry land areas, build shelterbelts and reforest the land, extend farming to upland areas, and more completely utilize waste products.

In the same volume, C. H. G. Oldham reports (Oksenberg, pp. 85-86) that of the 2.4 million scientists and engineers in the PRC in 1967, a substantial majority had been trained prior to 1949 or had been promoted into technical positions without the benefit of full-time training. Yet fully 670,000 of these technical personnel had received their training since 1949 in institutions of full-time higher education. However, mass campaigns unleashed by the Cultural Revolution asserted the primacy of political training and qualifications in regard to the recruitment and promotion of technical cadres, and as a result the quality of technical education worsened appreciably. Now it appears that a swing back to a stress on formal education for training skilled manpower has recently begun.

Transformative policies, nonetheless, have been the hallmark of Maoist ideology and policy prescriptions. Yet it may be that such policies are becoming increasingly less attractive as solutions to the PRC's current economic dilemmas. Possible evidence of this emerged during 1972-73—a period in which Chou En-lai's influence was on the rise—when China began to look more toward foreign trade as an alternative source of scarce production inputs. Thus, between January 1972 and May 1974, Peking contracted to buy from abroad 30 units of chemical fertilizer plants at a cost of $US492 million (Garth et al., p. 29). The Chinese also purchased iron and steel and power-generating plants, valued at $815 million. In order to finance some of these imports, China in 1973 became a net exporter of energy for the first time, by delivering one million metric tons of crude oil to Japan (Garth et al., p. 119).

Although trade between the PRC and the US declined in 1975-76, owing possibly to the internal disruption following Chou's death and the temporary resurgence of the radical left faction, it may well revive. In May 1977, Chinese and US representatives began negotiations on the issue of US private claims against the PRC and the latter's blocked assets in the US. As David G. Luther points out (Garth et al., p. 213), an agreement might easily be reached, based on a lump sum settlement, which could clear the way for greater trade between the two countries.

Additional imports should provide some of the advanced technology which the Chinese economy needs to overcome various commodity scarcities, a different course than the one stressed by Mao and his supporters. Yet such trade may in turn promote still greater complexity and interdependence among sectors in the PRC economy and, in the process, create the need for further technological assistance. For example, the chemical fertilizer industry will require an improved transportation network to distribute that industry's increased output. Thus, it may be argued in more general terms that modern technology develops its own imperatives, which can become sufficiently strong to shape ideology itself. In this connection, some CCP leaders and factions may well come to see greater promise in more accommodative economic policies and, thereupon, may break with the transformative thinking and inclinations long associated with Mao and his followers. If this happens, a very different relationship between scarcity and ideology may evolve in the PRC in the future.

The nature of the economic policies that will finally emerge from the continuing struggle and confusion of the succession to Mao are by no means clear. Throughout 1975-76, factional conflict raged within the party. Especially during the late spring and summer of 1976, the radicals seemed to have the upper hand, stressing the importance of perpetuating the class struggle while castigating Teng Hsiao-p'ing and his adherents for arguing the priority of modernization. In contrast, a recent statement by Party Chairman Hua Kuo-feng emphasizes the importance of modernizing the economy and of giving production high priority.[30]

There is the possibility that a

[30] For the most recent and most elaborate theoretical statement by Hua Kuo-feng on developments in China over the past quarter century in which such sentiments are expressed, see Hua Kuo-feng, "Continue the Revolution Under the Dictatorship of the Proletariat to the End," *Hsinhua Weekly* (Peking), May 7, 1977, p. 15.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

powerful, charismatic successor to Mao will be able to silence intraparty debate and initiate once again a transformative economic course, relying on mass campaigns for instilling in the Chinese masses new beliefs and values. It seems more likely, however, that Mao's successor will prefer, or may even be restricted to, more accommodative policies providing for the gradual adoption of modern technologies. This would mean that while some technologies would be developed at home, others would be acquired through foreign trade and the dispatching of scientists for study abroad. Flexible, pragmatic economic planning, presupposing steady, incremental change, appears to this reviewer at least as the most probable economic strategy over the near-to-medium term.

It also seems to this reviewer that such an accommodative course should allow the Chinese people greater opportunity to take advantage of their organizational heritage, in more creative and efficient fashion than in the recent past. As a result, China's pattern of economic modernization should continue to differ basically from that experienced by most other industrializing nations.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Problems of Communism

REPRINTS, MICROFILM, REPRODUCTION

A variety of services ranging from reprints, through microfilm and microcard editions, to reproduction of individual issues or articles are commercially available. Those firms which offer one or more such services and which have come to the editors' attention are, in alphabetical order:

J. S. Canner & Co.
49-65 Landsdowne Street
Boston, Massachusetts 02215

Infordata International, Inc.
175 Delaware Place
Chicago, Illinois 60611

Johnson Reprint Corporation
111 Fifth Avenue
New York, New York 10003

Pergamon Press, Inc.
Fairview Park
Elmsford, New York 10523

University Microfilms
300 Zeeb Road
Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106

Annual indices for Volumes IV-to-date appear in the November-December issue (No. 6) for each year. A combined index to the first three volumes is contained in Vol. III, No. 6 (November-December 1954).

ORDER FORM FOR PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM

CURRENT PRICES. Annual subscriptions, US mailing address: $9.35 each. Single copies, US mailing address: $1.60 each. Annual subscriptions addressed outside the US: $11.70. Single copies addressed outside the US: $2.00 each. A 25% discount is allowed on orders of 100 or more subscriptions or copies mailed to a single address. For further information, see front inside cover.

ENCLOSE CHECK OR MONEY ORDER, payable to the Superintendent of Documents, USGPO. Mail to: Superintendent of Documents, US Government Printing Office, Washington, DC. 20402 (USA).

Publication: **PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM**
To be mailed to:
(Please print or type. Include zip code for US addresses.)

NAME _____

ADDRESS: _____

_____

_____

_____

ORDER: Annual subscription(s) of six bimonthly issues _____ How many _____

Single issue(s) designated by date _____ How many each _____
(Enclose separate sheet if more space is required.)

I enclose payment of _____ by check ☐ or money order ☐ payable to SUPERINTENDENT OF DOCUMENTS, USGPO.

[FOR USE OF SUPT. OF DOCS. Entered _____ Begins _____ Expires _____]

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED